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On the )JY ashington end of a transatlantic 
radio hookup, Henry Owen (foreground) and 
Philip Trezise inten1 iew Belgian Pt·ime Minis-
ter Leo Tindemans in Bmssels. 
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TINDEMJINS 
REPORT 
HENRY OWEN, PHILIP TREZISE,_  and 
CHARLES WHEELER interview the author 
The long-anticipated Tindemans report on  European  U n-
ion is  provoking discussion  on  both sides of the Atlantic. 
The following interview with the report's author, Belgian 
Prime Minister Leo  Tindemans,  gives a glimpse of what 
the report is,  and of its implications for  both Europe and 
the  United  States.  The  transcribed  and  edited  interview 
comes from  the Washington-based National Public Radio 
(NPR),  broadcast  on  .i\1arch  2,  after  an  unprecedented 
transatlantic radio hook-up. Moderating the interview from 
Washington was  Henry Owen, director of foreign  policy 
studies at the Brookings Institution, former deputy to  the 
Under Secretary of State  for  Political Affairs, and former 
chairman of the Policy Planning Committee. Also partici-
pating on the Washington end was Philip  Trezise,  senior 
fellow at Brookings, former US Ambassador to the Orga-
nization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development 
( OECD  ) ,  and former  Assistant Secretary  of State  for  Eco-
nomic  Affairs.  The  British  Broadcasting  Corporation's 
(BBC)  chief  European  correspondent,  Charles  Wheeler, 
was with the Prime .iVfinister in the EC' s Brussels studio. 
Owen:  Would you  sumnzarize  the  main  thrust  of your 
report, its general philosophy, and particularly, its implica-
tions for the future of European unity? 
Tindemans:  My  fellow  heads  of government  asked  me 
at the summit conference held in Paris in December 1974 
to  write a report on European Union, to  define it.  Gener-
ally  speaking,  I  may  say  that  in  the  Fifties  we  always 
spoke  of  the  Community,  or  the  Communities  in  the 
plural. In the Sixties we spoke of political union, and since 
1972 we  used  the expression "European Union,"  but no-
body knows  exactly what it means.  So  they  asked  me  to 
make a report and to define  European Union. 
I speak of the proper identity of Europe;  how can we 
reinforce  that identity?  My  conclusion  is  that  we  must 
speak with one voice in some big problems of world poli-
tics.  That is  the best means to  have out own identity. We 
must improve  the situation of the  citizens  in  Europe  be-
cause we are making Europe for people, not for the insti-
tutions. Then I develop some ideas in the field  of a com-
mon  economic  and monetary  policy.  In  1972  at another 
summit conference it was decided to create economic and 
monetary  union.  But  the  devaluation  of  the  dollar,  the 
floating  of  currencies,  and  all  the  difficulties  we  have 
known since  1972 have had an influence-an influence so 
big  that for  the  moment,  even  with  the  worldwide  eco-
nomic  recession,  it  is  still  impossible  to  have  a  conver-
gence  of  economic  policies,  of  budgetary  policies,  not-
withstanding inflation, unemployment, and so on. 
So,  I develop a new approach to that problem in my  re-
port, and say  that since the EC  currency "snake" now ex-
ists, we must put it in the framework of the Community. 
The snake can be  the basis of a future common economic 
and monetary policy.  At the same time,  we must develop 
the  other policies  that  necessarily  must  accompany  such 
a policy;  that means regional policy,  social policy,  and so 
on.  And then  I  make proposals  in  the field  of the insti-
tutions. How can we improve the working of the existing 
institutions? And what will  we  do  with  a thing like  the 
summit  meeting  called  "European  Council ?"  How  can 
we improve the working of the Council  of Ministers,  of 
the Commission, the position of the Commission president, 
and what will we do with the European Parliament? 
Based  upon  the existing  treaties,  the  Treaty  of Rome 
and the Treaty of Paris, we must now reach a qualitative 
change  in  Europe.  My  proposals  should  be  taken  as  a 
whole. If they are accepted in themselves with what exists 
and  what will  be,  that will  mean  European  Union.  It's 
not a final phase of European evolution. It's impossible for 
the moment to define that final phase. I don't want to start 
a  new  theological  war,  for  instance  between  federalists 
and those  who  want a  European  confederation  or  those 
who are speaking of the functional Europe. I  accept,  and 
I  think I make proposals  to  strengthen,  the  basic  philos-
ophy of the Treaty of Rome. That in  a nutshell  is  what 
you can read in my report. 
Also,  I  think  that it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  define 
clearly  the  relationship  between  the  United  States  and 
Europe.  You remember  that in  1962  President Kennedy 
spoke of equal partnership between the United States and 
Europe.  But  since  Europe  didn't develop  in  such  a  way 
that it could act as  an equal partner, we  lost every  sense 
of  relationship  between  the  United  States  and  Europe. 
We had some  difficulties-remember the  "chicken  war," 
monetary problems, and other things-and now and then 
it was a rather sharp situation between the United States 
and Europe,  although we  remained partners, for instance 
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But our relationship is  so  special  that I  think that it ab-
solutely necessary to define these relations, and I propose 
to  send  a  special  envoy,  a  delegate of Europe,  for  talks 
with the President of the United States,  and to prepare a 
new definition of that relationship. 
Trezise:  One  should  begin-!  believe  every  American 
should begin-by saying to his European friends that de-
spite  the concerns  that are often expressed  among Euro-
pean intellectuals and political leaders, there is  no feature 
of American foreign policy that's more formally founded 
in conviction, and in belief in the American interest, than 
the relationship with Western Europe.  And belief in  the 
desirability  of  European  Union  is  strongly  held,  I  be-
lieve, in almost all circles of American opinion. This goes 
back,  as  you know,  to World War II,  to our strong view 
that  steps  must be  taken  to  end the internal  rivalries  in 
Western Europe which  led  to  two  wars  and then  which 
were  reinforced  by  the  appearance in  the  East of a  po-
tentially aggressive power, militarily and politically. 
Now, at the popular level in the United States, it would 
be  too much,  of course,  to  say  that European Union is  a 
matter that is  crucially·  attended to,  because it  is  not.  In-
deed, in this year when we are having a national election, 
preoccupation  with  domestic  affairs  will  be  overriding, 
and Europe and other aspects  of our foreign  affairs  will 
get relatively less attention. Nonetheless, I would say  that 
if  you  tested  American  opinion,  you  would  find  most 
Americans saying the Europeans are not really getting on 
with it, why don't they go ahead and achieve union. There's 
a tendency here, of course, to draw a lesson from our own 
experience,  tending to forget that it took us  7 5 years and 
a civil war to achieve a full federal union. The American 
body politic, I  believe,  is  disposed to say,  well, the West 
Europeans ought to follow us  and ought to finish  up and 
get West European Union in place. 
Now at the official  level and in the private community 
among the  better informed people,  I  believe  the attach-
ment to  the goal of European Union is  just as  strong as 
ever. There have been misgivings, as  Mr. Tindemans sug-
gested,  about  agricultural  policy,  sometimes  about  the 
Community's  commercial  policy  when  it appears  to  dis-
criminate  against our trade,  but I  think the general view 
is  that these matters can either be negotiated or that time 
will  mitigate  their  implications  for  us.  Furthermore,  I 
think  there's  a  good  deal  more  realism  here  now  than 
there was 10 years ago about the pace, the likely pace., and 
the consequences of European Union, a less naive approach, 
a more hard-headed recognition that Europe once unified 
will be a  separate entity not following the United States 
in  all  respects.  But,  of  course,  with  all  that,  as  union 
progresses, there will be particular areas, particular issues 
that will  cause  misgivings  and trouble,  no doubt,  in  our 
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relationship. And those will probably fall in the areas of 
defense  policy,  European  foreign  policy,  and  economic 
and monetary policy. 
Owen: What is the reaction in Europe to the general thrust 
of the Prime Minister' J report, in the prospect that it holds 
out for European unity? 
Wheeler: The reaction was very mixed at the beginning. 
It really depends whom you  talk to,  whom you  listen to. 
The theologians  in  the Community,  that is  many of the 
people who actually work in Brussels at the EC Commission 
headquarters, did find it, on first reading, an overcautious 
document, and I think many of Mr. Tindemans' country-
men did.  They were expecting something quite different; 
many of them  were expecting  a  blueprint  for  European 
Union. 
Mr.  Trezise  just  now  talked  about  an  assumption  in 
America, a feeling in America, that Europeans aren't mov-
ing fast enough toward European Union. I  think one has 
to accept that not all Europeans want European Union at 
all. Certainly, many people in  Britain say they don't want 
it;  they  may  come  to want it in  SO  years,  but they  don't 
now.  So  that people of that kind,  people who are suspi-
cious  of  a  federal  solution,  people  with  strong  feelings 
about their own national sovereignty,  particularly people 
in  the countries that have only recently become  members 
of the Community,  praise Mr.  Tindemans'  report for  its 
realism,  that he didn't sit  down  and  do  a  blueprint for 
something called European Union. Some even went so far 
as  to suggest that the title of this report was, in fact, mis-
leading, that what he was really writing about was Euro-
pean unity, which was something different. 
It's a  very  useful  contribution  to  debate.  But  the  idea 
that's got across is  that European Union as  an institution, 
as a sort of political entity, as a development, is something 
so  far off that we really don't need to start worrying about 
it yet and that what Mr. Tindemans has really done is  to 
produce a  series  of recommendations  for  making Europe 
more united and making the European Community work 
better,  for more efficient coordination of its various poli-
cies. 
Owen: Let's proceed directly to  the  substance  of that de-
bate, and start with an  area which is  of pat'ticular concern 
to Americans, the field of defense policy, of security policy. 
Tindemans: Defense for Europe is a very difficult subject. 
You know the struggle and the difficulties you had, for in-
stance, with a country like France, France being a member 
of the  Atlantic alliance but not being  a  member of the 
military  organization.  Ireland  is  neutral,  and  the  seven 
other EC member states are members of NATO. I say in my 
report that defense policy is  an essential element of com-Uniforms of theN  ATO pc~rtner.r. fflf/  hen I make proposals in my 
report abo11t t1  better Em·operm semrity policy, I do it in order to 
strengthen the E11ropean pillar of the Atlrmtic defeme system," says 
Tindemans.  German  Defense  Ministry Information Photo. 
plete European Union.  But  the  difficulties  in  Europe are 
so great and the differences in  judgment about defense are 
so  great that it  is  unthinkable  for  the  moment  to  make 
proposals in that field.  But-and this is  my personal, very 
strong opinion-we must have the courage to  have a  de-
bate, a regular debate, about security problems, the secur-
ity of Europe. For instance, at the Helsinki Conference on 
Security  and Cooperation  in  Europe,  the  European Com-
munity spoke with one voice.  But it is  impossible to speak 
on  other  big  problems  of  international  policy  with  one 
voice  if we  haven't the  courage  to  examine  the  position 
internally. 
Trezise: I think most Americans would agree that a union 
of Europe implies very  strongly that Europe would have 
a defense policy as  well as  a foreign policy and as well as 
a common economic policy.  But here I suppose we would 
be concerned with the implications for  NATO.  Now, if at 
this  stage,  developments  in  the Community  should work 
to  strengthen  NATO,  there could only be  applause in the 
United States.  It could only be welcomed. For it has been 
noticed  and  remarked  upon  often  and  recently  that the 
Soviet Union has been steadily and somewhat alarmingly 
improving  and  modernizing  its  own  forces  at the  same 
time  as  military budgets in  the United States  and in  the 
West  generally  have  come  under  increasing  strain  and 
downward pressures.  In this  respect,  the Prime Minister's 
suggestion for common arms manufacture within the Com-
munity could contribute to the strengthening of the organ-
ization-or, of course, it could work in the other direction, 
and that would be  the  American concern.  Anything that 
diverted the progress away from standardizing, harmoniz-
ing equipment within NATO would be looked at with some 
alarm.  On  the  other  hand,  1' m  not  suggesting  that  the 
American position should be one of providing all the arms 
for NATO or being other than another partner in a general 
process or strengthening and modernizing. 
Wheeler: What we're thinking about now are two things: 
One, rationalizing our defense production in Europe and, 
therefore, making the pound or the franc or mark stretch 
further.  But secondly,  standardization to us  means a two-
way street; it means America buying more European weap-
ons  as  well  as  Europe  buying  more  of its  own  or more 
American.  In other words,  I  think that the greater Euro-
pean effort has  to  be connected with a greater American 
willingness  than  in  the  past  to  look  to  Europe  for  its 
weapon supplies as  well as  to its own production. 
Trezise: I  think we've come some distance away from the 
period when we believed that we were the arms supplier 
for NATO, pretty much to the exclusion of everybody.  But 
I think there are some difficulties involved here. The United 
States is,  after all, probably the most efficient producer in 
many  fields  of  armament  and will  be  indefinitely-pri-
marily because of the very large economies of scale that can 
be  obtained in  a  country where output can  be  in  such  a 
large volume.  But in  principle, it seems to me that this is 
an area where  it would be  well  for the United States  to 
make feasible concessions in the direction of getting a more 
harmonized, a more nearly standardized NATO force. 
Owen: Mr.  Prime  Minister,  as  a political man,  comment 
on  the  European  attitude  toward  defense.  First,  do  the 
Europeans  share  the  concern  about  what's  coming  to  be 
seen  in  thi.r  country  as  an  imbalance  between  the  Soviet 
effort,  which has  placed great emphasis on  the qualitative 
improvement of their  forces  in  Europe,  and the  Western 
effort, which is not seen here as keeping pace? And, second, 
do  you see the insistence on national prerogatives and na-
tional parochialism as  abating in Europe in the  face  of an 
evident  need  for  more  effective  European  concert  in  the 
defense field? 
Tindemans: I  personally am  strongly in  favor  of NATO. 
When I make proposals in my  report about a better Euro-
pean  security  policy,  I  do it in  order  to  strengthen  the 
European pillar of the Atlantic defense system.  I want to 
make it clear because there are other voices in Europe. 
Are we keeping pace with the development in the Soviet 
Union? A few days  ago the Belgian defense minister was 
delivering a speech developing the same idea, that the de-
velopment  is  unbalanced,  and he was  attacked  by  some 
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self now in  the  Belgian  Parliament about what he said. 
So,  you see that not everybody in Europe is  convinced or 
knows what is  going on for the moment.  But the feeling 
is  growing that there is,  indeed,  an  unbalanced develop-
ment in the field of defense, or armament, and so  on. All 
responsible  political  leaders  should  carefully  study  that 
development and have the courage to say what they think 
we have to do. 
The nation-state is  still very strong in Europe. And it is 
still  an  extremely  difficult  task  to  share  sovereignty  in 
common. You know that problem of sovereignty is  always 
the big difficulty  in  order to  reach  some  achievement  in 
Europe. You called it parochialism. Nationalism in Europe 
is  still very strong, especially in the field  of defense.  It's 
clear in France, for instance, the moment you speak of de-
fense immediately you arouse passions. The idea of a Euro-
pean defense community was  killed  in  August  1954  be-
cause France-one of the big members of Europe, of the 
European Community-did reject the proposal. So we must 
have a more flexible attitude but always in the framework 
of NATO, for not everybody, not the Nine, but only seven 
EC countries, are members of NATO. That's the main prob-
lem in the field of defense for the moment. 
Owen: Let's mo-ve now to the second of the specific areas, 
the area  of foreign  policy,  what does your report recom-
mend? 
Tindemans:  Foreign  policy  is  not covered  by  the  Rome 
Treaty.  We always  make a  distinction between  "integra-
tion"  (the competences  given  to  the  institutions  by  the 
Rome Treaty)  and what we call "cooperation"  (political 
cooperation among the member states). It's always based 
upon the free-will of the member states to reach an agree-
ment in  the  field  of foreign  policy.  On the  other hand, 
the Community as  such has  no influence at all in foreign 
policy,  even  if  there  was  some  iire  at  the  entrance  of 
Europe, in the Middle East,  for  instance.  And that's one 
of the reasons why people in Europe have a  feeling that 
the influence of their state and of Europe as such have very 
much diminished since the end of the Second World War. 
If we want to  signify  something  in  the  world,  if we 
want to  have a  proper identity,  the best  possibility  is  to 
speak with one voice  in some big problem.  For instance, 
if we decide  to  act  as  Europe,  as  the European Commu-
nity or the European Union,  at the  North-South  Confer-
ence,  then we must have the courage to  say  to ourselves: 
Now we will have a  discussion,  we will  speak with one 
voice,  and it will be the majority rule to  fix  our attitude, 
because if we insist upon the principle of unanimity,  the 
result will be  that Europe will  have  no  voice  at all.  Be-
cause seldom we will reach unanimity in these  questions. 
That's the essential part of my proposal. 
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Henry Ou•en (right): 
11l'd like to ask Phil Trezise to speak to a 
question  rt~iJed in yo11r recent book The Atlantic Connection ....  " 
Trezise (left): rrThe American vieu' in general is sympathetic to 
the notion of c1 llnified, common EC foreign policy." 
Owen: I'd like to ask Phil Trezise to speak to a question 
which  is  raised  in  your  own  recent  book  The  Atlantic 
Connection as  to  whether we may not be  wise to  distin-
guish  between  certain  areas,  such  as  East-West relations 
where  close  concert  is  necessary,  and  other  areas  where 
close  concert  may  not  only  be  less  necessary,  but  leu 
feasible. 
Trezise:  The American  view  in  general  is  sympathetic 
toward the notion of a unified, common EC foreign policy. 
It's been very difficult over the years to talk about dealing 
with Europe but then to  find  that you  were dealing with 
four,  five,  or six,  or nine different political entities.  And 
while one would not expect that these entities, once oper-
ating in  a common fashion,  would always  agree with us, 
nevertheless, I think it would be a step forward for West-
ern  policy  if Europe was  more  nearly  able  to  approach 
matters as  a unit. A single approach, even when it differs 
somewhat from that of the United States, would be toler-
able simply because it would be known and could be man-
aged and dealt with. It's quite clear that in some  areas we are not going to 
have  identical  points  of  view.  I  think  the  relationships 
with the South are going to  be  different  if only because 
of the strong tendency in Europe to maintain attachments 
to  colonies  and  former  associated  states.  And  in  many 
cases,  this. will  involve  discrimination  against  our  com-
merce, and that will cause some problems. It may well be, 
furthermore, that Europe will see relations with the South 
somewhat less  stringently  than will  the  United  States.  I 
don't think we are prepared to  go,  in principle, as  far  as 
some  of  the  European  countries  in  conceding  positions 
to the less developed world. But realism tells us  that these 
are inevitable and, furthermore, mostly the differences will 
be bridgeable. 
Then again, there are some areas where a  more nearly 
common  and  effective  European  policy  would  be  very 
much desired on our part. In the present period in south-
ern  Europe  and  the  Mediterranean,  where  we're  clearly 
going through a  transitional period,  it's possible that the 
Community, with its  immediate interests engaged and its 
special  capacities,  may  help  the  trend toward  democracy 
more effectively than we can. And in  that area, one would 
look to  a  unified European policy with hope. If we ever 
do  manage a  settlement in  the  Middle East,  one  would 
hope that Western Europe would be,  in one  form  or an-
other, able to help assure its durability. 
Wheeler:  There are certain  areas  in  which  Europe  per-
haps  can  be  a  more  useful  or  more  effective  influence 
than the United States can.  I think we have seen an inter-
esting  example  of  this  when  the  European  Community 
recently  took  what  I  happen  to  think  is  a  very  radical 
decision  from  the Community's point of view,  namely  to 
admit Greece  to  possible  membership.  It  is  pretty  clear 
that the reason the governments of the Nine decided to do 
this was because they wanted to anchor Greece within the 
Community and anchor Greek democracy.  It's an interest-
ing example of what the Community is  setting out to do, 
and perhaps will succeed in doing.  And if the admission 
of Greece is  followed  by  the  admission,  for  instance,  of 
Spain and Portugal, and perhaps other countries  too, we 
may  see  a  distinct  trend within  the Community  that,  al-
though its expansion may inhibit its internal development 
toward unity,  toward greater cohesion  in  foreign policy, 
it may  ;.tt  the same time help to  bring these vastly strate-
gically important peripheral countries into the West Euro-
pean family,  as  it were, and what's more important, keep 
them there. 
Tindemans:  I  think that Europe still has an influence in 
the world or some prestige, maybe a cultural prestige, es-
pecially upon less developed countries, and that using that 
influence could play a positive part in world politics with-
out opposing ourselves systematically to the United States. 
That  fear  exists,  that  Europe  in  affirming  itself  would 
Liste11ing to the u·c i1YI  acro.rs the Atlc mtic in the BmJSels EC radio 
st11dio are Belgian Prime J Vfinister Leo Tindemans (facing camera) 
c md Charles Wheeler, the BBCs chief E11ropean correspondent. 
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proper attitude, a very specific attitude of Europe as  such 
in international policy, could have a good result with our 
partners and our allies,  and where it  is  possible  playing 
even a part a little bit alone. 
You mentioned the enormous question of the relations 
between North and South.  You even  used  the word dis-
crimination. Europe in certain fields  has special  relations, 
for instance,  with African countries,  and  I  know that in 
the United States  this  is  considered as  being  discrimina-
tion,  for instance, with  the  North African countries.  But 
I think you forget too easily that thanks to these relations, 
we can develop a good influence in these countries, and if 
Europe were absent from these countries or if Europe had 
not  that  economic  influence,  other  countries  could  take 
the place of Europe, and 'other countries' does not always 
mean the United States. 
Trezise:  It seems  the main economic point raised by  the 
Prime Minister in  the report is  to focus  on the  "snake." 
He suggested that to make the snake effective and durable 
will  require  a  commonality  of  monetary  and,  perhaps, 
fiscal  policies among the participants. And on that,  he  is 
surely  right.  But,  again,  one  approaches  this  with  some 
scepticism,  for here we  are  touching on one of the very 
sensitive areas of political life. Monetary policy and fiscal 
policy bear directly on employment, and it's been  my  ex-
perience that politicians are extremely sensitive to changes 
in levels of employment. In the European context, I suspect 
even more sensitive than to questions of defense policy in 
some cases. 
Tindemans:  I  am  convinced  that what we have reached 
already  in  the  Community-for  example,  the  common 
agricultural policy-will not continue if we don't find  a 
solution  for  monetary  problems,  because  nowadays  we 
already have to  adapt the prices of agricultural products 
at  the  national  frontiers  due  to  floating  currencies  and 
the differences that arise everyday.  So,  the notion of com-
mon market and customs union will disappear if we don't 
find  a  solution  for  the  monetary  problem.  But  it's  ex-
tremely difficult.  I consulted professors, bankers, financial 
experts,  and finally  the  only  thing  I  could  propose  was 
to put the snake into the EC  framework  and  to  develop 
some  policies  starting  from  that basis,  because  currency, 
the value of a currency, is  the expression of the economic 
strength of a country. 
A certain convergence of important points of economic 
policy, of social policy, of fiscal policy, of budgetary policy, 
is only possible for those who accept discipline. And that's 
the reason why I proposed to decide in common what ob-
jectives  we  want  to  reach  within  the  framework  of the 
Union,  of the Common  Market,  and  then  to  make  pro-
posals by  the Commission for  the Council  to  decide. The 
Council could decide at the same time the help we could 
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give  those member states that are not yet  able  to  follow 
the decisions  of the stronger ones.  That's,  in  a  nutshell, 
the  difficulty.  But  I  am  convinced  that  in the  Western 
world things will not improve if we  don't find  a solution 
for monetary problems. 
Wheeler: The Ofl:e  aspect of this report that really stirred 
up a hornet's nest was  the question of the snake.  The re-
port said basically that the snake should be  used,  should 
be developed, in order to bring the European Community 
closer  to  an  economic  and  monetary  union,  that  states 
within the snake or states which are more able to progress 
because  they  are economically healthier than other states 
in  the  Community have  a  duty  to  forge  ahead,  in  other 
words, at a faster pace than the others.  Now, this  led  to 
an immediate outcry-it's the only word-in many  parts 
of Europe that what Mr. Tindemans was  doing was  pro-
posing a  two-speed  Europe,  a  two-tier  Europe,  a  convoy 
which would move at different paces.  And it was  alleged 
that this proposal  of his  would deepen  the gulf that al-
ready exists between the economically stronger states like 
Germany and the weaker states like Britain. 
Mr Tindemans, as  he  will  tell  you,  has  several  times 
denied  that this  is  what,  in  fact,  he  was  proposing.  But, 
nevertheless,  the  impression  that  he  was  proposing  this 
has been made a great deal of, and it has not been totally 
possible  to  disperse  it.  And  so,  there  has  been  a  lot  of 
discussion, which has been joined by the discussion of the 
question of Greek membership. In other words,  the ques-
tion of bringing in new members has exacerbated this dis-
pute,  and we  are  still  at a  stage where nobody  is  really 
quite sure whether Mr. Tindemans was suggesting a two-
speed Europe or not. 
Tindemans:  You put it in an excellent way.  There exist 
two  Europes  for  the  moment.  There is  a  Europe  at  two 
speeds  or  a  two-tier  Europe  because  member  states  are 
participating  in  the  snake  and  other  member  states  are 
not.  And the  Commission  is  not participating in  the  ac-
tivities of the snake.  So,  when I  propose to  put it in  the 
framework of the Community,  I'm trying to find  a  solu-
tion  for  that very  specific  question.  And  there  was  one 
small phrase,  I  think,  in  my  report,  that was  overlooked 
because  I  said  "following the  rules  of the  Community." 
That means the Commission must make proposals follow-
ing the philosophy of the Treaty of Rome  and  that the 
Council of Ministers will decide. So,  nothing can be  done 
without  that  specific  EC  framework.  And,  at  the  same 
time,  when  they  propose  decisions  which  cannot  be  ac-
cepted  or  implemented  immediately  by  weaker  member 
states,  they  must propose  at  the  same  time  intermediate 
steps  to  enable these  member  states  eventually  to  accept 
and implement  the  same  measures.  I  think  it's  the  only 
possibility to make some progress. Otherwise, we will fall 
apart, and it will be the end of the Common Market. • JAMES O. GOLDSBOROUGH, Parir-ltt.;ed  con'e.tlotldent f or the International Herald Tribune
\\'l llrN IrRl:N(.ll PItl:SII)liNl: VALlilt\' (;lS(-ARD I) llS'I'AING  an-
rrotrnced that the Rhine-Rh6nc  cilnrtl *'or.rld finrtlly get
tuncleru'rL1' this I'ear, hc lavc thc go-ahead to a project that
l:unrpclrr.rs  Irave drerrrned of sirrce (-harlcmagne:  the link-
ing of the North Sca to tlre N,Icditcrriurean  by an inlrrncl
u'atenval'. Ntit only that, but u'itl.r courl',lction  by the West
Gen.nans of thc Rhinc-Dantrbe  canal now sct for abor.rt
the sarne time thc rnid-i980's-tlre 6ntl Iink rvill be
1;rovidcd in another Iiuropean clrcam: the bridging of l:rLst
rrnd Wcst lunrire by' u'ater, from the Dtrtch clikes to the
Illack Sea.
Roth these cxl)cnsivc plrjects lrave their op1'rtinetrts,
f.'ut both govcntrneltts  ltavc clcciclecl that, desPite  unsure
projections about pnrlitability, I:urope no lor.rger can pr.rt
them off. When he gave tlie green light to the Rhine-
Rl-r6r-re canal in a November  speech in Dijon, Giscard
d'lrstaing stressed the project's historical and symbolic
importance, crelrting a "river to irrigate economies rrnd
unify peoples." It is in the "interest of all Europe," the
Frer-rch Presrdent said, to connect the great French and
German rivers. For France, it rvould enable her "to be
present at the great economic and geopolitical rendezvous
of Europe at the end of the next decade"-a clear refer-
ence to the European Commurrity's  plans for Er.rropear"r
union.
Tlre Rhdne-Rhine canal, wlrich will cost an estimated
$1.1 billion by the time it is finished, is expected to open
up rvhole nerv regions of easterrr and central France toindustrialization.  No  longer  will  the  broad  Rhine-so 
crucial  to  the  life of  Belgium,  Holland,  and  West Ger-
many, end in a cui de  sac  in Switzerland, as it does today. 
Instead,  it  will  flow  across  Alsace  and  into  the  Saone, 
emptying into the Rhone at Lyons and flowing on to  the 
Mediterranean. The French,  ever  interested  in  attracting 
West German capital  beyond  the narrow border area of 
Alsace it now serves,  hope that this broad valley of cen-
tral France stretching down to Marseilles and the new in-
dustrial complex at Fos,  will become an axis  of Franco-
German cooperation, linking the overpopulated industrial 
north  of  Europe  with  the  growth  potential  of  central 
France. 
Both the German and French projects are part of a new 
European economic strategy to improve inland waterways 
in coming years, take the pressure off road and rail  build-
ing, and further improve the interaction among their sev-
eral  economies.  The French  and  Germans  are  not  alone 
in  the  effort.  The  completion  last  fall  by  Belgium  and 
the Netherlands of the inland canal linking Antwerp and 
Rotterdam reflects  the same thinking. For more than  100 
years  the  Belgians  had  wanted  to  complete  that  link, 
which also shortens their passage to the Rhine by  several 
locks and 20 miles. 
French  hesitation  over  the  cost  of  the  Rhone-Rhine 
link  was  long-standing.  Critics  of  the  project,  such  as 
former Gaullist Minister Edgard Pisani, have argued that 
the money could be  better spent,  that  for  the  same  cost 
1,000 kilometers of freeway,  2,000 kilometers of railroad 
expressway, or 65,000 new apartments could be built. He 
said that the same $1.3 billion would finance  100,000 new 
jobs.  Impressive  arguments,  especially  when  even  the 
champions of Rhcme-Rhine  admit that  the  rate  of return 
will not exceed 4  per cent per year  (when  10 per cent is 
estimated as  a  reasonable  return) ,  and that even  among 
canals  there  would  be  better  investments,  for  example 
building a new Paris-Lille link. 
The  deciding  factor  for  Giscard  d'Estaing  appears  to 
have been the success of the 1-foselle canal, from the Rhine 
through Luxembourg to Metz and Nancy in the Lorraine. 
That canal, completed  last  year  after  10  years  of work, 
has passed all projections in performance. 
"THERE ARE  CERTAIN  INTANGIBLES that never can be pre-
cisely evaluated," explains Pierre Guerin, engineer at the 
French Public Works Ministry.  Guerin  points out,  more-
over, that French statistical and actuarial methods tend to 
leave out the intangibles more than do, for example, '\f..' est 
German methods.  The result  is  that while  the  prevision 
for the Moselle canal was for 7 to R million tons of traffic 
in 1975, the canal actually did 10 million tons of business. 
"A new project such  as  Rhine-Rhone,"  say  Guerin,  "can 
generate new patterns that are impossible to foresee." 
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The French long have had something of an  inferiority 
complex  about  their  canals  vis-a-vis  the  Germans,  just 
as  they  do  over  their  freeways.  The West  Germans  use 
their  inland  waterways  for  over  30  per  cent  of  total 
transport, and the Belgians and Dutch reach  even higher 
percentages. The French, on the other hand,  ship only  8 
per cent of their  tonnage by  inland waterway.  Barely  10 
per cent of the French system is  capable of taking barges 
of 3,000 tons or more, standard size  for the new fleet  of 
pushed,  flat-bottomed  giants  that  nO\V  ply  the  German 
waterways.  Anyone  \vho  has  ever  ridden  the  French  Gl-
nals, mostly built by Colbert under Louis XIV, knows their 
delights, especially in the summer months. But despite their 
charms-or  perhaps  because  of  them-the  network  re-
mains highly inefficient  for  modern transport. 
In fact,  a  modest canal  of such  scale  already connects 
the Rhine and Rhc)ne,  but it is  largely unused. Built in the 
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·.  ·· ... last century, its course will be  followed  for about half of 
the new 140-mile  route,  but none of its  facilities  will  be 
saved,  for they cannot be  used for the huge barges of to-
day. The new canal will be all new, with 24  locks,  newly 
dredged beds,  and a  depth of 3. S meters,  extended  to  4 
meters  in  the  locks.  Instead  of  40  yards  wide,  as  is  the 
old canal, it will be 200. 
It is  a mighty project, in  a sense something the French 
have been looking for since the British withdrew from the 
English  Channel  tunnel  project  last  year.  It  is  arguable, 
and is  argued at the  French Public \Xlorks  lvfinistry,  that 
Rhone-Rhine  is  possible  only  because  the  British  aban-
doned the Channel tunnel. There always  is  a limit to  the 
amount of financing  available for  these mammouth proj-
ects without putting too much strain on the capital  mar-
kets.  Moreover, many of the firms  to  have been  engaged 
in cutting under the Channel now will be working instead 
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cutting a  wide  trench  across  eastern  France.  Of the  two, 
the Public Works Ministry probably would have preferred 
the Channel,  for  all  studies  showed it would  have  been 
an immediately profitable  investment.  But  with  the  new 
link  to  Britain  impossible  for  the  moment,  the  French 
will concentrate on this new link  to West Germany, and 
beyond. 
For France, it  is  not simply  a  matter of opening cities 
such  as  Strasbourg,  .. Mulhouse,  Besan<;_:on,  and  Lyons  to 
the commerce from the North, but of attacking the prob-
lems  of  regional  development  that  have  plagued  the 
country since Henry IV. French life is  still so centered on 
Paris  that economic  ties  among  the  nation's  regions  are 
stifled.  It is  almost impossible,  for  example,  to  go  from 
Strasbourg  to  lvfarseilles,  the  capital  of  the  East  to  the 
capital of the South. The canal will open up new patterns 
of regional  life,  in  addition  to  providing  traffic  for  the 
industrial  complex at  Fos,  the  multi-billion  dollar  devel-
opment near  ~1arseilles the French hope will grow to  be-
come the Hamburg or Rotterdam of the lvfediterranean. 
Six  major French regions will be  touched by  the canal, 
and politicians from all parties in those areas have cheered 
its  beginning,  though  some  of  them,  such  as  Socialist 
Jean-Pierre Chevenment, have warned Paris not to  expect 
the regions to put up any of the financing. The six regions 
are Alsace, Franche-Comte, Bourgogne, Rh6ne-Alps, Prov-
ence-C()te d' Azur, and Languedoc-Roussillon  . 
The present planning calls  for  about half  the  land  to 
be  acquired  this  year,  with  digging  to  begin  from  the 
Alsace end before the end of the year.  About $90  million 
has  been  allocated  for  land  acquisition,  mostly  farming 
land  along  the  river  banks.  The  scale  of  the  project  is 
impressive. Its 24 locks will accommodate a change in alti-
tude  of  275  yards.  Fifteen  dams  will  need  to  be  con-
structed,  plus  86  bridges.  It will  be  able  to  take  barges 
of 4,000 tons, and, when the depth is increased to 4 meters, 
of 6,000 tons. 
It is  a  project destined  to  change the  life of much of 
the area,  and its  scale  alone  is  enough  to  give  pause  in 
much  of  the  region  affected.  For  there  is  serious,  well-
founded opposition to  the project from  farmers,  environ-
mentalists, fishermen-the people who for  one reason  or 
another have elected  to  stay  in  these  areas  precisely  be-
cause they  are unindustrialized, have  retained  their beau-
ty,  and  provide  an  escape  from  the  sound  and  fury  of 
French ports and cities, and the urban sprawls mushroom-
ing around them. 
Already  these  people have banded  together in  the  six 
depctrlenzents  concerned, and they will be certain to speak 
out when the public hearings begin this year.  For the first 
step  to  be  held throughout the  area  will  be  the  posting 
up on the walls of towns and villages notices of intention 
to build, notices that are certain to arouse and divide  the 
townspeople. 
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dreds of years they have dropped their lines into one o[
the cleanest rivers of France, the Doubs, which springs
from the valleys of the Alps and flows across a part of
rural France still untouched  by industry  ar-rd developn-rent.
Quoted in a local newspaper  soon after the decision was
announced, an inhabitant of Belfort had this to say:
"They are going to operr the Doubs to water from the
Rliinei That sewer!" Referring to the place the Doubs
occupies in local life, he said, "A river, even slightly
polluted, flows and nourishes life. Rut a canalized  river
is simply a chain of stagnant  pools. It is dead."
Marcel Verneaux, head of the Association for tlre Pro-
tection of the Doubs, added this: "The er-rtire basin is
going to be drained, all the way to the Swiss border. Al-
ready this river is supposed to feed the cities of Mont-
b6liard ar-rd BesanEor-r. How will it be able to feed the canal
without emptying it?"
The farmers associations, which only recently  spent
Iong months and considerable  money lobbying against
ne*, highwul' construction in the region, are reluctant to
enter a new fight, though sentiment in them clearly runs
ageinst the canal. The leading farmers' group from the
Dor.rbs area estimates that 1,500 hectares of cultivated
Iand rvill be lost to the crnal.
Serious  arguments, all of them. They will be taken into
account,  and the Public \Works Ministry claims that the
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best solutions will be found to solve all of them. Rut the
ministry doesn't expect tl-rem to block the car-ral. It simply
has taken on too much symbolic importance to the nation.
The French  see the canal as literally changing historical
patterns of trade and commerce. Says Pierre Pflimlin,
mayor of Strasbourg: "This can be a particularly effective
instrument for expanding not only toward the rest of
Europe but toward the Middle East. It v.'ill provide  an
effective link between  the Rhine and the Middle llast. No
longer can it be said the Mediterranean has become  an
Arab lake destined for economic stagnation."
In a sense the Rhine-Rh6ne canal is a reaction to the
Rhine-Danube effort, opening \West German might to
the East European  Socialist countries. The French, indeed
much of \Western Europe, long have feared that \Western
Europe might one day grow too small for \7est Germany.
That thinking was the key reason that prompted  Georges
Pompidou  to reverse Gaullist policy and open the Con-r-
munity to Great Rritain. With the completion of Rhine-
Danube, which the Soviet Llnion has backed politicallv
though without contributing anything financially, com-
merce between East and \West will increase. and it is
clear that France does not intend to be cut off frorn the
new currents.
Rut if part of the French thinking is that French trade
too will find its way down the Danube, the main consid-
eration in the Rh6ne-Rhine decision r,r'as tbe Franco-
German relationslrip. These two giants of \Western
l,urope have become each other's largest buyer and sel,
ler. The Franco-German  economic relationship, revers-
ing historic patterns, now is the third largest bilateral
trade relationship in the rvorld, ranking only behind US-
Canada and US-Japan. Given this scale, all must be done
to maintain and enlarge it. Thr-rs the Rhine-Rhdne canal
will exert as strong an attraction on West Germany as
the Rhine-Danube,  and giverr tl-re greater importance  of
France in the \West German  economy tlran Ilastern [urope,
the Rhine-Rh6ne  is expected to be the bigger success.
S7ith the re-opening of the Suez Canal, however,  the
Mediterranean  is coming back to life. Perhaps the giant
oil tankers lrave found other routes, but ordinary busi-
ness shipping is on the increase, and ports like lvflrseilles,
with Fos, are beginning to get part of the action. The
East-lVest  connection is being increasingly  talked about
today, and it is certain to be helped by the completion  of
both canals.
"The relations that we have built up with the Rlack
Sea Socialist countries would have been short-circuited by
the Danube-Rhine canal alone," says Gaston Defferre,  tl-re
Socialist mayor of Marseilles. Vith both canals, however,
the French feel such trade can only be stirnulated. "It goes
beyond regional interests," says Pfimlin. "It is a great
question of overall political and economic strategy." IRICHARD  C.  LONGWORTH,  European  diplomatic 
correspondent for United Press International 
ON BRITAIN'S EAST COAST, AN OLD SIDE-WINDING TRA\X'LER 
limps  up  the  Humber,  toward its  berth on  St.  Andrew's 
dock  in  the  port of Hull.  It's  a  dismal  homecoming:  A 
stinging  south-easter  is  blowing  and  the  old  ship  didn't 
make a profit on its run-didn't "get its trip," as  Britain's 
trawlermen say. Instead, it lost valuable fishing time dodg-
ing Icelandic gunboats, then suffered a mechanical break-
down and, denied the repair docks of Iceland's ports, had 
to head home. After three days  on the town, its  21  crew-
men will  join  12,500  other unemployed  men  in  Hull in 
competing  for  a  place  on  the  next ship  out.  As  for  the 
old  ship  itself,  it may  never put to  sea  again.  Some  30 
other ships at Hull-and more at Grimsby and Fleetwood 
-were left to  rust within the past year alone.  None was 
replaced. 
Eight hundred miles to  the north,  British  trawlers  and 
frigates  dance  a dangerous  quadrille with  Icelandic gun-
boats in the cold Atlantic off Iceland's Seydisfjord. Some-
times  the gunboats surprise  the  trawlers  to  try  to  arrest 
them as they shelter in the fjord from a winter gale. Some-
times  they  swoop  as  the  trawlers  are  fishing,  nipping in 
aft to  cut their nets  with the  v-shaped  steel  blades  they 
tow behind them.  Sometimes the frigates get between,  to 
protect the trawlers. Then there are threats, and occasional 
rammings,  and even  shots,  not always  blanks.  Somehow, 
no one has been killed, but it's a miserable way to earn a 
living. 
Over  on  the  western  side  of Iceland,  this  misery  has 
company on  a flat  and stony peninsula,  3  5 miles  along a 
winding road out from Reykjavik. Three thousand Ameri-
can servicemen and their 2,500 dependents live and work 
at  the  Keflavik  air  and  naval  base,  keeping  an  eye  on 
Soviet activity in the North Atlantic. Although the base is 
the result of a bilateral American-Icelandic treaty, it comes 
under the general umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and has become a pawn in the strug-
gle  over  fishing:  Icelanders,  never  fond  of  this  foreign 
presence anyway,  have  demonstrated against it  and have 
threatened  to  close  it  unless  the  NATO  allies  force  the 
British  frigates  to  go  away.  At Keflavik,  the  Americans 
soldier on behind storm fences in a landscape that is  stark 
and lunar,  even by  Iceland's standards.  Children play  in 
rocky  yards  around  rusting  stationwagons  outside  their 
barracks  home.  The  NCO  club  offers  the  only  entertain-
ment.  The whine  of  jets  is  a  constant  noise.  The wind 
blows and blows. 
Go back  1,000 miles  southeast,  to  Brussels.  There,  the 
NATO Council-the ambassadors of the  15  NATO nations 
-meets in worried conclave in Conference Room One at 
the  alliance  headquarters  and puts  ever  greater  pressure 
on  Britain  and  Iceland,  both  NATO  nations,  to  reach  a 
settlement. Two NATO countries  had  never broken diplo-
matic relations, but Iceland did on February 19.  No NATO 
nation has ever quit the alliance, but Iceland is  threatening 
that, too. 
A  few miles  away,  closer to  the heart of Brussels,  the 
Common Market Commission maintains its  refusal  to  re-
duce  the Community's tariffs  on  imports  from  Iceland-
reductions to which Iceland, as a member of the European 
Free  Trade  Association  (EFTA),  is  otherwise  entitled-
until it settles its fishing dispute with Britain. At the same 
time, the Commission must prepare a new fisheries  policy 
in  preparation  for  the  day  which  may  come  this  year-
when the whole world will adopt the principle of 200-mile 
territorial  waters.  The  Commission  knows  that  the  two 
problems will, in the end, only complicate each other. 
These  are  some  of  the  landmarks  of  the  Cod  War, 
which is  probably the oldest established permanent float-
ing fish  story-or saga-in the world.  It began  in  1952, 
has  erupted periodically over  the  years  like  an  Icelandic 
volcano, and is  in its fourth round now.  As  in most wars, 
there are more losers than winners. Like the British fisher-
men,  Icelandic coast guarders,  American  servicemen,  and 
Western diplomats mentioned above. Or the  British Gov-
ernment in Whitehall, retreating step by step in the face of 
Icelandic demands, yet never able to get a settlement. Or 
the  Icelandic  Government  in  its  house  overlooking  Rey-
kjavik harbor, locked in a hard line by  a xenophobic pub-
lic,  dependent on  fish  for  the  nation's  living,  yet  aware 
that this line is  alienating it from the Europe to which, by 
history and tradition, it belongs. 
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and history of Iceland. The tiny nation  (only 218,000 per-
sons)  hangs like an appendix from the Arctic Circle, hun-
dreds of miles from anywhere, locked in cold and darkness 
much of the winter, buffeted not only by  weather but by 
earthquakes  and  volcanos.  Most  of  the  island  is  rock. 
Steam geysers puff from  the ground inside  the capital  of 
Reykjavik  itself.  It's  a  bleak,  tough  environment,  and  it 
has produced a bleak, tough people, totally dependent on 
themselves  and  their own hardihood  for  survival.  These 
are circumstances that breed a stern patriotism, a defensive 
cultural  pride,  an  isolationism,  a  self-reliance  that  takes 
little notice of the outside world,  and a  disinclination  to 
compromise with adversity. 
Bac,  Nuernberger Zeitung,  Germany. 
The  Keflavik  base  is  Iceland's  only  contribution  to 
NATO.  Apart  from  the  coast  guard  gunboats,  it  has  no 
military  budget  at  all.  The Americans  at Keflavik  have 
run  up  against  Iceland's  cultural  pride:  The  Icelandic 
language, benefiting from so  much isolation, is  the purest 
Scandinavian tongue,  and the government has  forced  the 
American television station on the peninsula to black out 
the rest of the nation,  lest it blight the cultural  and  lin-
guistic heritages of Iceland's youth. 
Iceland's  economy  is  equally  inward-looking  and,  in-
creasingly, a troubled one. The inflation rate, varying from 
30 to  55  per cent annually, is  the highest in  the Western 
world. Only two devaluations of the kronur, amounting to 
3  7 per cent altogether, have kept Icelandic fish  prices com-
petitive, but have shoved up the cost of the  many  neces-
sities which  the country must import.  Over  the  past two 
years,  world fish  prices-especially in  the  United States, 
which  takes  70  per cent  of Iceland's  fish  exports-have 
fallen drastically, and the country's trade deficit is a whop-
ping $120 million. 
The only  foreign  investment  is  a  Swiss-owned  alumi-
num mill. Other foreign firms  would like  to  locate there, 
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to  take  advantage  of  all  that  cheap  thermal  electricity 
underground  (basically, Iceland is  the world's biggest tea 
kettle).  But  the  Icelanders  say  "no"  and  instead  have 
based their economy on the huge schools of fish  off  their 
shores. These fish,  even after the collapse of world prices, 
provide more than 80 per cent of Iceland's export income. 
Without  them,  Iceland-which  has  one  of  the  world's 
highest  living  standards-would go broke.  And  that,  of 
course, is the cause of the Cod War. 
Iceland, once a colony of Denmark, has been independ-
ent only since 1944. Eight years later, in  1952, it extended 
its  fishing  limits,  for  the  first  time,  from  three  to  four 
miles.  Britain temporarily closed its port to Icelandic fish 
imports, but this  incident-Cod War I-was quickly  set-
tled. 
Cod War II came in  1958, when Iceland proclaimed a 
12-mile zone.  Then as  now, there were daily conflicts  be-
tween Icelandic gunboats and British navy vessels. A Rey-
kjavik  newspaper  printed  pictures  of  Queen  Elizabeth 
captioned "Her Majesty  the  Thief"  and  the  British  em-
bassy  was  under  police  protection.  A  British-Icelandic 
agreement  in  1961  ended  these  hostilities,  and  British 
trawlers  fished  the  Icelandic  banks  unhindered  for  the 
next 12  years,  fueling Britain's appetite both for fish  and 
chips  and for  fish  fingers,  usually  made  from  cod. 
Cod  War  III  broke  out  in  1972  when  Iceland  pro-
claimed  a  50-mile  limit.  Once  again,  the  gunboats  and 
frigates appeared. Once again,  Iceland justified its  action 
on the special, vital role that cod  (which British  trawlers 
fished  almost  exclusively)  plays  in  Iceland's  economy: 
Unless fishing of cod could be controlled and conservation 
promoted, the government said, the stocks might be deci-
mated  and Iceland's  economic  future  imperiled.  For  the 
first time, Iceland threatened to break diplomatic relations, 
leave NATO, and kick the Americans out of Keflavik. The 
International Court of Justice issued an injunction against 
Iceland, which ignored it. 
THE COMMON MARKET GOT  INVOLVED in the Cod War at 
this  stage.  Iceland,  like  the  other  EFTA  nations,  made  a 
special treaty with the Community when Britain, the lead-
ing EFTA nation, entered the Commorr Market. This treaty 
provided for a huge EFTA-EC free trade area, with progres-
sive dismantling of tariffs  between EC  and  EFTA  nations. 
For  most  of the  EFTA  nations,  these  tariffs  have  fallen 
since 1973 to only 20 per cent of their previous levels and 
will vanish altogether next year.  But the treaty with Ice-
land was made dependent on a satisfactory fishing agree-
ment  between  Iceland  and  the  EC  nations-specifically, 
Britain and West Germany. Otherwise,  Brussels  said, EC 
tariffs against Icelandic goods would stay as  high as  ever. 
And so they have. 
Cod War III continued into  late  1973.  British  planes 
were banned from Keflavik. The gunboats began to open W fire. Rioters in Reykjavik  smashed rvindorvs at the Rritish
embassy. NATo Secretary  General Josepli Luns went to
Reykjavik and London to mediate. Irinally, Iceland de-
livered ar-r ultimaturn: Either British warships left Ice-
landic s'aters by October 3 or relations rn'ould be severed.
On October 2, the then British Prime Minister Ildward
Heath announced that the warsbips were leaving "on the
assumption" that British trawlers would not be "har-
assed." The then Icelandic Premier Olafur Johannesson
rvent to London, and within a month a temporary, twt)-
year agreement rvas sealed. The rrumber of Rritish trawlers
authorized  to Iish in Icelandic waters was cut from l(r9 to
139. (The number has fallen since through attrition to
about 100.) These trawlers were allowed to fish within
the l0-rnile limit but only within six specified  areas. Irive
of these areas could be fished at arry one time; each area
would be closed, on a rotating basis, for two months  per
year.
The agreement specified no catch limit, but the treu'
ruies presupposed a maximum  British catch of some 130,-
000 tons of cod per year. It's a figure worth noting, be-
cause it shows the erosion in Rritish 6shing arouncl Ice-
land over the years. Retv'een 1960 and 1969, Rritain
caught an average 210,000 tons per year. In 1969 itself,
it caught 21),00o tons. Dr-rring the I972-77 war, Rritain
first offered to lower this to 181.000 tons. then went dowtr
to 170,000 tor-rs on $/orld Court orders, then offered t6l,-
000 tons, tl-ren 118,000, and finally settled on 130,000 tttns.
Lou'er figures were to come, as we shall see.
This agreement  would have cleared the way for Ice-
lar-rd's free trade deal u'ith the Common Market, exce;rt
that Reykjavik could not work out a similar agreement
with Germany. By the time an agreement  with Germany
was fixed tn 79f 1, the agreement with Rritain had expired.
The most interesting thing about the first three Cod
\fars is the rvay they l-rave repeated themselves in Cod
War IV, which began on July 15, 1975, with Iceland's
announcement  that its lisheries [mit would go out to 200
miles on October 15, giving it control over an arer six
times the size of Iceland itself. Britain and Germany pro-
tested, and the EC Commission  said that plans in the
works to lower the 15 per cent tariff on Icelandic fish ex-
ports to the Community would have to be sr,rspended.
Iceland based its 200-mile decision both on the familiar
arguments about sovereignty  and fish conservatiou  and on
the expectation  that tl"re other coastal uations of the world
-including 
Britain-will probably adopt the 200-mile
limit sometime this year. In this, it was perhaps guilty of
no more than jumping  the gun.
Last November 13 the 1913 two-year agreement  be-
tween Rritain and Iceland expired. On November 11 lce-
landic gunboats  began cutting Rritish trawls. On Novem-
ber 25 British navy frigates were ordered into Icelandic
waters, and Icelandic Premier Gier Hallgrimsson  threat-
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Briti.rh lrau ler " Lorl
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masked armed violence."  Icelandic  airspace  and  airports 
were closed to  the  RAF,  and in December Iceland threat-
ened once again to quit NATO and close Keflavik.  Britain 
offered  formally  to  lower its catch  limit  to  110,000  tons 
and made it clear it would go below 100,000 tons if nec-
essary-maybe all  the  way  down  to  85,000  tons,  barely 
one-third of its 1969 catch. But Iceland offered only 65,000 
tons,  said  it was  "not negotiable,"  then  withdrew  even 
this offer, and began hinting at lower levels. 
EVENTUALLY, ICELAND SAID,  it wants no British fishing at 
all  within  the  200-mile  zone.  In  addition,  Iceland  de-
manded  British  support  for  free  entry  of  Icelandic  fish 
exports  into  the  Community.  Britain  agreed  that  some 
conservation was necessary and said it could agree to nets 
with  larger  mesh  and other methods  to  let  smaller  fish 
escape  and promote  spawning.  But  the  British  said  the 
Icelanders were the prime culprits in the decimation of cod 
stocks,  and even  scientists  disagreed  on  just how serious 
the conservation  problem really  was.  Accompanying  this 
debate was  the familiar  tinkle of glass  as  demonstrators 
in Reykjavik broke British  embassy  windows  with snow-
balls. 
Luns went to Reykjavik to  talk with Hallgrimsson and 
returned with the Icelander's promise to  go to  London if 
Britain withdrew its frigates.  But just as  Luns was meet-
ing  with  British  Foreign  Secretary  James  Callaghan  to 
formalize this deal, the Icelandic premier suddenly issued 
a public ultimatum, threatening to break relations unless 
the frigates left. Luns,  furious,  telephoned Hallgrimsson, 
who quickly backed down. The ultimatum was withdrawn. 
The frigates  left.  No Icelandic promises were made,  but 
Britain was  "given to  understand"  that its  trawlers were 
safe.  Hallgrimsson flew  to  London  for  talks.  The  NATO 
Council heaved a sigh of relief and publicly praised Brit-
ish restraint-a sign that, in the NATO allies' eyes, Iceland 
a  Active volcano .'n  E.  A.  Harris,  Canada. 
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was  beginning to  overplay  the  David-and-Goliath  angle. 
It all seemed to be heading once again for a truce,  1973-
style. 
But the script went sour. The talks ended inconclusively. 
Britain, under pressure from its fishermen,  sent the frig-
ates  back in.  Iceland went to  the brink of breaking rela-
tions,  then-arm-twisting-pulled back.  Then, on Febru-
ary 19, Iceland did break diplomatic relations with Britain. 
In the meantime, the EC Commission prepared its  new 
common fisheries  policy,  to keep  cod wars from breaking 
out all  over  when  the  200-mile  limit  becomes  common. 
The new limit will give Community nations thousands of 
square miles of new coastal waters;  but the same will  be 
true of non-EC nations whose coasts are now fished by EC 
trawlers. On balance, Community fishermen  stand to lose 
more than they gain:  Britain in particular takes about one 
third  of its  1  million  tons  of fish  each  year  in  non-EC 
waters; and its fishermen,  if shut out of these waters alto-
gether, could lose  $190 million.  At the  same  time,  some 
60  per cent  of the Community  fish  stocks  in  the  North 
Atlantic  lie  within  Britain's  200-mile  limit;  Community 
rules say these waters should be open to fishing by  trawl-
ers from all EC  nations,  which  is  more competition than 
Britain wants. 
The Commission recognized the problem and suggested 
several  ways  to  get around it-"coastal bands"  reserved 
for  local  fishermen,  subsidies  or compensation  for  hard-
hit ports,  quotas.  The danger lay  in delay:  The 200-mile 
limits could be international law before the new policy is 
ready. 
That is  how things stand at this writing,  leaving little 
but  uncertainty  in  the  ports  at  which  we  called  as  this 
report began: 
•  In  Hull,  the  trawlermen  wait.  It's  estimated  that,  for 
every  1,200  tons  that Britain's  catch  limit  falls,  another 
trawler will go out of service  and  its  21  crewmen  (and 
100 other persons in connected shore-based  jobs)  will go 
out of work. The limit will almost certainly fall by  50,000 
tons per year, and that means 5,000 jobs. 
•  Off Seydisfjord, 40 British trawlers have returned to  the 
banks.  The  frigates  are  there  to  protect  them,  ramming 
and being rammed. Still, no one has been killed-yet. 
•  In Brussels, NATO seeks both a solution and an alternate 
eye on the Russians should Keflavik close. 
•  In  Reykjavik,  the  government  maneuvers  between  its 
NATO  allies  and  the  powerful  nationalist  sentiment  at 
home. With each day,  its elbowroom gets smaller.  In Ice-
land,  fish  equal  politics,  and  real  concessions  to  Britain 
would be political suicide. 
•  In London, a  Britain that once ruled the waves  tries  to 
keep its fishermen in business and its people in fish  fingers. 
Weariness clearly is  settling in. As the Guardian said in a 
recent  editorial,  "cod-catching  with  a  bodyguard  cannot 
go on forever." • Mediterranean Survey 
GREECE 
"The suitor is  Greece,  its beloved is  Europe. 
Now at last the confetti is being prepared. 
STEPHEN MILLIGAN, Brussels correspondent for The Economist 
An old love-affair is  on the road again. The 
suitor is  Greece,  its  beloved  is  Europe.  For 
2000 years,  Greece has  flirted with its West 
European  neighbors  to  the north,  but mar-
riage  has  never  before  been  on  the  cards. 
Now at last,  the confetti is  being prepared. 
But this latest affair is likely to be slow-mov-
ing.  Neither  the  bride  nor  the  groom  ex-
pect a wedding before 1979 at the earliest. 
The Greeks  first  expressed  their wish to 
join the European Community back in 1962 
when  they  signed an  EC  association  agree-
ment.  This deal  provided  for  the slow  re-
moval of tariffs  and other barriers  to  trade 
between the Community and Greece and for 
the gradual harmonization of the economies 
-for example  in  farm  policies.  The  idea 
was  that  by  1984 Greece would be  able  to 
become a full-fledged member of the Euro-
pean Community.  So  far,  so  good.  At that 
time  Greece  was  a  democracy.  It belonged 
to the Council of Europe (a kind of parlia-
mentary  talking shop  set  up after the war 
in  Strasbourg  on  the  German  border  of 
France to  discuss  European affairs).  It also 
belonged  to  the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization  (NATO) and played a key  role 
in  defending the Western alliance's  Medi-
terranean  frontiers.  So  it  was  quite  natural 
to  think  of  Greece  joining  the  European 
Community. 
Then in  1967 came a hammer blow. The 
colonels'  coup  which  overthrew  the  Greek 
Democratic system was  viewed with horror 
by  the rest  of Europe.  Greece was  chucked 
out of the Council of Europe,  and  the Eu-
ropean  Community  decided  to  freeze  most 
of the planned steps aimed at  harmonizing 
the Greek and the EC  economies.  Between 
1967  and  197  4,  relations  between  Greece 
and  the  Europeans  were  abysmal.  The Eu-
ropeans  regarded  Greece  as  an  outcast  and 
put the plans to  include Greece  in  the Eu-
ropean  Community on the back-burner. 
Then in 1974 the Cyprus crisis led to the 
overthrow of the Colonels'  regime.  Almost 
miraculously,  democracy  again  returned  to 
Athens-where  it  had  first  been  born  so 
long ago.  On June 23,  1974, the telephone 
rang  in  the  Paris  apartment of the  former 
Greek  Prime  Minister  Constantine  Kara-
manlis,  to  summon  him  home  to  lead  a 
provisional  government.  By  November, 
Karamanlis's own center-right party, known 
simply  as  "New  Democracy,"  had  tri-
umphed in an election, winning 54 per cent 
of  the  votes  and  a  parliamentary  majority 
of over two-thirds. 
"If'  ulking toward Europe": A  shoe shop in Janina. 
Robert  Mottar,  for  OECD,  Paris. 
One  of  the  principal  planks  in  Kara-
manlis's platform was  a promise to  reestab-
lish  links  with  the  European  Community. 
He reckoned  that if Greece  could join the 
Community, it would help anchor the fragile 
ship of democracy in Greece and would also 
bring  economic  gains  which  themselves 
would  increase  the  chances  of stability  in 
Greece.  Karamanlis's  views  on  the  Euro-
pean  Community were not opposed by  the 
main  opposition  party,  the  Center  Union, 
which got 21  per cent of the votes. The on-
ly  opposition  to  the European  Community 
came  from  the  far  left-the Pasok  Party 
(Socialists),  led  by  Andreas  Papandreou, 
which  got  14  per cent,  and  the  Commu-
nists,  who got 9 per cent of the votes. 
Both  these  parties  are  semi-Marxist  and 
do not want to see  Greece operate either in 
the  Western  alliance  or  as  a  free-market 
economy;  so  naturally  they  do  not  think 
much  of  the  capitalist  European  Commu-
nity.  Papandreou  is  a  bright,  charismatic 
politician who was  engaged in an academic 
career in the United States, until he was re-
called  to  head  an  economic  research  team 
by--ironically-none other  than  Karaman-
lis during one of his earlier administrations 
before  the  Colonels'  coup.  Although  Pa-
pandreou  did  not  pull  many  votes  in  the 
197 4  election,  he  is  regarded  as  a  future 
threat to centrist rule  in  Greece,  and Kara-
manlis is unlikely to ignore him. One meas-
ure of the power of the left in Greece was 
that within a few months of taking power, 
Karamanlis  felt  obliged to  pull Greece out 
of NATO's military command structure, al-
though  Greece  remained  a  member  of the 
alliance. 
Karamanlis  did  not  officially  submit the 
Greek  application  to  join  the  European 
Community until  last  June,  but he had al-
ready  sounded  out  European  reactions  and 
found a warm and friendly  response.  Poli-
EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY March 1976  17 ticians of all shades in Western Europe were 
determined  to  do what  they  could  to  help 
the  cause  of  Greek  democracy.  As  a  first 
step,  the EC  Commission was  asked to give 
an  opinion on  the  problems  involved with 
Greek  entry.  In the meantime,  other Euro-
pean politicians waxed  more  and  more  en-
thusiastic.  German  Chancellor  Helmut 
Schmidt  traveled  to  Athens  for  his  New 
Year holiday at the start of 1976 and held 
a  televised  press  conference  at  which  he 
emphasized  German support for the Greek 
application.  The  Germans  are  especially 
worried by  the instability throughout south-
ern Europe:  Spain and Portugal are  in tur-
moil.  Italy is  poised  for a semi-Communist 
government,  and  Yugoslavia  could  be  in 
ropean scale, and there has been some prog-
ress  toward the harmonization of standards 
in industry and commerce.  But most of the 
grand  political  targets  have  been  missed. 
There  is  still  no  semblance  of a  common 
foreign policy. 
The most glaring recent  example of this 
came  over Angola.  The British tried to  es-
tablish a common EC policy toward the An-
golan war, calling for the withdrawal of all 
foreign  troops.  But  the  French  refused  to 
agree and so  the Community could not even 
make  a  statement on the war.  Later,  when 
the  Marxist  MPLA  had  won  the  war,  the 
nine EC  governments made a desperate at-
tempt to coordinate their announcements of 
recognition  of  the  new  regime-but  once 
Signing the April 1975 protocol extended the r96r EC-Greek a.rsociation agreement to include the 
three new EC member states, and the love affair was out of the deep freeze. 
chaos  when  President  Tito  dies.  So  they 
want to  do  all  they  can  to help stability in 
Greece. 
BUT  IT  WAS  NOT  THE  POLITICIANS  of  the 
Nine who raised  the first  objections. These 
came  from  the  EC  Commission,  which  be-
gan to consider the problems if Greece was 
allowed to  join. These were listed  in  a pa-
per which the Commission agreed to at the 
end  of January  1976 and  delivered  to  the 
Council  of Ministers.  The  main  problems 
the ·  Commission considered were  the threat 
to  further  EC  integration.  For  the  last  10 
years,  the  European  Community has  stead-
ily  failed  to  meet  most  of  its  targets  for 
further  integration,  both  of political  deci-
sion-making  and  for  economic  and . mone-
tary  union.  The Community  has  succeeded 
in  creating  a  full  customs  union,  with  no 
tariffs  on  trade and in creating an EC-wide 
agricultural  policy.  There  are  a  variety  of 
funds-like  the  regional  and  social  funds 
- usefully redistributing resources on a Eu-
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again they  failed thanks to  non-cooperation 
from the French. 
The one hopeful feature  on  the scene  is 
that the nine governments have now agreed 
to  hold  direct  elections  for  the  European 
Parliament.  Until  now  this  parliament has 
been a toothless wonder, with no real pow-
ers.  But fans  of further  European  integra-
tion  reckon  that,  once  the  parliament  is 
given genuine democratic legitimacy by  be-
ing  directly  elected  rather  than  (as  now) 
merely  appointed  from  individual  parlia-
ments,  this  will  provide  a  major  spur  to 
integration. 
The long,  tortuous  negotiations to  bring 
Britain  (plus  Denmark  and  Ireland)  into 
the European Community and the period of 
uncertainty from  1961, when British Prime 
Minister  Harold Macmillan  first  suggested 
that Britain  should  join, until  1975,  when 
the  British  referendum  finally  confirmed 
that Britain would stay  in, did much to  de-
lay  progress  on integration in the European 
Community.  And  since  Britain  joined,  it 
has  proved  even  tougher  to  get  common 
decisions  than  in  the  original  Six,  for  ex-
ample over energy policy. 
Thus the Commission naturally fears  that 
if  Greece  joins  the  Community,  this  will 
yet  again  delay  integration.  What is  more, 
if  Greece  is  allowed  to  join  the  Commu-
nity,  it will  be  hard to  say  "no" to  Spain, 
Portugal,  or  Turkey-all  of  whom  might 
also want to  join at a later date. The bigger 
the European Community becomes, the more 
unwieldy  it  is  likely  to  become  and  the 
harder it will be to reach common decisions. 
THE  CHALLENGE  to  the European Commu-
nity's  foreign  policy:  Clearly,  it  would  be 
harder to reach agreement on foreign issues 
with  10  members  of the  Community.  But 
there is  another more specific problem. The 
Commission  fears  that  a  Community  in-
cluding Greece would have its hands tied on 
policy toward the Mediterranean, thanks to 
Greece's  unceasing  quarrel  with  Turkey, 
notably in Cyprus. Greece might also use its 
power as  an EC member  (with the right of 
veto over EC decisions)  to  stop Turkey im-
proving its links with Europe. In fact,  Kar-
amanlis has publicly said that if Greece were 
inside the European Community,  he  would 
support  any  application  by  Turkey  to  be-
come  a member.  But this  has  not  quashed 
suspicions of Greek motives,  both in  Brus-
sels and in Ankara. 
ADMINISTRATION  SNAGS:  The  Commission 
did not officially  list these in  its paper,  but 
Commission  officials  are  all  too  well  aware 
of them.  If Greece  joined the Community, 
a  host of Greek civil  servants  would  have 
to  be  brought to  Brussels,  and many  exist-
ing Commission  officials  would  have  to  be 
thrown  out.  Privately,  some  EC  observers 
wonder  if  the  Greeks  could  find  enough 
Gathering tobacco in a country where a third of 
the people work in agriculture. pofi of Pirueus,  are tlre.dl tarilf -free.
men of adequate caliber. A Greek Commis-
sioner would also have to be appointed to
join the other Commissioners who sit on the
board which runs the Commission. Even
more of a Droblcm is thrt Greek would have
to be adopied  as one of the EC official lrn-
guages. There are already six, and it causcd
quite enough pain when Britain, Denmark,
and Ireland joined--every  single piece of
EC paper hrd to be translated into English
and Danish. But, as thc Grceks can fairly
point out, the Community  was llso ready
to tdmit Norwiry  rrt the same time-which
would also huvc rneant the inclusion of an
extra language.
cosr: If Grecce joined the European Com-
munity, it would have to pay out large sums
to Greece under its existing  policies, includ-
ing the farm fund, the regional fund, and
the social fund. Like low-income  Ireland,
Greece would stand to benefit finLrncially
from nerrly all the present EC policies. Pre-
liminary calculations by the Commission
show that Greecc would be entitled to some
$4:0 billion from the Community  and
would only have to pay some $151 million
^ 
year. At a time when there is budget
stringency in every treasury in Europe, this
will not be popular and will divert funds
from much nccded areas inside the existing
Community.
coN{p[TrrroN  HAZARDs: Some members of
the eristing  Europcan  Community are a lit-
tle scary rbout thc effects of having to com-
pete with Greecc. Thc French and Italian
?arms and vineyards irc not wild about hav-
ing to compete with cheap tomatoes,
peaches, olive oil, and wine from Greece.
But this problem has been exaggerated.
Greek farm exports are not large and are
declining in relative importance.  Ten years
ago, four-fifths of Greek exports were firrm
goods. Today, only one-fifth  of exports  are
farm goods (although a third of Greeks
still work in agriculture).  As for Greek
wine imports,  these only account for a tiny
1.6 per cent of all EC wine imports-so
thcre is little need for the southern wine-
growers in the Community to shake their
bottles.
Much more important, however, is the
impact of free competition on Greece it-
self. Extra industrial competition  from the
European Community would not matter too
much: Two-thirds of all goods traded  be-
tween Greece lnd the Community are al-
ready tariff-free  under the customs  union
section of the 1962 association agreement.
But recent accords signed between the Eu-
ropean  Community and third countries,  in-
cluding European Irree Trade Association
(rrra) countries (like Norway and Portu-
gal), Third $7orld countries, and other
Mediterranean  states. mean that Greece will
be exposed to tough competition  especially
in farm goods. According to the Commis-
sion paper, "this aspect of membership
could give rise to serious problems."
\0i lAKN[ss of tlre Greek economy: If
Greece  joined the Community, it would be
easily the poorest nation of the Ten, with
an income per head even lower than that of
Ireland. This would not help progress  to-
ward monetary and economic union inside
the European Community. However, Greece
hirs been industrializing  rapidly, and be-
tween 1968 and t974 its average growth
rate was 6.6 per cent-neady  half as fast
rgirin as the EC average. True, it has ex-
perienced higher inflation, but this now
seems to be falling (1) per cent at the last
count). A bigger problem is the Greek trade
balance. It is in persistent deficit with all
nine EC countries and overall is badly in
the red. According to the Commission,  this
will probably "constitute a major constraint
on economic  growth in the coming five-year
period."
GREEK [MrcRATroN:  Some Europeans have
been irfraid that if poor Greece joined the
rich European  Community,  there would be
a stampede  of Greeks cmigrlting  to jobs in
thc rest of the Community.  Already some
290,o00 Greeks have jobs in the European
Community.  However, this fear seems illu-
sory. The recent trend in Greek emigration
to thc Community  has been dropping fast.
ln 797o, 68,000 Greeks emigrated to the
Europcrrn Community, but in 1974 only
10,000  Greeks emigrated to the Commu-
nity. In any cas€, the Greek Government is
keen to keep emigration low because it
wants to retain the labor to work Greece's
new developing industnes.
rVhen the Commission  discussed these
problems,  there was a heated debate,  but it
decided-against  opposition from several
Commissioners-to recommend  some delay
in letting Greece join. It advocated a pre-
membership  phase for Greece, in which
Greece could adjust slowly and in which the
rest of the European Community could pro-
vide aid to help it do so.
This suggestion  did not go down at all
well eithcr with the Greeks  or with the nine
EC governments. The Greek Government
reacted angrily. Karamanlis  summoned  all
his EC ambassadors home and explained
that Greece did not wrnt to become  a sec-
ond-class member of the European Commu-
nity but wanted to press ahead for full in-
tegration.  Greek newspapers headlined
their reports of the Commission's views
"EC Blackmails Greece."
Rut the Greeks need not have worried.
Two weeks later, the EC Council of Foreign
Ministers specifically rejected the Commis-
sion's plans for a pre-membership  phase  and
ordered negotiations  to start as soon as Pos-
sible. Talks will probably start in the sum-
mer. On the most optimistic  timetable,  they
could be concluded within a year, followed
by another year for ratification. This would
allcrw Greece to join in 1979, perhaps with
a five-year transitional period to full mem-
bership in 1984.
The negotiations  and the battles over
Greek entry are likely to be one of the cen-
tral preoccupations  of the European  Com-
munity for the next three years. If Greece
does succeed in joining the Community,
then there would be momentous consequen-
ces for both. For Greece, it would mean the
strongest  political link it has ever enjoyed
with West Europe. For the European Com-
munity, it would mean a new frontier-
and, for the first time, a gap in the Com-
munity's frontier (Yugoslavia  lies between
Greece  and the rest of the Community).
Morc important it would give the European
:::#:",O 
a foot in the eastern Mediter-
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Tu'o-thirds  ol all goods trtded betu,een Greece rtd t/te Contrtunitl,Iilch  di tbe.re bein,q.rhipped at tbeThe EC "Global" llpp-roath 
"This common  economic adventure affects 3  50 million people and 
provides every country in the region a better assurance of  peace." 
MARION BYWATER, editorial adviser to the Brttssels-based newsletter European Report 
The  maxim  that  EC  foreign  ministers 
should have better things to talk about than 
fish  fingers  is  attributed  to  that  old-school 
statesman,  Sir  Alec  Douglas-Home,  whose 
outburst came when, as  British foreign sec-
retary, he had to attend an interminable late-
night discussion in Brussels on negotiations 
with Norway. Whether he was right or not, 
he personally must have been  thankful-if 
the story is  true-that he was  only around 
for  the  design  stage  of  the  Community's 
overall,  or "global," approach to the Medi-
terranean. 
Foreign ministers who survived the basic 
philosophy  discussions  of  late  1972  were 
condemned  subsequently  to  learning about 
the importance of canned fruit salad to the 
At Januat·y 20 EC Council of Foreign Ministers 
meeting,  "which had better things to talk about 
than fi.rh  fingers," (left to right) Council Presi-
dent and Luxembourg Foreign Minister Gaston 
Thom, Commission President Franrois-Xavier 
Ortoli, and French Foreign Minister Jean Sau-
vagnargues. 
British  housewife,  to  discussing  the  com-
peting claims  of Italian and Tunisian olive 
oil,  to  deciding  whether  Italian  oranges 
were really  any  substitute for Israeli grape-
fruit,  to  defining  the  extent  of  Europe's 
commitment  to  importing  Algerian  wine 
(after all  it  was  the  French  who  planted 
the vines in teetotal Moslem Algeria in the 
first  place)  at  a  time  when  the  European 
Community was  swimming in a wine over-
flow  of  650  million  gallons,  to  deciding 
whether  cotton  yarn  from  Commonwealth 
Pakistan  has  a  stronger  claim  to  access  to 
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the British market than yarn from a factory 
in  EC  associate  Turkey,  which  was  built 
with a  financial  subsidy from  the Commu-
nity's  investment bank.  Over the last three 
and a half years  observers could easily have 
been forgiven for losing sight of the forest 
of political vision  for the trees  of tariff re-
ductions and social security improvements. 
But by  the beginning of 1975, the vision 
was  beginning to get the upper hand again 
-that dream described by EC Commissioner 
Claude Cheysson,  responsible for the Com-
munity's development policy, as  "a common 
economic  adventure  affecting  3  50  million 
people,  providing every  country  in  the  re-
gion a better guarantee of its independence, 
a better protection against external interfer-
ence,  a  better  assurance  of  peace.  In  this 
way, the industrial and economic experience, 
the  human  and  economic  wealth,  and  the 
very large European market will be brought 
together  on  the  one  hand  with  the  re-
sources, the space,  the peoples, and the am-
bitions  of our southern  neighbors  on  the 
other."  And  in  Cheysson's  view  it  is  not 
just the citizens of Marseilles, where he was 
speaking,  who  are  affected,  but  those  of 
northeastern Europe,  the Ruhr,  the Hansa, 
Scotland, and Jutland-"even if sometimes 
they may  have the feeling that the require-
ments of their defense, that their concept of 
economic organization, that their search for 
secure  energy  supplies  lead  them  to  look 
across  the  Atlantic  rather  than  the  Medi-
terranean." 
But it is early yet for the man in the street 
to feel much impact from the overall Medi-
terranean  policy:  Tariff concessions  at best 
slow the rate of price increase,  they do not 
bring prices down. Better social security for 
Europe's  migrant  workers-the  700,000 
Turks,  for  example-are  regrettably  more 
likely  to  cause  resentment  than  anything 
else.  In the transitional period until EC in-
dustry  has  adjusted  better  concessions  for 
Portuguese  textiles  exports,  when  employ-
ment in European textiles firms has dropped 
by  10-20 per cent in the last five  years,  re-
sentment is  also  likely.  And if the tourists 
who flock  to the Dalmatian Coast each year 
are  at  all  aware  that  the  European  Invest-
ment Bank is  putting up the money for the 
new  Adriatic  motorway,  they  are  unlikely 
to  appreciate,  or  care,  that  with  one  $50 
million  loan,  if it  comes  about,  the Com-
munity will have killed three political birds 
-bettering relations with Yugoslavia, keep-
ing Yugoslavia from  the arms of Comecon 
(the alternative  source  of financing),  and 
building a much-needed road  link between 
Greece and Austria  (the only surface route 
to  the rest of the European Community for 
Main street in Dubmvnik, Yugo.rlavia, a countfy which could have had closer EC ties but preferred to 
preserve its political neutrality. Greek merchandise if and when Greece  be-
comes a member).
rr ALL CAME ABour essentially  because of
EC enlargement  to take Britain, Denmark,
and Ireland on board in 1973. By the eady
Seventies, the Six had a piecemeal network
of trade arrangements scattered around the
Mediterranean  that had arisen more by luck
than judgment: A preferential trade agree-
ment with Spain, concluded in 1970. Prefer-
ential association  agreements (the differ-
ence being that association agreements in
some cases come with the option of eventual
by Commonwealth preference in trade.
(Cyprus  was kept at bay in the interim with
a limited association  agreement, which came
into effect in May 1973, and temporary  pro-
tocols were concluded with a number of
other countries to prevent a legal vacuum
where possible.) In addition, Britain had
long-standing trade relations with Spain and
Israel, which in particular sold large quanti-
ties of agricultural  produce  to the less pro-
tected British market. This fact has added a
certain disincentive to the Spaniards to ne-
gotiations in the past couple of years since
out of this patchwork, the Community  de-
cided in November 1972 thil it would ofter
preferential  deals to any country bordering
the Mediterranean. The approach  was not
originally conceived in quite such gcnerous
terms as finally emerged after three years of
haggling. This was cssentially due to the
efforts of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.
Their hand was strengthened  in the mean-
time by their post-energy crisis position of
power. Having  seen what the African  coun-
tries to the south of them (some of them
fellow Arab states) had obtained when they
Valletta, lhe capitdl ol lllalta, whose rcuieued and expanded agreenent uitb the Commznity  is expected  to go ittro effect  larer rbis year.
Malta  Covernment  Tourist Boarq.
membership)  with Greece and Turkey, con-
cluded in 1962 and 1964. A non-preferen-
tial trade deal in the pipeline (it was con-
cluded in 1973) with Yugoslavia (which
could have had closer ties but preferred  to
preserve its political neutrality and which in
consequence hovers on the edge of the EC
global approach). Preferential trade agree-
ments with Morocco  and Tunisia, dating
from 1969. A commercial and technical co-
operation agr€ement  with Lebanon, going
back to 1965, and a still unratified  prefer-
ential trade agreement with the same coun-
try, signed in I972, the year a similar agree-
ment was signed with Egypt. And an asso-
ciation  agreement with Malta, which took
effect in 1971. $fith Algeria the Community
had never reached agreement, and Algiers
maintained privileged bilateral  arrangements
with France.
All these had to be adapted to enlarge-
ment. It was mostly at Spanish  insistence,
that technical adjustments were not enough
but that adaptation  to a new economic real-
iry was needed, that the overall approach
was born. And obligations  of the new mem-
ber states had to be grafted on as well:
There were Britain's  political commitments
to Malta and Cyprus, which were reinforced
any agreement would mean higher British
tariff walls to jump in Spain's biggest EC
market for farm produce-hence  part of
Spain's ernphasis on a more sweeping ap-
proach than the Community  originally  en-
visaged. Israel was in a similar position but
less inclined  to balk, since the political ad-
vantages of an agreement were so consid-
erable whatever the economic cost.
Then there was Portugal, one quarter of
whose exports go to its former European
Free Trade Association  (rrr,r) partners,
Britain and Denmark, and for whom the
industrial free trade agreement formula de-
vised for the other EFTA countries was
hardly suitable because  most of Portuguese
tr:rde is in agricultural  goods (crnned sar-
dines, tomato concentrate, and of course yet
more wine). But while Portugal was still a
dictatorship, the Community was extremely
circumspect, and Erre treatment  with some
extra concessions  had to do. Since the
change of regime, however,  Portugal has
been welcomed  into the EC Mediterranean
policy fold, though it remains something  of
an odd country out, rejecting association  or
membership  and working out its own solu-
tions.
Faced with mirking a meaningful whole
signed the Lom6 Convention, they saw no
reason why they should not do as well.
(The unspoken  rcason in the Community's
mind for disagreeing being that these coun-
tries are a far more realistic competitive
threat. )
The resulting  compromise  for the coun-
tries of the southern side of the Mediter-
ranean included: Completely free access to
EC markets for industrial  goods with only
the vaguest  commitment  to reciprocate  at
some "appropriate" undefined  date in the
future. Generous  access for their most im-
portant agricultural produce (much of
which competes with that of southern EC
countries and is better quality because it
gets more sun). A better deal for their
migrant workers in EC factories and their
families, whether  they accompanied  them or
stayed  at home, and financial and technical
assistance. In some cases this has been
backed up by a special food aid eftort and
most recently  an agreement on agricultural
supplies with Egypt. In addition, the fact
that the Community is now almost the sole
support of the United Nations Relief and
\forks Agency (uNnva), which looks
after Palestinian  refugees,  has not gone un-
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" ::,::,:::i,:::Arrrbs thcnrselvcs dcclinc to  support
IJNR\\'A bec:nrsc thcy do not $'rrnt it to lrc
infcrrctl tlr.rt thcy rccognizc thc pcrmrrncnce
of thc sittrrrtion.) Of rrll thc countrics on
thc southcrn sidc of the Mcditcrrrrncan  only
Liby.r hrrs ncvcr rcsl.rondcd  to the (-omrnu-
nity's trdvanccs.
(.or-rntrics on nortlrcrn  sidc of thc Mcdi-
terrirne;ur s'crc to get hrgcly the same cx-
cc1>t that thcy rvcrc cxpcctcd  to rcciprocrrte
thc trrrde conccssions end do without thc
nroney. In pr.rctice, .rs firr irs the moncy  is
conccrned,  cxccptions rrre beconring the
rttlu: Prr1111g.,1 rs gcttlng tcltrt'cssion.try
gr.rnts; thc Yugosl;n's q,ill bc ablc to bor-
r,rw fror.t-t thc Eurol-rc,tn Invcsttnent Brrnk at
its nornal l slightly lou'er than markct)
rltcs, rrnd Isr;rel h.rs l-rccn prouriscd linan-
cial hclp .rs u'cll u,hcn thc de:rls u'ith the
Arirb countrics  rrrc complcte.
A'I THII SAilf It ltIf tj (;RIitjOIt irnd Turkcy
u,crc promisecl that thc (-ornrr-runity u'ould
rnrrke sure th.rt, if  thcy turned out to bc
gctting less flvor,rl'rlc  tcrms, tl-rcir rrrrirnglc-
tncnts u'ould be brought  Ll[) to prrr. (]rcccc
hrrs solvcd its o*'n prolrlcms  and staycd onc
jump ,rhc..rd of thc othcrs by applying to
corrpcte fron.r insidc. Turkcy -rrlwal's  scn-
sitivc rrnd .rlrerrdy dubious  that thc Turkish
Cypriot irreirs of (-yprus were gctting u'hat
it would rcgrrrd irs rr flir  dcal undcr thc
Cyprus rgrccr.ncnt-is currcntly  fceling
hard done by. \X/hile the (-on.ununity  secms
in no hurry to rrlign agriculturrrl  conccssions
(thc main bone of contcntion)  until the
lirst Mcditcrrrrn€an  irgrccment hrrs bccn con-
cludcd, Turkcy felt it hLrd a right to shout
"foul' as soon rls Isracl conch.rdcd  its dcrrl
lrrst yeirr. The cxperts hirvc so fer turncd rr
dcrrf c:rr to repcatcd plc:Ls by forcigrr  rnin-
istcrs to consider  thc politic;rl implicrrtrons
of more delay.
(, o n n i r.t i o t e r ( ) I t u d e, C /s t, I' r r o n. " C r e t t i n,q,t
ton!tIiIit  t' tbrttt."
Thc implicrrtior.rs of this zone of privi-
lcgcd rclrttionships in thc Meditcrr;rncrrn---
in addition  to custonts  union with thc lr.r,r
countries ar-rd thc prcfcrcnti:rl  Lon-r6 Con-
vcntion with ,i6 Africr,.t, (.rrribbcan,  .rnd
Pircific statcs-is that the (-ommunity hes
rnorc prcfcrcntial then non-prcfcrcntial  ties.
A sitr-retion u,hich h.rd to bc squared at thc
outsrt with the (,cner.rl Agicenrcnts on
Trriffs rrnd Tradc (c;alr') pirtners, pirr-
ticulrrrly thc [Jnitcd St:rtcs, which had with
rnuch reluctrrncc rrgrccd  that thc Europeln
(-ommunity could go this far lnd no furthcr
--a pledgc it has rcccntly bccn trying to
explilin to non-cA'IT mcrnbcr Irrrn. So frrr
it hrrs succecdcd in holding  the linc.
But it hirs not bccn roses all thc wiry.
Evcn the cver-optimistic  E(- (-ornmision  was
adrnitting in licbruary 1974, by u,hich tirr-re
it had becn hopcd that the first wevc of
talks would be cornplctc,  that "the Commu-
nity's position on this mlttcr is still imprc-
cisc rnd in somc rcspccts  sketchy."  This
follou'cd rcjection by the first wave of ncgo-
tiating partncrs-the  Mlghrcb countrics
(Algcria, Morocco, Tunisia), Isracl, and
Sprrin- of thc Community's initial offcrs.
Morcovcr, the (.ornmunity's careful plans
for Isrircli-Arirb balincc. with Splin thrown
in to bro,rdcn thc- b.rse, ,oon ..,i,. unstuck:
Sp;rin provcd thc most intransigcnt and
laggcd behind. Israel u';rs rnrrinly intcrcstcd
in thc politics and forgcd ahead. Aftcr con-
cluding ncgotiations  rvith Isracl in Janu-
uy 197), thc (-ommunity  draggcd its fcet
on sign.rturc irs Iong rrs it decently cor.rld
in thc hopc thlt the Maghreb  agrccments
could be implcmented at thc srrmc time. It
was not to be, lnd Isrlcl's pitct took cffcct
on July I, l9lS.
In fact, thc negotirrtions with thc "sctting
sun" M.rghrcb countrics wcre finished just
bcforc and eftcr (-hristmirs-not  without
somc lirst minute clrssing of fingcrs: \7hirt
if cithcr Algcril or Morocco  rcfuscd to sign
if  the othcr did bccause of thcir conflict
over thc Spanish Sahara; and how ironic
thrt this conflict should occur rt thc time
thc (-ommunity u,as busy sclling its one
of thc rrgrccn'rcnts'  ;rdvrrntrrgcs  thtt products
rvhich h.rvc undergonc  diffcrcnt  stages of
proccssing in diffcrcnt Maglrrcb countrics
u'ould bc rrblc to count them as one for
purposcs of pr,rving origin to <lualify for
prcfcrentill  tr.rde tcrms. Thcn the Moroc-
cln and Tunisiln (iovernmcnts  showcd
signs of wiinting to disavou, thcir negotil-
tors by rejecting thc wholc p;rckrrgc, but de-
spite last-rr.rinutc elurms, it is now all cx-
pected to comc out right in thc end. The
:rgrccrncnts, ;rlong with rr rcvic*,cd  rrnd cx-
panded agreement with Milt;r, rrrc cxpcctcd
to bc implcmentcd lrrte this yc;rr.
So now the Community t.rn go ()n to
tackling thc "rising sun" Mrrchr:Lk coun-
trics (Egypt, Syria, thc Lcbanon, Jord:rn)
irnd thcn (.yprus. At thc s.rmc timc it c.rn
come to som€ srrtngcmcnt with Splin, fin-
ish talks on a bettcr dcal with Portugal,  and
then do something about Turkey. By that
time, as Commissioner  Cheysson  pointed
out whcn prcsenting the final Maghreb
.rgrccments, and making projections about
the rcsulting potential for triangular  co-
operdtion involving use of EC know-how
plus Arab c;rpital and these countries' man-
1>ou,er-thc Comrnunity will be faced with
rr competitivc threitt frrr more real than any
dangers it exposcd its economy to via the
Lom6 Convention.  The challenge will be
in emphasizing the complcmentxrity  and
rninimizing thc constraints. If  it  works,
these EC "devclopment  contrrrcts" may
prove a modcl for dcalings  with the Third
World.
"rlnd thct lbc'rt'tt.tr Porlt.qtl.'IIrrc'Porlt.qrt'rc,  I:orti.ytt Minii/,r ilrlo Ail/il)t(t  (cc'ntL,r)  t jtit.r Bra.s-
.rels it Jtnrty /o nc'tt u'ith Conni.rion Prc,sidtnt I:rtnluir-Xtritr  Ortoli (ri.<ht) tnd Couni.r.rion
l/ ice Pre.ridtr t Chti.r top her Sotnet.
Cre,rtin,q,t
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"Spain is the problem,  Europe is the solution," said Ortega y Gas  set 65  years ago. 
He could have been talking about today. 
WALTER NICKLIN, European Community's editor and a recent visitor to Spain 
As  the train  jerked to  a start from lrun to 
Madrid, the bereted, old man and his wife 
bowed and crossed themselves.  It would be 
a  long  trip  (eight  hours) -particularly 
long  in  second  class  on  the  Spanish  rail-
way,  notoriously  bad  by  West  European 
standards.  From the border town  near  the 
French  coast  where  trains  from  the  Com-
mon Market countries  must switch  wheels 
for  Spain's  broad  gauge  tracks,  the  train 
would  wind  through  the  Basque  country, 
that  ethnic  ache  in  the  false  heart  of 
Spanish unity; through the Pyrenees passes, 
with their great trout fishing and beautiful 
evocations  of deja  v11  to  the  Hemingway-
schooled  Western  imagination;  over  the 
Rappahannock River of Spain's Civil War, 
the Ebro; onto the  beaten  plateau paths of 
the  two  Castiles,  which,  to  quote  philoso-
pher Ortega y Gasset,  "made Spain," gave 
it a language, nationhood, and a capital. 
The  next  morning,  after another  eight-
hour wait,  the couple would genuflect  and 
cross  themselves  again.  This time  in  front 
of Generalissimo Francisco  Franco's corpse 
and coffin.  They  had  waited  in  a  line,  up 
to  six  abreast,  that  began  at  the  National 
Palace,  crossed  the  Plaza  de  Oriente, 
wound  its  way  to  the  Puerta  del  Sol  and 
beyond,  almost  to  the  Prado,  doubling 
back  on  itself  in  the  narrow,  sixteenth-
century  side  streets  like  a  stream  near  the 
source.  And  it  was  merely  one  of several 
lines- officially  estimated  at  a  total  of  l 
million  persons-all  emptying  before  the 
captain-general-uniformed  body  in  the 
mahogany  casket,  the  center  of  Spain  for 
48 hours. 
They waited  for  Franco,  even  in  death. 
And  they  had  waited  34  days  for  him  to 
die- through  influenza,  Parkinson's  dis-
ease,  phlebitis, peritonitis, pneumonia,  kid-
ney failure,  internal hemorrhages, ulcerated 
stomach,  cardiac  infarctus  and  arrest.  But 
they had also waited several years:  "Franco 
was  too old," is  a typical remark even from 
a far-rightist,  who then goes on to describe 
the Caudillo as a "soft dictator." Of course, 
Cookson,  The  Evening News,  london. 
Bas,  Tachydromos,  Greece. 
those  on  the  left,  whether  in  or  out  of 
Spain,  had  waited  too.  You  could  even 
find  some  members  of  Spain's  outlawed 
political  parties  in  the  mourning  lines-
as  if to make certain,  with their own eyes, 
that  Franco  was  indeed  dead ... finally. 
(A joke making the rounds in Brussels had 
a  punchline  about  the  necessity  of driving 
a  wooden  stake  through  Franco's  heart.) 
For  the  most  part,  however,  the  left  was 
not on the streets, wanting neither to  swell 
the  homage  nor  to  stimulate  countermeas-
ures  with  premature  celebration.  They 
were  behind closed  doors,  toasting Spain's 
rebirth  with  champagne  and,  when  that 
ran out, roija.  Perhaps more to  the point in 
the  puzzle  of  Spain's  future,  there  were 
those  who stayed  in  the privacy  and bour-
geois  comfort  of  their  homes  simply  be-
cause  they  could  see  it  all  on  television: 
Once  tuned  in,  they  sang  along  with  the 
falangist  hymn  "Face  to  the  Sun"  and 
rendered  their  last  glimpse  of  Franco  tn 
straight-armed salutes. 
"Viva Franco . .. Viva Juan Carlos  . 
Viva  El  Rey !"  The  funeral  procession--·· 
Franco's coffin  on  a flatbed  army truck fol-
lowed  by  Prince,  now  King,  Juan  Carlos 
and  the  palace  guard of  lancers  on  h·)rse-
back- -·left  a  wake  of  anachronistic  shouts 
along  the  street-lined  crowds.  That  is  to 
say, "The king is  dead, long live the king." 
As  dictator,  Franco  had  been  more  king 
than  those  who  have  the  title,  a  king  in 
the  way  kings  used  to  rule.  The emotions 
that November day  are  hard  to  understand 
for anyone who shMcd the almost universal 
distaste  for  Franco.  But,  not  too  simply 
put,  Franco  was  (or  pretended  to  be) 
Spain,  and vice  versa.  ("Long live  Spain ! 
Up with Spain!" were his last words to the 
Spanish people.) Time-36 of his 82 years 
as  chief  of  state- had  something  to  do 
with  it:  He was  the  only  leader most  liv-
ing Spaniards  had  ever known.  Even  if a 
man  hates  his  father,  the  father's  death 
brings  emotion;  familiarity  breeds  senti-
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"Franco Franco Franco,"  the blown kisses, 
the  reverent  bows,  the  tears.  Grief,  sub-
limated in ritual,  then turned to  relief that 
the  inevitable  death  was  over,  the  waiting 
finally  finished;  as  Juan  Carlos  passed,  the 
crowds  gave  deferring  applause  to  El 
Caudillo's  last  will  and  testament,  the 
peaceful  transfer  of power  to  the  Borb6n 
grandson of Spain's last king. Then, in the 
same  life-goes-on  stability  of  the  Franco 
regime,  the  street  cleaners  got  quickly  to 
work.  They  were  shaded  by  the  changing 
leaves  of  40-foot  sycamores,  planted  in 
Madrid's  Civil  War rubble  not  long after 
the  37-year-old  Juan  Carlos  was  born.  No 
matter  what  happens  in  Spain  this  year, 
they will endure longer. 
THE REST OF WESTERN EUROPE had waited 
as  well,  but usually  less  patiently and  less 
passively.  There had been  no  CIA-like as-
sassination  plots,  to  be  sure;  but there had 
been other, more reasonable attempts to in-
fluence  internal  Spanish  policy.  The  last 
public  act  for  which  Franco,  brutally  in 
character,  will  be  remembered  outside 
Spain is  illustrative-the summary trial and 
execution of five  alleged Spanish terrorists, 
despite  pleas  for  mercy  from  other  West 
European governments and even  the Pope. 
Outraged Europeans  immediately  respond-
ed  with  public  demonstrations;  at  Leuven 
University  the  students  were  particularly 
furious  in  their  "Franco  assassin"  graffiti, 
as  if  the  ghost  of Erasmus,  whose  books 
had been burned in  the Spanish Inquisition 
Low Countries, was at work; Danish trans-
port workers  staged  a  48-hour boycott  on 
all traffic  to  Spain;  outside Paris  a Spanish 
military  attache  was  gunned  down  with 
automatic  weapon  fire.  Within  days  most 
West  European  governments  had  recalled 
their  ambassadors  from  Madrid.  Also 
within  days  the  European  Community's 
Commission  decided  it was  not possible  to 
continue  discussions  for  a  new  Spanish 
trade agreement,  a decision  quickly  ratified 
by the nine EC foreign ministers. 
Across  the  Atlantic,  meanwhile,  it  was 
business  as  usual  for the US  Government, 
in the process  of renegotiating its  "friend-
ship  and  cooperation  agreement"  with 
Spain.  ("Europe can  afford  the  luxury  of 
moral  self-righteousness,"  said  one  State 
Department official  in  Brussels.  "It doesn't 
have the weight of our higher responsibili-
ties.")  Buddying  around  with  an  interna-
tional  pariah  is  certainly  nothing  new  for 
Washington, which in  195 3 first  concluded 
its  Spanish  pact,  a  year  when  Cold  War 
realities made the 1946 United Nations ex-
clusion  of  Spain  seem  a  naivete  from  a 
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The EC-Spain handshake: Spanish Foreign Minister Jose Maria de Areilu (right) 1 1 isits EC Commis-
sion President Fran~·ois-Xavier Ortoli in Brussels in February. 
fairyland  world.  With  detente,  not  Cold 
War,  the  conceptual  catchword  emanating 
from  the  Executive  Branch,  1976  is  not 
1953;  and  unless  Juan  Carlos  puts  more 
distance  between himself and his  predeces-
sor,  Administration  policy  doesn't  taste  so 
good  to  American  liberal  opinion,  which 
on  the  other  hand  was  full  of  praise  for 
the European Community's Spanish  policy. 
The  Neu'  York  Time.r  commented  in  an 
editorial:  "In these  as  well  as  other  recent 
events,  it  has  not  been  the  United  States 
but  its  European  allies  who  have  demon-
strated that they  take seriously the Atlantic 
alliance's  commitment to  'the principles of 
democracy,  individual liberty,  and the  rule 
of  law.'  Ironically,  it  will  almost  surely 
turn  out  that  in  taking  these  ideals  seri-
ously,  the Europeans also  took  the path of 
realism  and  enlightened  Western  self-
interest."  The  New  Yorker.  in  its  post-
Vietnam "Talk of the Town":  "The Com-
mon  Market, which may  be  the only  polit-
ical  association,  in  the  world  composed 
entirely  of  democratic  governments,  has 
shown a willingness to  do what the United 
States  has  so  conspicuously  failed  to  do  in 
recent decades:  to  make judicious use of its 
political power in order to support liberty." 
There's  parallax  in  the  Iberian  Penin-
sula.  The  same  day  the  EC  Commission 
announced  its  suspension  of  trade  talks, 
Spaniards  answered  with  dancing-in-the-
streets  rallies  displaying  massive  support 
for  their  Government.  Even  discotheque 
proprietors responded,  by  forbidding music 
from  "anti-Spanish"  countries.  True,  the 
public  demonstrations  were  well  orches-
trated,  in  a  country  prone  to  dropping 
leaflets  on  itself;  but  that  they  could  be 
orchestrated  at  all  affirms  nationalistic,  not 
"European,"  loyalties.  "Spaniards  are 
grown up.  .  .  Europe wants  to  suck  our 
blood,"  read  the  banners  in  the  Plaza  de 
Oriente,  where  a  month  later  Franco's 
final  mass  would  be  given.  "If European 
governments  and  organizations  seek  once 
again  to  influence  the  course  of events  in 
our country,  they are  again misjudging the 
Spanish  character,"  said  Gregorio  Lopez 
Bravo,  who  as  foreign  minister  had  exe-
cuted  the  Spanish  policy  seeking  member-
ship in  the  Common Market and  relations 
with  Eastern  Europe.  "It  is  not  on  the 
basis  of shameless  pressure  against our in-
stitutions  that  the  goal  of  incorporating 
the Spanish people into common European 
tasks can be achieved." 
Even  liberal  Spaniards  condemned  the 
West  Europeans  for  forgetting  what  the 
perception  of  outside  pressures  can  do-
the  postwar  Soviet  menace  had  forged 
European  cohesion.  In  an  emotionally 
charged  atmosphere where  an  attack  upon 
Franco  was  felt  to  be  an  attack  upon 
Spain,  Western  Europe's  actions  strength-
ened  only  the  right-wing  "bunker."  This 
"outside threat"  thus  provided  rationaliza-
tion  for  the  regime's  rounding  up  poten-
tially  trouble-making  dissidents,  in  a  cam-
paign  of  repression  known  as  "Operation 
Lucero" to ensure domestic peace and unity 
during  frail  Franco's  lingering  death.  In 
short,  the  foreign  meddling-reminiscent 
of  the  Spanish  Civil  War-was  counter-
productive. The Spanish Civil War: 
ALONG  WITH  THE  PYRENEES,  a  time  warp 
separates  the  Iberian  Peninsula  from  the 
rest  of Europe.  Portugal-it took Western 
Europe two years of turmoil to recognize-
is  a  developing country.  And  only  now  is democratic  Europe  learning  that  Spain's 
193  7-39  Civil War is  over.  For  3  7  years, 
stability and sanity at stake, Spain has  been 
trying to  forget  it;  the hotflashes  of mem-
ory  are  of  the  bloodshed  and  the  cruelty 
on  both  sides,  "never  again."  For  the 
"new" Europe it is  a war that would not be 
forgotten.  Indeed  a  uniting  Western  Eu-
rope doesn't want to forget it-the prelude 
to  its  own  great  civil  war,  World  War 
Two,  itself  the  negative catalyst  for  Euro-
pean  integration.  As  long  as  the  Franco 
legacy lives, Europe will never be united. 
The romance  of a  lost cause-not pres-
ent-day  realities-propelled  anti-Franco 
demonstrators  into  the  streets  of Western 
Europe. That, together with the perception 
of  Spain  as  integral  to  Western  Europe's 
fate,  helps explain the lack of similar pro-
test against similar,  often worse,  repression 
in  Eastern  Europe.  Thus,  too,  the  outcries 
from  West  European  governments,  whose 
leaders  spent their youth  fighting  fascism. 
Also  their  re-election  means  courting 
domestic,  not  Spanish,  opinion.  Their 
constituents  include  not  only  student 
demonstrators  but also  families  of Spanish 
Civil  War  dead  (for  France  alone  an  es-
timated  3,000)  and  those  Spanish  Repub-
lican exiles who renewed their political ac-
tivism  in  the host countries  (for example, 
through  the  postwar  "European  Move-
ment"  toward a  United States  of Europe.) 
Privately many government officials  now 
admit that,  in  the diplomatic world where 
form equals substance,  it was indeed coun-
terproductive  to  withdraw  their  ambassa-
dors from Madrid and to refuse representa-
tion  at  Franco's  funeral.  (Of  all  the  EC 
countries,  only Ireland kept its  ambassador 
at  his  Madrid post,  for a  complex of rea-
sons:  In  the  pot-calling-the-kettle  syn-
drome,  Ireland has  its  own urban guerrilla 
problem;  given  the  historical,  racial,  relig-
ious  affinity  with Spain  that only  the  Irish 
can  explain,  "Dublin knew it would serve 
no useful purpose,"  said  one Irish official. 
French diplomacy chose Cartesian logic: To 
most  Spaniards,  the  French  ambassador 
was  vacationing;  to  the  rest  of  Western 
Europe,  he  was  recalled  in  protest.)  The 
one foreign action that could perhaps force 
Spanish  liberalization-the  suspension  of 
EC  trade  talks-di'd  more  to  help  the 
Common  Market's  self-image  than  to  in-
fluence  events  in  Spain.  "Suddenly  the 
word  'Europe,'  which  up  to  now  has 
meant boredom to  the young,  has  taken on 
attractive  colors,"  said  the  French  weekly 
Le  Nom1el  Observatettr.  But  in  Spain  the 
EC  action  was  diluted  by  its  timing,  the 
passion of the moment.  For the talks were 
already  in  a  state  of  de  facto  suspension 
over  purely  bread-and-butter  negottatmg 
issues.  Thus  the  EC  Commission's  public 
announcement was  branded by even "Euro-
pean"  Spaniards  as  "an  infuriating,  band-
wagen  gesture  heightening  emotion  and 
solidifying extremism." 
The question of whether one or several 
countries  can,  short  of  war  or  other  vio-
lence,  effect  desired  changes  in  another 
country's  domestic politics  is  as  old as  the 
notion  of country  itself.  And remains  un-
answered;  indeed,  a  country's  foreign  pol-
icy  is  schizophrenic  to  the  degree  it  vacil-
lates  between  an  idealistic  "yes"  and  a 
status  quo  "no"  (witness  imperial  versus 
isolationist  America) .  But  there  can  be 
little  argument  about  the  influence  of the 
international  environment;  in  the  charac-
teristic  fatalism  of  El  Caudillo  and  his 
ose.  This  was  the  conclusion  of  Franco 
technocrats  in  a  secretive,  lay  Catholic 
society called Opus Dei, which had studied 
the  booming  economies  of  the  rest  of 
Western  Europe.  Rigid  capital  controls 
were  relaxed;  foreign  investment  and 
trade, promoted. 
The  Spanish  economic  miracle-an  apt 
phrase in view of the country's now liberal 
and  pragmatic  Catholicism--was  on  its 
way.  Per capita  income,  less  than  $300  in 
1960,  reached  over  $2,000  in  1974.  The 
economic  growth  rate,  averaging  nearly  7 
per  cent  a  year,  has  been  second  only  to 
Japan's  and  industrial  capacity  now  ranks 
tenth  in  the world.  Other statistics  (from 
the  Organization  for  Economic  Coopera-
tion  and  Development,  OECD) :  The in-
fant mortality  rate,  at  15.1  deaths  per  1,-
Attendinf!. accession ceremonies for Juan Cm-los in Madrid are:  (front row, left to right) German Presi-
dent Walter Scheel and French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing; (third row) US Vice President and 
Mrs. Nelson Rockefeller, and Princess Graet: of Monaco. "And their lingering figuratit1e presence will 
probably help exorcise Franco's ghost." 
countrymen,  Spain  adapted  to  a  world 
without  Hitler.  And  today's  International 
Brigade  is  made up,  not of  rusty-rifle-tot-
ing poets,  but of tourists,  traders,  and  in-
vestors. 
The  irony  is  that  the  US  military  base 
agreement  probably  did  more  to  open  up 
Spain  than  any  conscious  outside  efforts 
ever  would  have.  For  the  American  mili-
tary  presence  brought  dollars,  then  tour-
ists  and more  dollars.  Not to  mention  the 
cultural  baggage  that  Americans,  whether 
soldiers  or  tourists,  don't  check  onto  re-
turning  planes.  By  the  late  Fifties,  the 
proliferation  of  dollars,  and  the  attendent 
mentality  of  consumptive  consumerism, 
posed  a  bigger  menace  to  the  archaic  re-
gime than all  the clandestine liberals com-
bined,  indeed  the  greatest  internal  threat 
to  Spanish  stability  since  the  Civil  War. 
The  National  Socialistic  autarky  would 
have  to  pollute  itself  with  Western  eco-
nomics  to  survive  or,  rather,  metamorph-
000  live  births,  is  lower  than  that  of  the 
United  States,  at  17.6.  There  are  almost 
as  many  telephones  per  1,000  inhabitants, 
at  164,  as  there  are  in  F ranee,  at  199. 
Take  the  high  road  north  from  Madrid 
and  you'll  see  suburban  homes-cum-pools, 
the  opulent  architecture  of  which  makes 
you  think  you're  in  Dallas,  Texas.  Go 
south  toward  Toledo  and  you'll  see,  jux-
taposed with one-room shanties  and mule-
drawn carts,  rush-hour traffic  jams of Seat-
Fiat  500's  and  low-cost  highrises  to  equal 
any  low-income  housing  in  the  United 
States.  And you'll  see  perhaps  the  truest 
index of uneven economic progress-goats 
eating the road-strewn  litter and  refuse of 
a newly imbiding consumer society. 
"JUST  BECAUSE  I  LIKE  GOOD  RESTAU-
RANTS,"  a  young Madrid  resident  says  of 
her visit last year to old friends  in  Lisbon, 
"they call  me a  fascist. ... If freedom  is 
what's happening in Portugal, I don't want 
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in  her  mid-twenties  and  representative  of 
Spain's  not-long-ago-nonexistent  middle 
class,  has  traveled  elsewhere  in  Europe: 
"Everywhere  I  go  they  say  Franco  was 
awful,  but I live better here than anywhere 
I've visited."  She  has  recently  completed  a 
three-year  course  in  "tourism  techniques" 
and  continues  her  studies  at  Madrid  Uni-
versity  in  philosophy  and  art.  (According 
to  OECD  figures,  a  higher  percentage  of 
the  relevant  age  group  receives  college-
level  education  in  Spain  than  in  most 
Western countries- despite new,  tough en-
trance  exams  designed  to  keep  enrollment 
in  Spain's overcrowded schools down,  and, 
critics  say,  to  keep  the less  privileged  anti-
status quo classes cut.) 
For a young woman whose father fought 
on  the  Republican  side  during  the  Civil 
War,  her opinions  seem  out  of joint.  But 
the father now has  a high-paying job as  an 
economist with a Spanish firm;  and,  while 
his  F rancophobia  persisted,  he  admired El 
Caudillo's  "honesty,  which  matched  his 
cruelty." What memories have been passed 
onto  the  daughter  of  Republican  Spain 
are of paranoia:  "Maybe  the  Russians  are 
giving  guns  to  the  Basques,"  she  posits. 
And of never-again:  "If the left takes over 
Spain,  we  would  have  the  same  situation 
as  now,  only  worse-no  freedom  and  no 
prosperity.  .  .  .  We  are  politically  un-
educated.  People  scream  for  democracy 
without knowing what it means.  We must 
go slow." 
Like  Pavlov's  dog,  Spain  is  being 
slowly  led  to  the  socio-economic  goodies 
of a  pluralistic society.  And the European 
Community can  play  the  behavioral  scien-
tist.  Forty  per  cent  of  Spain's  external 
trade,  both export and import, goes to  and 
comes  from  the  EC  Nine.  Without  the 
foreign  currency  of  vacationing  European 
neighbors,  Spain  (which  generates  the 
most,  at  almost  $3  billion  annually,  net 
tourist  revenue  among  the  OECD  coun-
tries)  would  have  a  payments  deficit  near 
economic  anarchy.  If  almost  a  million 
Spaniards  (one-thirteenth  of  the  country's 
labor force)  couldn't find  jobs  as  migrant 
workers  in  the  rest  of  Europe,  the  con-
sequent  tripling  of  Spain's  unemployment 
rate  might  lead  to  civil  disorder,  if  not 
war.  Direct  foreign  investment,  though 
mostly  American  and  attracted  in  part  by 
a  favorable  tax  base,  would  have  little 
reason  to  flow  into  a  Spain  whose  access 
to  other European markets was limited. 
Not  that  the  Common  Market  would 
ever  withhold  these  rewards  as  punish-
ment  for  Spain's  not  joining the  Western 
democratic  club- the  damage  to  the 
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Nine's  economies  would  be  intolerable, 
particularly  those  of France  and  Germany. 
(True,  the European Parliament,  the  nom-
inal  Common  Market  legislature,  and 
European  trade  unions  did  call  for  eco-
nomic  sanctions  last  autumn;  their  voices 
may  be  loud  but,  in  this  particular matter, 
lacked  power and thus  responsibility.)  On 
the  other  hand,  the  mere  maintenance  of 
economic  bonds  serves  as  positive  rein-
forcement  in  Spain's  long march  of rising 
expectations into Western Europe. And the 
grandest  reward  of  all-Spanish  member-
ship  in  the  Common  Market  -hangs like 
a  lure  before  all  Spanish  policy-making, 
and  must  inevitably  seduce  the  Franco 
legacy. 
Indeed,  "godless  capitalism"  had 
seduced  Franco  himself,  when  in  1962 
Spain  began  its  overtures  to  the  Common 
Market. Spain wanted an association agree-
ment,  like  the  1962  EC  accord  with 
Greece,  that  would  lead  first  to  customs 
union and ultimately perhaps to  full  Com-
mon Market membership. What Spain  got 
in  1970  was  a  six-year  preferential  trade 
agreement  with  limited  tariff  reductions 
on  specific  products.  Negotiations  to  ex-
pand the  existing  trade  arrangements  into 
a  free  trade area  began  in  1972  but dead-
locked in 197 4 over agricultural issues: The 
Community agreed to give duty-free access 
for  Spanish  industrial  products  beginning 
July  1977  if  Spain  would  do  likewise  by 
1980  (with a possible extension to  1982); 
Spain,  however,  conditioned  its  industrial 
tariff cutting on free  trade for farm goods. 
The  Community- that  is  to  say,  Italy  in 
an  EC  decision-making  process  that  re-
quires  unanimity-finds  this  unacceptable. 
One  Spanish  government  official  was  not 
far  wrong when he told  me,  "Italian farm 
interests  arc  to  Spanish  integration  in  the 
Common  Market  as  De  Gaulle  was  to 
British entry." 
But at stake is  more "than trade in citrus 
fruits,"  as  West German President Walter 
Scheel  put it.  A  European  Parliament  re-
port  agreed:  "The  Community  is  in  the 
paradoxical  situation  of  being  the  main 
customer  and  the  main  supplier  of  the 
Mediterranean  countries,  whereas  the  US 
and the USSR,  whose trade  relations  with 
the  Mediterranean  are  on  a  smaller  scale, 
enjoy  far  greater influence.  It  is  true  that 
economic  power  is  not the  only  source  of 
power,  but  here  it  is  definitely  being 
undersold.  And  this  is  because  the  Com-
munity lived and operated on a  day-to-day 
basis." No longer: 
If the  European  Community  is  ever  to 
develop  a  common  foreign  policy,  it  will 
be  in  the  Mediterranean  area,  where  flex-
ing  economic  power  in  political  ways  has 
lately  proved  healthy  (perhaps  addictive) 
exercise  for  a  uniting  Europe.  1.  The EC 
Commission  "froze"  the  Greek association 
after  the  1967  colonels'  coup;  what  real 
effect this had on Greece's return to  parlia-
mentary  democracy  is  still  unknown,  but 
at  the  very  least  it  let  the  Greek  "resis-
tence"  know  that  it  had  not  been  forgot-
ten. Now the new, Caramanlis Government 
has  formally  applied  for  full  membership 
in  the Common Market and staked its  poli-
tical  cards,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  on 
Western  Europe,  even  at  the  expense  of 
NATO.  2.  Turkey  too,  has  EC  associate 
statUs,  providing  a  22-year  transitional 
period  to  full  EC  membership.  The  re-
sultant,  potential  leverage  in  the  Cyprus 
dispute  has  not  gone  unnoticed  in  Brus-
The Valley of the Fallen, Fcn·nco' s Pharaonic monument to  himself and the Citd lf/  ar dead, hewed out 
of living rock largely by political prisonen , is where El Caudillo wa.r  buried"  before God and history." 
Spanish  Government Tourist  Office. A  few miles south in the foothills of the Guadarama Mountains stands the Escorial,  built in the six-
teenth century by Philip II, whose blood and dominions bound Spain to the rest of Europe. 
sels-or  in  Washington,  where  Dr.  Kis-
singer's  triangular  diplomacy  might  soon 
have  to  expand  to  the  multipolarity  of 
economic  superpowers.  3.  Although  ini-
tially slow to respond to events in Portugal, 
when the Community finally did act, its eco-
nomic  aid  was  premised  on  a  desired 
political  outcome.  4.  EC  negotiations  are 
underway for an  industrial free trade area, 
coupled  with financial  assistance  and  agri-
cultural access  for the entire Mediterranean 
area,  including Israel, Egypt,  Syria,  Jordan, 
Libya,  Malta,  and  the  Maghreb  countries. 
5.  And,  finally,  Spain:  Beyond  the fate  of 
3 5 million Spaniards,  whatever happens in 
Spain  this  year  will  tell  a  lot  about  what 
the  rest  of  Western  Europe  is,  and  will 
become,  whether it's  more  than  a  customs 
union  and en  route  to  political  unity  and 
clout.  Spain's  future  is  thus  Europe's  fu-
ture if "Europe" is  ever to  have the mean-
ing  the  Common  Market's  supranational 
Eurocrats say it has. 
"wE  SPANIARDS,  we  are  Europeans,"  de-
clared  Juan  Carlos  I  during  his  accession 
ceremonies,  at  which  most  of  Western 
Europe's  leaders  were  present,  the  same 
leaders  who  had  made  it  a  point  to  be 
absent  from  Fran  co's  funeral.  And  their 
lingering figurative  presence  will  probably 
help  exorcise  Franco's  ghost.  But  the  trip 
from  Franco  Spain  to  reunion  with  the 
rest of Europe is  a long one.  The question 
is  how fast  or how slow to make that trip. 
Like  a  man  on  an  Inquisition  rack,  Juan 
Carlos  is  being pulled many ways.  But the 
pulls  are  of  varying  rhythm  not  of  sub-
stance.  Except  for  the  ultra-right,  which 
still  equates  xenophobia  with  national 
unity,  all  Spain's  divergent  forces  seem 
united  in  the  belief  that  their  future  lies 
in  Europe,  in particular  Common  Market 
membership.  Even  the  Communists,  for 
example,  have  turned  their  back  on  the 
Portuguese  example  and  qst  their  fate 
with comrades in  France and Italy,  in seek-
ing  power  through  parliamentary  democ-
racy.  And  the  workers'  strikes,  surging 
through Madrid and Barcelona in January, 
were  based  on  demands  any  West  Euro-
pean trade unionist would feel comfortable 
with-higher pay  and political expression. 
Most Basques  and  Catalans  recognize  they 
can  have a larger voice in a larger Europe, 
as  the  recent  examples  of  the  Scots  and 
Bretons attest.  The Spanish military,  seem-
ingly content with the chivalrous surrender 
of  the  Sahara,  is  ready  to  join  Europe's 
post-colonial  age.  But unhappy with what 
it  views  as  security  arrangements  without 
representation,  the military  would  be  glad 
to  gain  a  voice  in  NATO,  possibly  only  if 
EC countries are  satisfied  that voice  would 
be democratically legitimate. 
In  a  society  that  still  knows  the  mean-
ing of manana  and siesta  (not to mention 
the  fascist  salute),  the  rhythm  of  change 
finally  established won't be  too fast.  While 
Juan Carlos spoke of democratic evolution, 
he  also  pledged  allegiance  to  Fran  co's 
"fundamental principles."  An amnesty was 
granted,  but a limited amnesty.  Parliamen-
tary  elections  were  promised,  then  post-
poned.  Franco's  Council  of  the  Realm 
blocked  the  king'  s  first  two  choices  for 
premier.  But,  in  the  resulting compromise, 
Franco's  relatively  moderate  premier 
(Carlos Arias  Navarro)  stayed  on as  head 
of government,  and Jose Maria de Areilza 
and  Manuel  Fraga  (the  king's  original 
premier  nominees,  both  with  "European" 
credentials)  became  respectively  foreign 
minister  and  interior  minister.  Another 
cabinet  officer,  Lieutenant  General  Fern-
ando  de  Santiago,  on  taking  office  as  de-
fense  minister,  said  the  Spanish  people 
wanted  a  life  "without  swift  breaks"  and 
"without  adventure."  But  if  the  rhythm 
of change is  too  slow,  yes,  there  could  be 
violence. 
So  the  Spanish  watch  continues.  At 
NATO  headquarters  in  Brussels,  "it's  wait 
and  see,"  says  chief  spokesman  David 
Kidd.  NATO  Secretary-General  Joseph 
Luns  has  publicly  recognized  Spain's  stra-
tegic  importance,  particularly  in  view  of 
the  alliance's  deteriorating  southern  flank; 
but,  without significant  political change  in 
Spain,  the  Dutch  in  particular  will  never 
"let it  out  of  the  sidecar  into  the  motor-
car," says  Kidd.  First Spain must prove it-
self  within  an  EC  context.  The same  res-
ervations  hold  for  the  Danes.  Italy's  eco-
nomic  objections  to  closer  EC-Spanish 
ties  could  be  easily  overcome  in  the mem-
ber state trade-offs  so  familiar to  Common 
Market  decision-making.  France  and  Ger-
many have the biggest economic interest in 
a  Spain  more  closely  knit with democratic 
Europe,  and  France  has  traditionally  sup-
ported an  EC  Latin  orientation  to  balance 
the Community's Nordic enlargement. Brit-
ain's  interests  in  the whole matter are  tied 
up  in  a  satisfactory  resolution  of  the 
Gibraltar question. 
The  Spanish  Civil  War  may  finally  be 
ending  for  the  rest  of  Western  Europe. 
And the European Community should thus 
do  what the  Allies  did  for  Germany after 
W odd War  Two,  says  one  high  German 
official  in  the  EC  Commission-"hold  out 
the  bait  of  a  kind  of  Marshall  Plan,  to 
keep the Spanish situation stable yet  evolv-
ing."  Spain,  which  in  fact  was  the  only 
European  country  not  offered  Marshall 
Plan  aid,  needs  it:  Inflation  averages  15 
per cent annually,  unemployment is  rising, 
investment capital is  low,  as  the industrial-
ized  world's  stagflation  has  now  brought 
natural  law  to  the  Spanish  economic  mir-
acle.  "The  question  is,"  continues  the 
Commission  official,  "is  Juan  Carlos  an-
other Adenauer?'' 
Whatever  the  answer,  the  great-great-
grandson of Queen Victoria and his  Greek 
wife  Sophia  won't  be  laid  to  rest  in  the 
Valley  of  the  Fallen,  Franco's  Pharaonic 
monument  to  himself  and  the  Civil  War 
dead,  hewed  out of living rock  largely  by 
political  prisoners,  where  El  Caudillo  was 
buried  "before  God  and  history."  A  few 
miles  south  in  the  foothills  of  the  Gua-
darama  Mountains  stands  the  Escorial, 
built in  the sixteenth century  by  Philip  II, 
whose  blood  and  dominions  irrevocably 
bound Spain to the rest of Europe. Within 
the  labyrinths  of El  Escorial  is  the  "Pan-
theon  of Kings,"  where  26  marble sepul-
chers  contain  the  remains  of Spain's  past 
kings and queens. There are two left. Iii 
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"THE  DAY  YOU  FIND  A  PRODUCT  LABELED  'MADE  IN 
Europe,' send it to me and I'll frame it as an historic docu-
ment." So speaks the head of a French advertising agency. 
"Europe?" questions another. "It's a concept, no more. 
Certainly we advertise all over the continent, but it's a lot 
more difficult than it is in the United States. Do you know 
how many  languages there  are  here?''  (In the Common 
Market alone,  there  are  six  languages:  English,  French, 
German,  Italian,  Danish,  and  Dutch,  without  counting 
Flemish,  Luxembourgois,  Gaelic,  or  the  various-and 
numerous-regional dialects.) 
"A  Euro-product ?"  asks  another  ad  agency  man. 
"What's that? The only one I  know of that's acceptable 
anywhere  is  a  Eurocheque.  Money  is  one  of  the  few 
things that can be internationalized." 
A generation ago,  advertising and marketing were still 
in their adolescence in Europe. Today, thanks to a  rather 
massive import of American techniques and selling meth-
ods, it is  possible to say  that the trade has grown up but 
has not yet  matured.  "Modern techniques  of advertising, 
publicity,  and  public  relations  are  recent  arrivals  in 
F ranee, but now they are sweeping through the land with 
hurricane  force,"  says  a  well-known  writer.  There  are 
ma~y problems in Europe that are by  now past history in 
the  United  States,  and  several  fields,  such  as  consumer 
protectionism and misleading advertising, have only come 
up for serious consideration in Europe within the past few 
years. 
Even  among the nine  members  of the European Com-
munity, the laws governing advertising have not yet  been 
harmonized,  leaving  a  glaring  "gap"  that  works  both 
against the consumer and against the company or adver-
tiser trying to sell  a  product on a European level,  which 
is more and more the case as trade barriers disappear. 
The  differences  between  the  American  market  and 
European  markets  ~an be  expressed  in  any  number  of 
ways. According to  Marcel  Bleustein-Blanchet, the presi-
dent of Publicis, one of France's  largest advertising and 
marketing  agencies,  ·'There  is  a  fundamental  difference 
in selling that strikes straight across Europe, without even 
mentioning the United States. On one side,  you  have the 
Anglo-Saxons, who basically accept publicity, and, in fact, 
read it.  On the other side,  you  have the Latins.  They do 
not  like  publicity;  they  simply  put  up  with  it,  and  go 
around saying,  'Oh, I  never  read the ads.'  This is  a  silly 
form  of  snobbism,  besides  being  quite  untrue,  but  the 
point is  that one generally qmnot run  exactly  the  same 
sort of marketing program in Italy that one could run, for 
example, in Denmark." 
"The idea of actually marketing a product," says French 
advertising  pioneer  Bleustein-Blanchet,  "or  of  spending 
money  on  an  advertising  campaign,  is  not a  Latin  idea. 
There is not the same Puritan work-ethic that exists in the 
United States, and money, in so  much of Europe, is  some-
thing  that,  if not  actually  sinful,  is  at least  not spoken 
about. Modern marketing and advertising techniques were 
initially very difficult to apply to Europe." 
Another point of view was expressed, at a recent confer-
ence, by a London-based, direct-marketing executive:  "We 
found that we could run a very successful campaign in the 
United States by mailing our sales letters from a European 
address, such as Geneva. Then we tried the same thing in 
Europe, and the idea flopped completely. A foreign stamp 
doesn't  impress  anyone  here.  That's  a  small  point,  but 
Europe is no place to be naive." 
Two factors  are particularly important for  large com-
panies  selling  their  products  across  Europe:  First,  lan-
guage,  and  second,  national  regulations,  which  vary 
widely.  Claude  Marcus,  assistant  director  of  Publicis, 
which handles the advertising for Renault cars, can show 
a  foot-thick  stack of sales  brochures  for  a  single model, 
each in a different language. "In principle," he says,  "the 
illustrations  are  the  same,  but  notice,  for  example,  the 
brochure for Sweden. It shows two outside rear-view mir-
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ish law." In the list of specifications, Continental editions 
use  metric  measurements,  while  the  edition  in  English, 
aimed  at the  British  market,  lists weights  and lengths in 
pounds  and feet.  The text is  carefully  tailored  for  each 
separate market, with either an "antique chest of drawers" 
or  a  "bahut  Louis  XIII"  mentioned  at  the  appropriate 
point as  being an object that could be  transported in  the 
car's  trunk  (pardon,  in  English,  "boot."  In  French, 
"coffre"). 
"What one  should  remember  in  the first  place,"  says 
Michael Cipolarro,  director of consumer  affairs  and new 
products  for  CPC  (Corn Products)  in  Brussels,  "is that 
the United States  is  one,  large,  unified market,  operating 
under the same federal  laws.  Europe is  a batch of small 
markets, operating under extremely diversified laws." 
Jean-Charles  Benchetrit,  head  of  the  Paris  office  of 
Doyle, Dane, and Bernbach, says, "There is  no such thing 
as  a common  market, so  far as  consumers are concerned, 
such  as  there is  in  the United States.  The United States 
was founded by  influxes  of new  people.  Europe,  on  the 
other hand, is  still Europe, a group of nations with long-
established national and regional habits. So  far,  regarding 
advertising  and  marketing  (and  let's  leave  regionalism 
out of this), you  deal on a national basis,  and you  must 
know the differences.  For example,  the  French  do,  still, 
drink  a  lot  of wine,  which  satisfies  their  physiological 
need for sugar. Therefore, they are not a nation of candy-
eaters. The British don't drink much alcohol, but do  con-
sume vast quantities of candy. Multiply this difference by 
a thousand or so,  and that will be the Europe we sell to." 
"Of course," he continues, "there are very few products 
that are,  in  themselves,  really international.  Volkswagen, 
perhaps,  or  Polaroid  cameras.  With  a  product  that  is 
really  unique,  there  is  no  problem  in  marketing it:  It's 
more a question of running a campaign that doesn't con-
travene  different  national  laws  on  advertising.  But  even 
cars  have  different  personalities.  What  has  a  consumer 
reputation as  being the car for  the nouveau riche  in  one 
country will be the car for the established-rich in another, 
and  the  advertising  and  marketing  approach  will  have 
to  be  different.  There  are  an  awful  lot of nuances,  but 
they are worth studying." 
ALSO  CONFUSING  THE  ADVERTISER  are  a  number of tech-
nical  problems,  one  of  them  being  the  fact  that  there 
is  no  central  office  within  the  European Community  for 
registering  brand  names.  "Therefore,"  says  Benchetrit, 
"if  you  want  to  ihtroduce  a  new  product  in  the  Com-
mon  Market,  you  have  to  go  through  nine  separate  na-
tional  offices  to  find  out  if  the  name  you  propose  can 
be  used.  In  some  places,  it  is  a  lot  of  bother  and  ex-
pense  to  register a  name.  In others,  such  as  France,  it's 
dirt-cheap  and  very  easy.  Either  way,  it's  nine  separate 
steps that should be one." 
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There  does  exist  a  general  ruling  on  the  registration 
of trademarks,  which  depends  on  the  OMPI,  the  Orga-
nisation  Mondiale  de  Propriete  Industrielle,  in  Geneva. 
Its  base  for  action  is  the  Madrid  Arrangement  for  the 
Repression  of  False  Indications  of  Merchandise,  drawn 
up in  1891, and revised, most recently, in Lisbon in  1958. 
Advertisers  consider  that  this  agreement-if  they  even 
remember it-is outdated and  ineffective.  The  European 
Community has in hand a project for a patents and trade-
marks  convention,  which  should be  implemented within 
the next few years,  but there is,  for the moment, no cen-
tral law of any kind. Lindsay Armstrong, of the EC Com-
mission  office  in  Paris,  as  well  as  Berthold  Schwab,  ad-
ministrator  for  internal  affairs  at  the  EC  Commission 
headquarters  in  Brussels,  say  that  an  advertiser  or mar-
keter  is  well  advised  to  register  his  trade-name,  or  the 
names  of  various  products,  in  each  of  the  countries  in 
which he proposes  to  operate. 
(In  the  interest  of  research,  the  following  question 
was  posed  to  a  number of advertising  agencies,  to  gov-
ernment  bodies,  and  to  the  EC  Commission:  "As  an 
American  tire  manufacturer,  I  would  like  to  produce 
and  sell  tires  in  the  Common  Market  countries  under 
the  trade-name  'Flab.'  What  should  I  do  next?"  The 
response,  without  exception,  was  ''That's  a  very  inter·-
esting question ... ," followed by  a strong recommenda-
tion to  apply  to  some  national  body  first.) 
There has  undoubtedly been  a  tremendous  impetus  to 
advertisers  and  marketers  because  of  the  lowering  and 
eliminating  of  trade  barriers  within  the  Common  Mar-
ket,  and  the  subsequent  broadening  of  operations  to  a 
continental  level.  However,  the  general  feeling  in  the 
trade  is  that  a  great  deal  remains  to  be  done  in  order 
to  harmonize  trade  practices  from  one  country  to  an-
other.  Although all  EC  member  countries  have  laws  re-
lating  to  misleading  advertising,  for  example,  there  is 
still  a  wide  gap,  in  practice,  between  those  countries 
which  apply their laws severely and those which don't. 
According  to  John  Braun,  head  of  the  EC  Commis-
sion's consumer protection department, "The Community 
has,  so  far,  proposed  a  draft  directive  for  a  consumer 
protection  and  information  policy.  The  committee  first 
met  in  November  1972,  and  will  meet  again  in  March 
197 6.  There is  still  a  lot of work to  be  done before the 
policy  becomes  a  law,  mainly  because  we  have  to  mesh 
the  different  sets  of  laws  now  in  existence  in  the  dif-
ferent countries. Some have specific laws concerning unfair 
competition;  others  don't.  However,  I  do  feel  that  it 
is  important  to  come  up  with  some  sort  of  clear  code 
of practice,  so  that an  advertiser who wants  to  promote 
a  product in  all  nine  countries  will  have  to  work  with 
only  a  single  code,  which  will  mean  that an  ad  that  is 
acceptable  in  one  country  will  thereby  be  acceptable  in 
the entire Common Market." 
"Surveys  of  our  own,"  he  says,  "show  that  mislead-
ing  advertising  is  a  chief  consumer  complaint  in  each 
country.'' 
Until  only  a  few  years  ago,  the  emphasis  of laws  re-
garding misleading advertising were aimed more at curb-
ing  unfair  competition  between  producers  than  at  pro-
tecting  consumers.  The Commission's  preliminary  report 
mentions  that  "practices  which  were  once  regarded  in 
many  countries  as  unfair solely  in  terms  of competition 
between  producers  (misleading  advertising,  for  ex-
ample), are now also  considered from the point of view 
of relations  between  producers  and consumers." 
Among  the  ideas  listed  in  the  Commission's  pre-
liminary program are  propositions  that "no form  of ad-
vertising-visual or aural-should mislead  the  potential 
buyer  of the  product  or  service.  Any  advertiser  in  any 
medium should be able  to  justify,  by  appropriate means, 
the validity of any  claims he makes." 
Among  measures  envisaged  for  protecting  the  con-
sumer,  the committee feels  that "principles should be  es-
tablished  to  assess  the extent to  which· an  advertisement. 
is  false;  and that the problems arising in connection with 
reversal  of the  burden of proof should  be  studied." 
The last measure  is  of particular  importance  because, 
in many countries,  the burden of proof as  to whether or 
not  an  advertisement  is  misleading  or  false  rests  with 
the prosecutor, i.e.,  the consumer, who normally does not 
have at his disposal the means for tackling the advertiser, 
the advertising agency,  or whoever else is  held to blame 
under national laws. This, too, varies widely. 
The Council  of Europe,  in  Strasbourg,  also  published, 
in  1972,  a  lengthy  report  on  misleading  advertising, 
which,  in  53  pages  of country-by-country  annexes  to  the 
main  report covering  most  European  countries,  gives  an 
excellent-if  sometimes  bewildering-example  of  how 
very  different  national  laws  relating  to  marketing  and 
advertising still  are.  The Council's  recommendations  are 
not very  different  from  those  proposed  by  the  EC  Com-
mtsston. 
At the present time, all EC member countries adhere to 
the International Chamber of Commerce's  "International 
Code of Advertising Practices," which is  not legally bind-
ing.  Statutory  measures  are  varied  in  the  extreme,  and, 
for the most part, date only from the Sixties.  In the sec-
tion  of  the  Council  of  Europe's  report  dealing  with 
France,  for  example,  it  is  stated  that  "prior  to  the  act 
of 2 July  1963,  there was no general prohibition of mis-
leading advertising  under  French  law."  Considering  the 
relative youth of modern advertising and marketing tech-
niques  in  Europe,  it  is  scarcely  surprising  that  the  laws 
concerning them are still in a confused state. 
THAT  EUROPEAN  CONSUMERS will  launch  Nader-type  at-
tacks  in the near future is  unlikely,  but consumer aware-
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as  is  evidenced by  the increased circulation  of such  con-
sumer-oriented  magazines  as  Which?  in  Great  Britain, 
Que  Choisir  and  50  Millions  de  Consommateurs  in 
France.  Says  Marcel  Bleustein-Blanchet:  "The era is  past 
when  a  company could write an .ad. saying,  'My product 
is  the  best,'  and leave  it at that.  In the first  place,  how 
could he know? :Perhaps it wasn't the best. In the second 
place,  who was  he  talking  to? Until  I  introduced  them 
myself, after a trip to the United States, nobody in France 
had any idea of what a market survey was, or who he was 
selling to.  A  consumer has a  right to know exactly  what 
he is  being sold, and an advertiser, by  now,  should know 
his market." 
"I  think  you  can  take  it  as  real  that  there  are  going 
to  be far more government controls  in  the  future,  even 
considering that measures such as  our Trad~ Descriptions 
Act have been effective,"  says  John Methven, the present 
head of Great Britain's  Office  of Fair Trading,  and  the 
next president of the Confederation of British Industries. 
"But this will depend to a  large extent on how well  ad-
vertising controls itself." Methven, while recognizing that 
consumer legislation is  on  the increase  in  Europe,  warns 
that "legislation is  an extremely blunt instrument, which 
it  is  wiser  to  avoid  by  severe  self-controls  within  the 
industry." 
From a European point of view, two points are evident. 
First,  advertising  on  a  large  scale  is  still  relatively  new 
to  Europe,  and,  second,  consumer  concern  with  adver-
tising has  jumped  the Atlantic  rather more  swiftly  than 
the latest marketing techniques.  · 
Great  Britain,  for  example,  has  a  private Advertising 
Standards  Authority,  with  membership  drawn  from  the 
media,  agencies,  and  industry.  It  has  a  current  budget 
of $600,000  per  year,  which  is  five  times  more  than  it 
had three years  ago,  and is  now advertising its  existence 
to consumers. 
France  has  its  Advertising  Verification  Bureau,  to 
which many advertisers and publications belong.  Accord-
ing  to  Jean-Charles  Benchetrit,  there  are  very  few  con-
trols on advertising copy  in France,  and the bureau nor-
mo.lly  acts only after an  advertisement has  appeared.  For 
example, the bureau forced  a  property company to with-
draw its  publicity in  a  morning newspaper when it was 
found  that  price  information  in  an  advertisement  was 
false. 
The only  really  strict  product control  in  France  is  on 
pharmaceuticals, which  are laboratory-tested  and,  in  ads, 
carry a  visa  saying  so.  This  does  not apply  to  the  para-
pharmaceuticals that are sold in  pharmacies, which gives 
many of them a certain "cachet"  that they  have  not per-
haps merited. 
Where really strict advertising controls come into play 
is  in  television,  which  Benchetrit calls  "highly difficult." 
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rrMarketing food prod~tcts throughout Europe is extremely dilficttlt 
without due regard for national preferences .... And most Euro-
peans are fully au·are that, u·ere it not for American influences and 
techniques, hardly a company in E11rope U'otdd knou· hou· to sell a 
prod1tct on a large scale.'' 
Each  country  has extremely  specific  rules  about  whether 
or  not  advertising  is  allowed  on  television,  and,  if  al-
lowed, what sort of advertising can be shown. Television 
in  France is  a  good example.  There are  three  television 
channels,  all  of  which  are  state-owned  and  controlled. 
Advertising is  permitted on two of the channels. All TV 
advertising is  controlled by  the Regie  Franraise  de  Publi-
cite,  which is  also  state-run. This group sets  the rules  as 
to  what  can  be  advertised-no  liquor,  no  tobacco,  no 
newspapers,  periodicals,  or  books.  An  advertiser  or 
agency  must first  submit a  script to  the Regie,  then  take 
it back for possible corrections until it is  considered satis-
factory.  Commercials  are  shown  in  clusters,  at  logical 
time  breaks,  under  the  Regie's  own  "label,"  and  never 
interrupt  a  program  in  progress.  Nor can  an  advertiser 
"sponsor" a show, as  is  done in the United States. 
This is  not the end of an  advertiser's  problems.  Since 
the  Regie  operates  independently  of  the  three  TV net-
works,  an  agency might sign a year's contract  (the mini-
mum) for a spot on channel 1 at 8:30 pm on Friday, which 
at the moment falls  just before an extremely popular pro-
! 
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f gra', alcl fincl that the spot loscs its value at a later date. are rnuch more conccrned rvith keeping a "t'ratitlnal" inlege,
iea,., Case.,a'e, the prcsent head of orre of the French especially u'hen it denotes  a particttlar  cltrality that is u'orth
TV channels,  sa)'s: "Since the Rlgie is con-rpletely sepa- advertisirrg.
.Lte, tlrere is nothing rrr.r aclvertiser can do if I, in the  This is particularly'eviderrt in marketins food proclucts,
course of the 1'ear, deci.le to su,itch a program from Fri-  s,hich are. in an)' case, extren-rel1' difficult ttl n.rarket
day night to Thgrsday night. This is oiten the case."  throughout Ilurope u'ithout .lr"re rctarcl for nrrtional  l',ref-
ALl'oucrr rrrE ,,uRop,,,{N (oN{N{uNrry rras been ex- ::;11';l"ffiilll;li::;:ll5"Tlli:'ll'iii'liili;
tremell'helpful  to mrrrketers by eliminating tarills and  proclucts frorn Great Ilritein, are virttrallt'inrpossible ttr
broadeninglrotential  markets, there is as yct no eviclence scll fronr one countrl'to atrother. Artcl Nlicheel Cipolarro,
that the ;rre6x "l:uro," attechecl to a product or service, of (.P(., points out that thcre is t.to sttclt tlrirlg tet as "l:urtl-
help5 16 sell it. A rar.rdom  srlrvey oI con-rparries  and services pear)" soup or "l:trropcan"  cheese, btrt rather Italian mine-
listed under "lluro-" in the Paris telepl.rone book seems stnrne, Su'iss cheese, French  brerrcl, Ilnnlish biscuits. "Acl-
to indicate that a large majority'of companies,  including vertising  canrPnigll5 must bcrtr these dilTerctrces in mind."
a mapufacturer  of novelties and a Parisian employ'ment Ss'iss cheese ads, for exanrl,le,  trsualll'feattrre a s'edge
rrgenc)', use a "lluro" prelix for rather ill-defined  reasons of clreese r{ainst a back{Iround of the Alps. rvhich is con-
oi ;'restige, or to mrike the company  appear larger than it  gnrous, rather th:rn tgair.rst a scene of fishing boats. u'hicll
actually is. In a few cases, such as a travellers' aid society is not.
that cl<tes opefate tl-rrgughotrt Iiurol',e,  and a car rental lirur  Another case in ;roint is peanut buttcr, that classic
thirt opera[es all over the continent, the Europeun con- Arnerican stxplc. The Dutclr, n'lro likc it. ntake tlreir os'rl.
nectiol is self-evident.  N,{ost of Irulrpe u'oulcln't,  as the saf int eoes, trltrch it u'ith
Jean-Franc;rtis  Plant6, assistant clirector of Euro-Adver-  a bargel'role. \'et Relciarrs feecl their cltilclren rtftertlctotr
tising,  sa1,s that it is occasior-rally usefsl fttr a cornl',any to  sr.racks 9f breacl s1''read u'ith chocolate pastc, an idea that
nse lL "llurti" label. as Iris agency does, to inclicate lI coltt- rcvolts tuany'<tther  Eurol'tearrs.
[)xny s scope or 6elcl of .,peratio,ls,  but tlrat it aclds nothing  Alfred Gerarcli, rnanaging clirector of Donnellel' and
io 
"nyproduct 
to call it h.rro;'ean.  "Some day," lre savs, Gcnircli, in lrttlingen, \X/cst Gernlrtnl', rrnd a spccialist
"sgch a lrrbel rnight be useful, but not fur a long, long time  in direct rnrrrketin[, savs that it'r orcler to nrarket anything
),et."  in I:trrope it is ubsolutely  neccssurv to knou' a tratit'rtt's
Fe*. marketing  men or advertisers think much of a  tastes verl'u'ell. "Thcre are alrcacll'frrr to<l rt.rar.ry'1.'roducts
Ir'ropeal label, aqd no one, as far xs can be cletermir.recl, tlrat clrnnot be solcl strccessfr.rl[1' from <lttc c<luntrl' to
is plarrning to use one. Lr some cases, in flct, advertisers  anothcr. (-lotlres cd)/ l)e sold interrrittiortally. bttt r.rot, for
t'edlo,tJ  r.,f pre:f ig'e. )t to ru,th'e the conp,tttl /tPpc.tt'ltil.{er  lhdtt it 'rcttdlll ir'"
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"'llllDUtlllElltt tJ.example,  French  furniture  in  Germany  or  vice  versa. 
Neither nation likes the other's furniture, for undoubtedly 
subconscious  reasons  of  taste.  Why?  Who  knows?  It's 
just  a  fact  of marketing,  like  knowing that it's  a  waste 
of time and money to launch a product in  France in  Au-
gust,  when everyone  is  on vacation." 
This holds true in other fields as well. James L. Mercer, 
managing director for Time-Life International in Amster-
dam,  which  sells  different-language  editions of books  in 
Europe,  said  at a  recent marketing conference  that their 
editions  are  "regionalized"  by  language,  that non-fiction 
books  are  rewritten  rather than  just translated,  and  that 
even  photographs  are  occasionally  changed  to  suit  the 
market. The Reader's  Digest  also  publishes  different-lan-
guage editions both for their magazine and for their book 
club,  using  different  editorial  matter  in  each  case.  Says 
one  book-marketing  report,  "The  French  don't want  to 
read  what  the  English  read  or  what the  Germans  read, 
except  perhaps  the  latest  Agatha Christie.  It is  really  a 
group of quite different local markets." 
However, in  direct marketing, which is  an increasingly 
important way of selling in Europe, there have been some 
breakthroughs  in  the  selling  procedure,  thanks  to  the 
lowering  of  trade barriers  in  the European  Community. 
"QueUe,"  the German mail order firm,  now sells outside 
its home country, as does the French company "Trois Suis-
ses."  Both use modified catalogs outside their home coun-
tries,  cutting out merchandise  that won't sell  in  another 
country,  and  quoting prices  in  the  local  currency  at  the 
point of sale, because transfers of payments by individuals 
from country to country is  still a laborious business. 
Another problem  is  pricing  outside  the  local  market. 
Setting a price in German marks to appear on an advertise-
ment for an Italian car due to appear in a German maga-
zine  six  weeks  hence  is,  according  to  one  specialist,  "a 
quick way to get grey hairs." Jean-Charles Benchetrit feels 
that the wider the possible  audience  for  an  ad,  the less 
precise the ad should be. 
AMERICAN-TYPE  SOPHISTICATION is  gradually catching up 
with European advertisers, however. Gerardi cites,  admir-
ingly,  a  Dutch  bulb grower-and Dutch  bulbs  fall  into 
the category of a  national  product that can  be  sold any-
where-who sends  out over  10  million  catalogs  a  year. 
He  has  considerably  reduced  his  expenses  by  confining 
written  comments  in  his  color  catalog  to  black  ink,  so 
that only  descriptions  and  prices  in  his  catalog need  be 
printed separately for each country. 
An anomaly that direct marketers  in  Europe complain 
about  is  the  differing,  but generally  very  high,  rate  of 
postage.  Europeans are  rarely surprised to  find  a  foreign 
stamp on a magazine subscription offer, because the stamp 
is generally Dutch, and the Dutch have the lowest mailing 
rates.  Considering the size of Europe by  comparison with 
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the United States,  where a  letter costs  the same whether 
it is  going from New York to New Haven or New York 
to  Houston,  marketers  would  like  to  see  a  rather  more 
equal system of postal costs. 
One area in which direct marketing has not yet caught 
up with the United States is  in the computerizing of mail-
ing lists,  without which leads to an enormous amount of 
wasteful duplication. Nor is  there in existence an across-
the-board law that protects a consumer from offers made 
in bad faith, or gives him a legal system of redress in case 
merchandise  is  not  what  it  is  advertised  to  be.  In  the 
United States, the Federal Trade Commission has recently 
come up with stringent requirements regarding mail-order 
selling, but little has been  done as  yet in  Europe, except, 
sketchily, on a country-to-country basis.  Even then, a con-
sumer has to be extremely clever,  or patient,  to  find  out 
which trade organization can cope with his complaint. 
Nor is  there in  Europe any way  for  a consumer to get 
off mailing lists if he wants to, a process that is now possi-
ble in  the United States. The rather hit-and-miss practices 
still  prevalent in  Europe  were epitomized  by  a  wry edi-
torial  in  the  French  newspaper  Le  Monde,  which  com-
plained that it had been put on various mailing lists,  and 
was being deluged by  free offers  addressed to  "Monsieur 
Le Monde." 
In some ways,  though,  European advertising and mar-
keting are going beyond the  lessons  that were learned in 
the  United States.  Many  European  advertising  men  and 
company  executives  have  worked  in  the  United  States 
and are fully aware that, were it not for American influ-
ences and techniques, hardly a company in  Europe would 
know  how  to  sell  a  product  on  a  large  scale.  Marcel 
Bleustein-Blanchet  recounts  with  astonishment  the  indif-
ference, or even hostility, of major companies to any form 
of publicity and to  unaccustomed ways  of selling.  "And 
this wasn't that long ago,  either." 
The  progress  made  in  the  past  few  years  has  been 
considerable. The technical skills have all come from the 
United  States,  with  as  yet  no  reverse  flow,  but the  end 
products,  the  expanded  European-scale  advertising  and 
marketing campaigns,  have been adapted to suit the con-
tinent's specific habits and tastes. A good example of this 
is  Bleustein-Blanchet's  picking  up  the  American  idea of 
a drugstore, open at all hours and selling everything from 
aspirin to paperbacks, and turning it into "Le Drugstore," 
which is very French. A recent attempt to install a French-
type  "drugstore" in  the United States was not a  brilliant 
success. 
Jean-Fran<;ois  Plante claims  that advertising in Europe 
is  "far  more  sophisticated"  than  in  the  United  States. 
Rleustein-Blanchet says that is  "softer," because American 
hard-sell techniques don't work well in Europe. "What we 
try to do," he says  "is to Jeduce  the buyer." • 
1 
_..,  1 aroun 
London 
One and a third million  people are  out of 
work in Britain, and things could get worse 
before they get better.  Yet Harold Wilson 
says  he is  for full employment, and Harold 
Wilson  is  an  honorable  man.  Indeed,  the 
Labour Government is  acutely aware of the 
gap between what its socialist goals are and 
what  recession  has  actually  meant  to  the 
worker foist on the dole. 
That awareness may explain the very  no-
ticeable change of heart come over Chancel-
lor  of  the  Exchequer  Denis  Healey,  who 
holds  the  purse  strings  for  Britain's  eco-
nomic  recovery.  He and  Industry  Minister 
Eric  Varley,  with  Wilson's  blessing,  have 
decided  to  plump for  industry  rather  than 
bash  it.  ("Bashing,"  for  readers  on  the 
other side  of the  Atlantic,  is  what  Labour 
Governments are  reckoned to have done to 
business,  and  Tory  Governments  to  have 
done to  trade  unions.)  Unfortunately,  this 
wry penitency may have come too late.  One 
losing company after another has run to the 
Exchequer for a bail-out.  And the Govern-
ment has  had  to  show a certain amount of 
reserve  when a  rescue  operation  could  not 
wholly be  justified on  the grounds that so-
and-so  many  jobs would be saved.  (In the 
case  of  Chrysler's  Scottish  factory,  there 
seems  even  to  have  been  a gross  exaggera-
tion of what the adverse effects  would have 
been  if  the  money-loser  had  simply  been 
closed down.) 
All of which comes  to  (one hopes)  the 
bottom of Britain's  deepest  recession  since 
the Twenties. Some of the answers will once 
again  be  found  in  pumping  more  money 
into new jobs. But done too soon, that could 
throw the country back into a new bout with 
hyperinflation.  If many  more  people  lose 
their jobs, this may prove a dire temptation. 
So  far,  Healey has  kept a tight rein on the 
situation,  and  his  package  of  unemploy-
ment measures  in mid-February were small 
enough not to make short shrift of his anti-
inflation policy. But it was also small enough 
not to  usher in  any  real  let-up  on  the tide 
of  layoffs.  At  best  140,000  jobs  will  be 
saved or created with the $450 million to be 
spent, and economists expect the actual fig-
ure to be  much less.  But at current rates  of 
unemployment,  that  could  mean  those  out 
of work will  stay  at  around  6  per cent  of 
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"If we don't control it, Harold, we'll be joining 
them.'"  Gurbutt,  England. 
the working population for the rest of this 
year. Unless .... 
There  is  one  important  "unless."  Both 
Foreign Setretary James Callaghan and trade 
union  leader  Len  Murray  have  detected  a 
silver lining to what they used to see as  the 
European  Community  cloud.  In  February 
both, separately, called for a joint attack on 
unemployment. There are various EC funds 
to help create jobs,  but until now they have 
been kept under close surveillance by  wary, 
and jealous,  national administrations.  Brit-
ain, it is fair to say, has been among the most 
wary,  and  the funds  could  come  in  handy 
for channelling money from the rich coun-
tries  (mainly West Germany)  to  the  poor 
(Britain,  Italy,  and  Ireland).  And  that  is 
precisely what Callaghan and Murray mean 
by a "joint" strategy to curb unemployment. 
Britain's jobless are a big chunk of the 5.3 
million people unemployed in the European 
Community,  and  although  Germany  has 
nearly  as  many  on  the  dole,  its  economic 
prospects seem far brighter in the short run. 
This, then, is the main challenge for Lon-
don in coming months as  it tries to sort out 
the unemployment  dilemma:  To somehow 
convince Germany that it should proffer eco-
nomic  aid,  or  else  let  Britain  take  some 
drastic  measures  (import  controls,  for  in-
stance)  to  save  companies from going bust 
in Britain. The Government's economic per-
formance  at  home,  therefore,  is  pegged  to 




George  Washington,  motherhood,  apple 
pie:  The  Royal  House  of  Orange-Nassau 
means  this  and much more  to  most Dutch 
people.  Because  of these  sentimental  con-
nections,  the  Dutch  simply  do  not  believe 
charges  leveled  in  the  US  Senate  in  early 
February  that  Prince  Bernhard  of  The 
Netherlands  had  taken  bribe  money  from 
the  Lockheed  Aircraft  Company.  "The 
prince is an honest man and he would never 
do  anything  to  hurt  the  Royal  House, 
never," said one Dutch Government official 
who is  a close friend of the prince,  reflect-
ing the general opinion. 
The urbane, witty prince has been popu-
lar in The Netherlands since 1936 when he 
arrived  from  Germany  to  marry  the  then 
Princess Juliana.  His popularity steadily in-
creased through the war years when he bit-
terly  resisted  the  Nazis and later when,  as 
husband of the queen, he represented Dutch 
business  interests  throughout  the  world. 
When Prince Bernhard stated he never re-
ceived  money  from  Lockheed,  the  public 
accepted  the  denial  and,  if  anything,  be-
came  angry  at  the  Americans  for  making 
irresponsible charges. But an unusual gloom 
descended  on  The  Hague,  where  many 
politicians  feared  the  charges  would  be 
difficult  either  to  prove  or  to  disprove, 
leaving  a  major  weight  on  the  sensitive 
Dutch public conscience. 
The Social  Democrat-led Dutch Govern-
ment,  which  supports  the  monarchy,  has 
nevertheless resented the prince's freewheel-
ing style in dealing with foreign politicians 
and  businessmen  in  the  past.  When  the 
controversy  broke,  it  took  a  cautious,  neu-
tral  stand.  Prime  Minister  Joop  Den  Uyl 
sternly  warned  the  public  not  to  jump  to 
conclusions until solid evidence turned up, 
and  a  three-man,  blue-ribbon  commission 
was  set up to investigate the explosive alle-
gations.  The group, which included an  in-
ternational  law  expert,  a  top  government 
accountant,  and a  banking expert, immedi-
ately  ran  into a  wall of secrecy  concerning 
the  bank  transactions among various  Lock-
heed  representatives  in  Switzerland  who 
were  said  to  handle the  bribe  funds.  Also 
the commission  was  hampered  by  its  non-
judicial character, which meant it could not 
subpoena evidence or hear testimony under 
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This  situation  symbolizes  the  Govern-
ment's dilemma.  In order to  give the com-
mission  real  teeth,  the  Government  would 
have  to  admit,  in  effect,  that  it  thought 
Bernhard had done something wrong. This 
is  simply  not  politically  possible  in  The 
Netherlands now. If in fact the prince were 
found guilty of taking a bribe,  the present 
cloud would become a national catastrophe. 
Most Dutch remember waving orange flags 
D  ~ 
0 
"Sire . .. His Royalness, the Ambassador from 
the Kingdom of Lockheed, bearing gifts!" 
Graham,  Ark~nsas Gazelle,  Little  Rock. 
at  Juliana  as  schoolchildren  and  have  a 
warm,  surprisingly  human  attachment  to 
her.  An  abdication  of  the  67 -year-old 
queen,  which  would  surely  follow  a  ver-
dict  against  the  prince,  would  be  pure 
heartbreak. 
Beatrix, 38, Juliana's eldest daughter who 
would  come  to  the  throne,  is  refreshing 
and  intelligent,  but  she  has  not  the  same 
warmth of her mother. Her husband, Prince 
Claus,  who  received  a  frosty  welcome  in 
Holland  in  1966  because  of  his  German 
background,  is  popular with  left-of-center, 
social-minded groups,  but unlike Bernhard 
doe  not  have  crowd  appeal  or  business 
touch. Prince Bernhard himself has kept an 
admirable stiff  upper lip.  He has  attended 
functions,  gone  skiing  in  Austria,  and 
plans a swing to the United States in April. 
But  it  will  clearly  be  a  long  time  before 
things  get  back  to  normal  either  at  the 
Royal Palace or in The Hague. 
-PAUL KEMEZIS 
Luxembourg 
Unemployment, literally unknown here un-
til a year ago,  has suddenly become a major 
issue in this tight little country. For decades 
the  Luxembourgers  had  had  a  zero  unem-
ployment  rate  and  expended  great  effort 
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to  bring in foreign workers to  fill  construc-
tion  jobs  and  work at  the mammoth  steel 
mills, which are the bedrock of the national 
economy.  Suddenly  however,  a  European 
steel  slump  arrived  greater  than  any  since 
the  depression  of the Thirties,  driving  the 
output of the dominant ARBED  Steel  Com-
pany down 27  per cent in 1975  to 4.1  mil-
lion  tons.  The  number  of unemployed  in 
the  50,000-man  work force  began  to  rise, 
reaching by year's end 600 hard-core unem-
ployed and another 1  ,000-to-1, 500 on part-
time work.  When the impact of the  slump 
hit  last  summer,  the  Government  was  to-
tally unprepared, and there were few if any 
programs on the books to meet the problem. 
The  Luxembourgers,  however,  were 
quick  to  improvise  a  unique  program 
whereby  about  1,000  excess  steel  workers 
were leased  out  by  their firms  to  the Gov-
ernment to do  work fixing roads and clean-
ing  forests.  The  idea  of  the  "emergency 
work" programs was  to  keep  persons tech-
nically  on  factory  payrolls  and  not  create 
a  large  group  of  persons  sitting  at  home 
with  no  job.  The  Luxembourg  Govern-
ment  pumped  about  $175  million  from  a 
cash  reserve  into  the  program,  which  fi-
nally  stopped in  December  because  of the 
winter  weather  and  lack  of new  funding. 
The men are now partially employed in fac-
tories  and get a wage supplement from the 
Government,  but  may  go  back  to  road  in 
the summer.  Fully unemployed persons get 
up to 80 per cent of their salary reimbursed. 
At the  same  time,  in  an  unprecedented 
move,  the  Government  decided  to  charge 
taxpayers a special extra levy of 2.5  per cent 
of their normal tax  bill, which will go into 
an  unemployment fund to  pay  benefits  for 
the  jobless.  According to  one  Government 
official,  part of the  hoped-for result  of the 
tax  is  "to make people here aware of how 
serious  the  situation  really  is."  A  bit  iso-
lated  and  used  to  things  going  well  at 
home,  the  Luxembourgers  were  slow  to 
realize the consequences of the steel slump. 
Last  year,  for  example,  they  kept  buying 
cars  at  a  high  rate  with  no  sign  of  fear 
about a drop in national prosperity. 
One  factor  that  has  spared  the  Luxem-
bourgers  an  even  sharper  problem  is  the 
presence  of a  number of American  manu-
facturing firms,  which were drawn into the 
country  in  the  Sixties.  At  that  time  the 
Government sought to diversify away  from 
the steel industry in  case  of an  emergency, 
and  this  year  the  policy  has  paid off  well. 
Automotive firms  like General Motors and 
Royal  Tires are  now beginning to  pick up 
again,  even  though  ARBED,  tied  to  the 
sluggish  steel  market,  is  still  in  the  deep 
doldrums.  Even  with  the  diversification, 
steel-making  accounts  for  20  per  cent  of 
the  national  product,  40  per  cent  of  the 
work force,  and 60 per cent of exports. 
Not  only  the  lost  sales  but  also  the 
severe  steel  price  decline  have  been  a  na-
tional disaster in terms of earnings flowing 
in from abroad.  The slump has  even cut a 
major hole  in  the  freight  revenues  of the 
tiny  national  railroad and reduced  national 
corporate  tax  revenue  by  $25  million  or 
about  one-tenth  of  Government  spending 
requirements.  Steel  company  and  Govern-
ment  officials  expect  a  small  improvement 
in the situation this year,  but the time when 
Luxembourg  listed  a  mythical  one man  as 
unemployed  in  their  report  for  statistical 
reasons will not return quickly. 
-PAUL KEMEZIS 
Rome 
In  Rome's  political  rhetoric,  "historical 
compromise," the Italian Communist Party's 
catchphrase  since  it  was  coined  by  Party 
Secretary  Enrico  Berlinguer  two  and  one 
half years  ago,  is  still controversial. To the 
despair  of those  forced  to  explain  it,  the 
phrase  has  never  been  dearly  defined  by 
the  Communist  Party  itself.  Attempts  at 
definitions  run the gamut from  a  "sharing 
of cabinet  seats"  by  the  Communists  with 
the  traditionally  dominant,  but  weakened, 
Christian Democrats,  to  "developing a new 
relationship" with them, which presumably 
means  at least  consultation  with  the  Com-
munists on  specific  programs before voting 
in  parliament. 
While Rome  politicians  staunchly  main-
tain their relative party stands on the feasi-
bility  of  such  a  proposal,  in  hundreds 
of  communities  outside  the  capital,  com-
promises  (historical  or  not)  are  taking 
place  every  day  between  the  Communists 
and  the  centrist  parties.  And  the  way  it 
works  on  a  local  level  suggests  that  the 
real  "historical  compromise"  is  among  us. 
That, despite the catchy phrase, it is  a situ-
ation more than an event,  an ongoing proc-
ess  reflecting the attitudes of many average 
Italians who are more concerned about solu-
tions  to  their problems  than  about  taking 
sides in the rhetorical sweepstakes of Rome. 
Take Cesena,  a small agricultural city  in 
the fertile Po Valley, about an hour's drive 
southeast of Bologna and  only  eight miles 
from  the  Adriatic  coast.  In  1970,  the  city 
voted  for a  council  in  which Communists, 
with  the  help of the Socialists,  had a ma-
jority,  and  a  25-year  dominance  by  the 
moderate Republican Party came to an end. 
Angelo  Mini,  a  Communist  leader  there, 
claimed  recently:  "There  is  a  more  open 
.. : - · 
Dublin 
The  increasingly  independent  line  being 
taken by the I tali an and French Communist 
Parties,  which  feel  the need  to  free  them-
selves  from the Moscow yoke,  has  not left 
the shrimp-sized Irish Communist Party un-
"lF7ill the boot fit?"  Bac,  Allgemeine Zeiwng,  Mainz,  scathed.  Only one month after the 43-year-
Germany.  old  party  won  official  recognition  for  the 
first  time  by  persuading  the  authorities  to 
relationship  between  the  voters  and  the  allow it to  be  registered as  a political party 
party  since  we  won,  because  people  have  (which entitles its candidates to  appear un-
seen  what  we  could  do."  And  what  the  der  the  party's  official  name  on  the  ballot 
party  did  during its  first  five-year  term  in  and gives the party time on the state-owned 
office is  the kind of things that make a dif- radio  and  television  during  election  cam-
ference  in a small city.  paigns), it has been split down the middle. 
Bodies  now  make  major  decisions  re- The  anti-Moscow  line  of  their  French 
garding  zoning  regulations,  family  assist- and  Italian  comrades  is  being  attacked  by 
ance programs, and other matters in which  the two-thirds of the Irish membership who 
direct  knowledge  of  neighborhood  prob- have remained faithful, and being quoted as 
lems make their solution more effective. The  a good example by the breakaway one-third 
new administration got nine bus lines going  who  have  now formed  themselves  into the 
where  previously  there  had  been  a  single  Irish Marxist Society.  The French and !tal-
bus to service the entire city-from the main  ian  new departures were, in any event, only 
square to  the railroad station and back,  and  the  catalyst  for  the  dissension  which  has 
only at train times.  Day-care centers for in- been boiling ever since the 1968 invasion of 
fants  and  nursery  schools  for  preschoolers  Czechoslovakia,  when the Irish Communist 
sprung up around the city,  freeing many of  Party's official  line was  to  support Moscow 
the  city's  women  to  work,  if they  wished,  despite  the opposition  of many  of its  own 
in one of the  few  areas  in  Italy  with  full  members. 
employment.  The party also  set up regular  The  split  among  the  party's  600-odd 
meetings with local private industry to dis- members marks yet a further fragmentation 
cuss the city's needs and formulate develop- of the far left wing of Irish politics. There 
ment programs for Cesena's agriculture.  are  now around a dozen more or less  orga-
The odd thing about all this is  that these  nized  political  groupings  on  the  extreme 
measures have been voted with the support  left,  ranging from the Marxist Official  IRA 
of  the  opposition-apparently  an  unpro- to  Maoists.  None of  them  holds  a  seat  in 
claimed  "historical compromise."  After lo- either the Dail (House) or in the Senate. 
cal  voting last year,  the Communists  alone  The Irish  Labour  Party,  is,  in  fact,  the 
emerged with a majority of one in the 40- only party of the left to  command a degree 
member  city  council.  But  they  consistently  of support from the electorate. It now holds 
get more than  90  per cent  support of the  19  out  of  144  seats  in  the  Dail  and  five 
council  on  their  programs,  they  say.  The  cabinet seats, including the deputy premier-
projects  have  left  Cesena  with  a  sizeable  ship,  in the coalition government it  formed 
deficit-another innovation  brought by  the  three years ago with the somewhat conserv-
Communists,  and the main point on which  . ative Fine Gael Party.  (The Fine Gael has 
their  administration  is  criticized.  Yet even  teamed up with the Christian Democrats in 
a leader of the opposition Republican Party  the  European  Parliament.  The  representa-
admits  grudgingly  that  "paved  roads  and  tives of the Labour Party, which manages to 
buses  are what people seem  to  like."  cover  a  broad spectrum  of leftist  opinion, 
Angelo  Mini  says  of  Cesena  that  "our  are, on the other hand, part of the European 
problems  reflect  national  problems."  And  Parliament's Socialist Group.) 
it is true that Italy badly needs a more effec- The largest single  party  remains  Fianna 
tive  national  administration  and  more  di- Fail,  which  was  founded  by  former  Presi-
rect  involvement  of  its  citizens.  But  in  dent Eamon de Valera and which has  been 
Rome,  the  capital,  there  are  still  questions  out of government office for only eight years 
being raised  of whether the national Com- since it first  came  to  power in 1932. Given 
munist  Party  can  really  function  as  local  the voting patterns over recent decades  and 
branches  do  and  devote  itself  simply  to  the general Roman Catholic conservatism of 
good  government  without  being  side- the Irish people, it is unlikely that the Com-
tracked  by  doctrinaire  issues  in  the  inter- munist Party  in  any  form  will  match  that 
national  field.  record in the foreseeable future. 
-CHRIS  TIN  A LORD  -PETER DOYLE 
"Gettinf{  ready for the 1976 German electoral 
contest . .. .  "  Bac,  Nordwest  Zeitung, Germany. 
Bonn 
The  national  election  campaign  in  West 
Germany,  which  runs  closely  parallel  to 
this  year's  American presidential campaign, 
with  the  vote  for  a  new  parliament  due 
October 3,  had long been pegged as  a bat-
tle  over  economic  issues.  But  in  February, 
as  the first  round of heavy slugging opened 
between  the Social  Democrat-Liberal coali-
tion of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the 
Christian Democrat opposition, the main is-
sue  has  suddenly  become  foreign  policy, 
and in particular Germany's  delicate,  emo-
tion-charged relations with Eastern Europe. 
A  major  treaty  with  Poland  which 
Schmidt  sealed  with  Polish  leaders  during 
the  1975  Helsinki  peace  conference,  had 
been  slowly  moving  toward  ratification  in 
Bonn  during  the  winter,  stirring little  in-
terest.  Suddenly in  February,  due to  an un-
foreseen  vote  flip-flop  in  the  German State 
of Lower Saxony,  the  opposition  Christian 
Democrats  found  themselves  in  a  position 
to  kill  the  accord,  which  in  essence  is  a 
tradeoff of German war reparations against 
exit visas  for ethnic-Germans still living in 
Poland. 
The  natural  instinct  of  the  Christian 
Democrats,  led  by  Rhineland  Pfalz  State 
Governor Helmut Kohl,  is  to  vote  against 
the Schmidt detente policy. But, some party 
strategists believe this would present a cold 
war  hardline  foreign  affairs  image  which 
could  lose  votes  in  October.  Equally  im-
portant,  however,  the  Christian  Democrats 
must give a picture of being united on the 
issue.  In 1972  the party split over  ratifica-
tion of a similar treaty with East  Germany, 
earning  a  hesitant,  unsteady  image  which 
hurt it in  a later national election.  This  is 
particularly  important  for  Kohl,  a  big, 
handshaking  politician  with  a  banal  de-
livery,  who  often  looks  like  he  is  being 
shoved around by Christian Democrat Party 
factions  instead  of  leading  them.  In  de-
bates on the treaty in the Bundestag, Chan-
cellor Schmidt scored points  by  saying that 
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cession to Bavaria Christian Democrat Party 
Boss  Franz Josef Strauss. 
In  the  Bundestag,  the  treaty  went 
through  comfortably  February  19,  garner-
ing  15  votes  from  the  opposition.  But  in 
mid-March  the  crucial  vote  will  come  in 
the Upper House,  or Bundesrat, where the 
opposition  suddenly  has  won  a  strong 
majority. The treaty is  equally important to 
the  present Government,  which  has  fallen 
short on  numerous  1972 campaign pledges 
and has  to  show some  major achievements 
in this election year. 
Also  the  treaty  is  a  particular  prize  for 
Foreign  Minister  Hans-Dietrich  Genscher, 
who  leads  the small  Free Democrat  Party, 
the junior partner in the coalition. Trust be-
tween the Free Democrats and Social Dem-
ocrats  has  begun  to  weaken  because of the 
mysterious  state  parliament  vote  in  Lower 
Saxony, where unknown deputies from one 
or  the  other  government  faction  switched 
votes  and forced  the Social  Democrat gov-
ernor from office.  Schmidt has had to  show 
super  dedication  to  the  cause  of the  treaty 
to  keep  Genscher'  s  trust,  which  will  be 
essential  if the  two  parties  seek  to  form  a 
new government after the October elections. 
The  Christian  Democrats  are  more  than 
ready to tempt the Free Democrats to throw 
in with them after the October vote. 
As  for  the  economy,  Schmidt  at  a  re-
cent,  very  relaxed  press  conference  main-
tained it is getting better every day.  He said 
the  Christian  Democrats  have  realized  this 
and  dropped  plans  to  peg  their  campaign 
on  economic  issues.  The  Government  ex-
pects  4. 5 per cent in  real  economic growth 
in  1976  and  says  inflation  will  be  only  5 
per cent.  The major problem  is  unemploy-
ment,  which  is  expected  to  stay  above  4 
per cent,  very  high for Germany. Whether 
Chancellor Schmidt  himself will  find  him-
self  in  the  unemployed  ranks  at  the  end 
of this  year,  something  few  observers  felt 
possible  a  while  ago,  is  becoming  a  fas-




Seldom  has  the  ballyhoo  surrounding  a 
French  Communist  Party  congress  been 
greater, but then seldom do the Communists 
publicize their "changes,"  unveil new  poli-
cies,  and  advertise  criticism  of  the  Soviet 
Union. All this fare was part of the French 
party's  twenty-second  congress,  one  that  is 
sure to go down as a milestone. Once known 
as  the Stalinists of the West, more interested 
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"Look daddy. all .relf-supporting .'"  Behrendt,  Het 
Parool,  Amsterdam. 
in doctrinal purity than any  serious  bid for 
power a  Ia  ltalienneJ the French party today 
has put on a new face. 
As a rule,  Communists do not talk much 
about change and new policies, for that im-
plies  past  error.  Yet  this  is  precisely  what 
the  French  party  did  at  its  February  con-
gress,  to  the  point  that  U Humanite  was 
quoting  from  Goethe  after  the  battle  of 
Valmy-when the revolutionaries beat back 
the royalists and the Prussians-that "a new 
era has begun." 
The debate  in  France  today,  a  full  year 
ahead  of the  local  elections  and  two years 
ahead  of the national  elections,  is  whether 
this  Communist "change"  is  appearance or 
reality.  They  say  they  have  changed,  but 
what  does  it mean?  for most  Frenchmen, 
renunciation  of a  notion  as  archaic  as  the 
dictatorship of the proletariat has  no  more 
significance  than  the  recent  Church  decree 
that  God  could  now  be  addressed  in  the 
familiar tu  form.  They are more impressed 
by  the  Party's  new  readiness  to  openly 
criticize Moscow over Soviet repression and 
abuse of liberties. 
But most significant  of all  is  the party's 
call  for a "union of the French people." It 
is  this concept that actually explains the rest 
of  the  change.  The  French  party,  so  long 
critical  of  the  Italian  Communists'  "op-
portunism"  for  proposing an  historic com-
promise  with  the  Christian  Democrats  in 
order  to  share  in  the  government,  is  now 
proposing  precisely  that.  The  new  French 
thinking came following a meeting in Rome 
last November between party leaders Geor-
ges  Marchais  and  Enrico  Berlinguer,  itself 
something of an historic compromise. 
Drawing, like the Italians, largely on the 
Allende  experience  in  Chile,  the  French 
party  now  reasons  that  it  no  longer  is 
enough to  aim for a magic  50.1 per cent of 
the  vote.  Instead,  a  larger  consensus  is 
necessary,  reaching  beyond  traditional  Soc-
ialist allies  to the center and seizing on the 
present recession as  the best time for action. 
Obviously,  such  liaisons  are  more  difficult 
when  outmoded  doctrine  such  as  the  dic-
tatorship  of  the  proletariat  must  be  de-
fended.  The  Italians  abandoned  that  no-
tion  years  ago.  It  also  helps  if  the  party 
does  not  seem  to  be  defending  acts  in-
defensible  in  Western  Europe,  such  as 
committing  political  prisoners  to  insane 
asylums,  a favorite Soviet practice. 
Thus  do  both  appearance  and  reality 
change. Does  it  mean  that Communism  it-
self is  changing;  that what Marchais has  in 
mind  for  France  would  be  much  different 
from what Communism has  produced else-
where? That is  the great imponderable. The 
most  recent  evidence  on  the  subject,  in 
Portugal,  is  not very  reassuring.  There the 
Communists,  defended  in  their  actions  by 
the  French  party,  made  an  all  too  clumsy 
attempt to seize  power and  circumvent  the 
will of the people as  expressed at the polls. 
Another  error,  like  Allende's,  for  Com-
munists to ponder. 
-JAMES 0. GOLDSBOROUGH 
Copenhagen 
The Danes are easy to hurt these days.  The 
most  recent  example  is  the  angry  official 
retort to Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tinde-
mans,  who was  quoted in Denmark several 
times  earlier  this  year  for  his  not  too  flat-
tering  remarks  about  the  Danes'  apparent 
lack  of  enthusiasm  for  European  integra-
tion: Tindemans even had the nerve to sug-
gest  that  Denmark  was  in  the  European 
Community more  for the money  than any-
thing else.  Danish Foreign Minister K.  B. 
Anderson answered straight-forwardly  that 
the Danes  "don't like  to  be  told  what we 
are,  and  certainly  not  by  a  foreigner  like 
Leo Tindemans." Just to  make sure,  words 
to  the same effect  were conveyed  to Tinde-
mans  through  the  Danish  ambassador  to 
the  European  Communities.  Hardly  the 
kind of response that fosters  solidarity and 
goodwill  among  the  smaller  EC  member 
countries. 
But  do  the  5  million  Danes  really  de-
serve their reputation as  the foot-dragging, 
reluctant, mini-heirs of Charles de Gaulle's 
nation-state?  By  their  own  standards,  cer-
tainly not.  The Danes-a majority  both in 
parliament  and  among  the  people-seem 
ready  to  accept  the  claim  of  the  minority 
Socialist  Government  that  Denmark  is  in 
the  vanguard  of  the  European  countries 
when it boils down to the real issues. 
And  these  issues  are,  according  to  the 
Socialist  Government,  primarily  the  fight 
against  unemployment,  a  common  energy 
policy,  and  a  strengthening  of  the  mone-
tary  agreement-the  so-called  "snake"-· "' 
I  # 
that,  thanks  to  the  strong  German  mark, 
has  brought  the  Danish  currency  safely 
through  the  crises  in  the  monetary  system 
in  recent years.  Not that this  last  fact  has 
provoked  any  special  gratitude  toward  the 
Germans.  Danish  Government  ministers 
have,  on  the  contrary,  helpfully  suggested 
that the Germans might do more to  stimu-
late  domestic  demand,  including  imports. 
The  Germans  say  no.  They  are  for  some 
reason more worried about inflation in Ger-
many  than  the Danes  are.  When  defining 
the issues as  above, the Danes are not with-
out  political  allies  in  other  EC  countries. 
However, the differences  really show when 
you  start talking about institutions. 
For  most  Americans,  the  proposals  the 
Belgian  Prime  Minister  has  made  for 
"European Union" must appear to be any-
thing  but  federalist.  Tindemans  does  not 
even  propose  a  senate,  much less  a  strong 
European  executive.  Still,  most  Danes  ap-
pear to consider his proposals too federalist. 
A  recent  survey  showed  that  less  than  a 
third  of  the  Danes  favored  a  European 
Parliament  elected  by  universal  suffrage, 
and this  is  only part of a generally hostile 
pattern  of  attitudes  toward  innovations 
and  experiments  in  the  European  integra-
tion  process.  But  why  is  this  pattern  so 
hostile? 
There is  no easy answer, of course. Two-
thirds  of  the  Danes  voted  "yes"  to  EC 
membership  in  the  1972  referendum,  but 
the  issues  of  the  campaign  were  almost 
purely economic-the main argument being 
that Danish agriculture  needed  free  access 
to its  main market,  Britain. As  Britain was 
joining  the  Community,  Denmark  would 
have to follow suit to safeguard this access. 
Entering  together  with  Britain  also  elimi-
nated  many  of  the  political  misgivings-
who  cherishes  sovereignty  more  than  the 
British?  But  this  never  really  became  an 
issue,  though  the  opponents  of  Danish 
membership  did  their  best  to make  it the 
issue of the campaign. 
Contrary  to  the  expectations  of  most 
Danish  politicians,  the  debate  about  Eu-
rope's  future  has  become  more  and  more 
political,  and  institutional  topics  are  now 
in the foreground,  highlighted by  the pro-
posals of the Tindemans report. It follows 
that  this  development  has  also  caught  the 
Danish public unprepared. If the economic 
indicators  had  been  more  favorable  than 
they have in the last years,  Danish attitudes 
would  no doubt have  been  different,  more 
positive. Opposition to Danish membership, 
as  reflected  in  the opinion  polls,  mounted 
with  the  increasing  economic  slack.  Who 
said that Tindemans had a point? 
-LEIF BECK FALLESEN 
Brussels 
Tall,  angular,  with  piercing  eyes  and  a 
down-to-earth manner, Belgian Prime Min-
ister  Leo  Tindemans  is  filling  his  role  as 
wise man of Europe to the hilt. The Tinde-
mans report on European Union,  which he 
delivered  to  the  nine  Community  govern-
ments and the European public in January, 
has  raised  a  number  of  storms,  and  the 
hardly-your-retiring  elder  statesman  has 
rushed  from  podium  to  pulpit  to  defend 
his ideas and inject a steadly sense of Flem-
ish realism in the European debate. 
The performance has  been  all  the  more 
amazing since  he has  also  had  to  steer his 
rather  heterogenous  Belgian  Government 
through  sticky  economic  and  language  is-
sues.  Until  the  Christian  Democrat  politi-
cians  formed  the  present  Belgian  Govern-
ment in March  197  4,  being Belgian  Prime 
Minister  had  normally  been  a  frustrating 
full-time  juggling act.  Few men had  been 
able  to  make  a  mark  in  European  affairs 
while holding the job. But Tindemans,  53, 
is  a  slightly  different  case  since  he  came 
into  the  job  reluctantly,  hoping instead  to 
become  foreign  minister  and  fulfill  a  life-
long dream.  A  foreign affairs  buff,  he had 
been  an  expert  in  European  policy  while 
working  himself  up  through  the  party 
ranks,  studied  at  the  famous  Harvard  In-
ternational  Seminar under Dr.  Henry Kis-
singer,  and collected one of Belgium's best 
private  libraries  on  international  relations 
at his home in an Antwerp suburb. 
In various  ministerial  jobs  he  showed  a 
diplomat's  flair  for inspiring trust and  co-
operation  among  Belgium's  various  lan-
guage  factions  and  party  leaders.  After 
leading  a  highly  successful  election  cam-
paign  in  March  197  4,  he  was  drafted  as 
prime  minister  of  a  center-right  coalition 
with a primary job of nudging Belgium to-
ward a federal state. He has produced more 
progress  in  this  field  than  many  thought 
possible  when  he  started,  but  he  has  not 
been able to  fix  the big compromise among 
all factions that would complete the job. In 
February  a  third  major  reconciliation  ef-
fort  among  language  radicals  failed  in  a 
fog of mistrust and petty  bickering. 
In  the  meantime,  however,  Tindemans 
never took his  eyes  off foreign  affairs,  and 
in December 1974 he volunteered at the EC 
summit  in  Paris  to  make  a  pilgrimage 
around  Europe  to  find  out  where  people 
thought the Community was  heading. The 
resulting report,  with few  rhetorical  frills, 
painted a gloomy view of the situation and 
recommended  some  practical  first  steps  to 
improve things.  The attacks  began at once. 
The  "federalism  now"  school  of  Euro-
pean  thinking  complained  that  the  Prime 
Minister had not  included their visions  of 
a  European  utopia  which  they  have  long 
proposed. The poorer Community members 
-Britain,  Italy,  and  Ireland-were jittery 
about  his  observation  that  the  Nine  were 
drifting into two groups, rich and poor, and 
that something should be  done so  that the 
cooperation  inside  the  richer  group  could 
progress  where  possible.  Many  European 
socialists  felt  that  there  was  not  enough 
emphasis on unemployment and social wel-
fare  programs in  the report,  while  French 
Gaullists  bridled at a  few  new suggestions 
on intensifying foreign policy coordination. 
Tindemans himself launched into a series 
of  speeches  to  clarify  his  point.  In  early 
April  the  nine  heads  of  government  will 
give their official views on his recommenda-
tions  at  a  summit  in  Luxembourg.  But so 
far, Tindemans says he has already achieved 
one  of  his  main  aims.  The  report  has 
touched  off  a  very  necessary  bout  of hard 
thinking about  the  future  of Europe. 
-PAUL KEMEZIS 
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REGINALD DALE 
EIGHT  YEARS  AGO,  BRUSSELS  WAS  CONSIDERED  A  PRETTY 
dull  spot  for  a  foreign  correpondent.  It was  partly  the 
place  itself,  known  generally  to  nonresidents  as  an  end-
less stretch of cobbled streets and drab buildings that they 
had to drive through to get somewhere nicer.  Try to  put 
a  telephone  call  through  to  Brussels  in  many  parts  of 
Britain  even  today,  and  the  operator  will  still  ask  you, 
"Where'  s  that?"  But  the  main  point  was  that  it  was 
hardly a major world news center. 
When I got there in early 1968,  Brussels had been the 
headquarters  of the  European  Common  Market  for  just 
over  ten  years.  After all  the  visionary  enthusiasm  for  a 
united  Europe  in  the  Fifties,  the  six  founder  members 
(France, Germany,  Italy,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  and 
Luxembourg)  had been getting down to  rather  uninspir-
ing brass  tacks.  They had just  about finished  laboriously 
working out common farm policies and were well on the 
way  to  removing customs  duties on each  others'  exports. 
To most  people  in  Britain,  Brussels  was  known  mainly 
as  the  mecca  of  Continental  officialdom,  chiefly  distin-
guished  by  interminable  all-night  "marathon"  meetings 
on obscure and irrelevant agricultural problems. Someone, 
with a stroke of genius,  had just coined the word "Euro-
crat" to describe the EC bureaucrats. 
In  Paris,  General  de  Gaulle still  seemed  to  be  firmly 
entrenched in power and had just vetoed  Britain's appli-
cation to join the Community for the second  time in  five 
years.  There  seemed  little  prospect  of  Britain,  or  any 
other country,  being admitted to  this  rather introspective 
little club  for  the  foreseeable  future.  It was  hardly  sur-
prising that the British public  did  not feel  like  taking a 
great deal of interest in  what went on  in  Brussels.  Cer-
tainly no one in the London office  was barking down the 
telephone for news,  and we felt little urgency in  sending 
it-if only because it was usually up to us,  in any case,  to 
persuade them that stories were worth printing. 
There were a total of three British journalists covering 
the Community  full-time.  But  we  outsiders  weren't  the 
only  ones  who  apparently  thought  it  unimportant.  I  re-
member being astonished to find  that there were only two 
French  Common  Market correspondents.  And  not  many 
more Italians, even  though both countries had long since 
entrusted  their  fate  to  Brussels.  There  were  a  lot  more 
Germans-there  still  are.  But  there  cannot  have  been 
many more than about 40  of us  altogether who gathered 
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every  Thursday at the Commission  for our weekly  brief-
ing.  We sat  cramped  round  an  E-shaped,  baize-covered 
table  in  a  dark  little  room,  like  a  war-time  school  class 
temporarily evacuated  to  makeshift  premises. 
The stories we wrote were mainly economic and often 
tedious. One of my  first  tasks was to spend 36  hours at a 
stretch covering a ministeral meeting devoted to the prob-
lems of Italian olive oil. The Common Market has never 
been a great source of "human interest" material,  but in 
those  days  nobody  seemed  all  that  keen  on  writing  up 
the personalities that were there.  I  doubt if most of my 
colleagues could have listed the names of all  nine mem-
bers of the Commission, and I'm not sure I can remember 
them all myself-we didn't see  them very often, if at all. 
We British relied heavily on the Dutch for inside informa-
tion:  As  traditional "friends of Britain,"  they  seemed  to 
feel morally responsible for us,  and very grateful we were 
too.  It has  always  been  much more difficult  to cover  the 
Community if you come from a nonmember country. 
'l 
I 
I 8 Years  Dateline  Brussels 
'-\ 
Today,  Brussels  is  a  different world.  The Commission 
has occupied its vast new steel and glass Berlaymont Com-
plex, and the specially designed press room seating 120 is 
already too small. With over 250 foreign correspondents, 
Brussels has moved into the same international league as 
Washington.  Up  to  100  reporters  regularly  attend  the 
Commission's daily noon briefings. The number of British 
correspondents has increased tenfold. And there are even 
a few more French. It is  no longer an easy-going journal-
istic  backwater;  the pace  has  become  ruthlessly  competi-
tive.  We have Tass,  Radio  New Zealand,  the Voices  of 
Zaire  and America,  the  New China  News  Agency,  and 
the  Plain  Truth.  Whatever  the  Community's  internal 
bickerings and shortcomings, the world at large seems  to 
be taking an interest. 
©  Ralrh  Robinson 
WHAT WE  DO  NOT  HAVE  is  one single staff  correpondent 
from one of the big US daily newspapers. Maybe the great 
American public does not find  Brussels important. Maybe 
the Community is  just too  difficult  to  explain  to  reason-
ably  sane people. Three years  ago  in New Mexico,  I  de-
livered what I thought to  be  a high-powered,  impromptu 
speech  on  European  monetary  union.  It was  extensively 
reported in the local press next day as  "military" union-
but perhaps that was  just the British accent. 
I suspect that there are two more fundamental  reasons 
for the absence of American  journalists. The first  is  that 
European  integration  has  never  been  a  major  domestic 
political  issue  in  the  United States  to  compare with,  say, 
detente or Vietnam. The second is  that, unlike Washing-
ton,  Brussels,  the "capital of Europe,"  is  still  not  really 
a center of power where decisions  are  taken that funda-
mentally  influence  world events.  That, of course,  is  Eu-
rope's fault, not America's. 
For  British  newspapers  it has  been  just  the  opposite. 
Seen from London, the Common Market, and the United 
Kingdom's tortuous flirtation with it,  has been one of the 
biggest  postwar  British  domestic  political  issues.  Seen 
from Brussels, the history of the Community over the last 
seven  years  has  been  largely  the  story  of its  painful  ab-
sorption  of the  United Kingdom,  accompanied  by  Den-
mark and Ireland. Like a difficult pregnancy in reverse. 
That this would be so  was clear to  us  in  Brussels from 
the moment that General De Gaulle abruptly shuffled  off 
the political scene  in  spring of 1969.  In London,  it took 
a bit longer to  sink in.  Nevertheless, by  the time the Six 
agreed to admit Britain at their historic summit conference 
in  the  Hague in December of that year,  it was  clear  to 
everyone  that Brussels  was  going  to  be  at  the  center  of 
a major, long-running "British story"  that would include 
almost  every  conceivable  economic  and  political  angle 
from the future of the Commonwealth to  the fate of the 
British breakfast. Would British sausages be illegal under 
Common  Market  rules?  What  about  warm  beer?  The 
Brussels  press  corps,  both  British  and  Continental,  sud-
denly woke up. 
Over six  years  later,  the  British  story  is  still  doggedly 
refusing to go away.  First we had the entry negotiations. 
Lasting from June 1970 to  the memorable signing of the 
Accession Treaty in January 1972, when a girl threw ink 
all  over  Prime  Minister  Edward  Heath-a godsend  for 
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had the "interim period" that lasted until January 1,  1973, 
when Britain, Ireland, and Denmark tried to get used  to 
the idea that they really were about to become  full mem-
bers 12  years after they first  asked  to join.  Next, we had 
to  observe  the  behavior  of  the  strange  new  nine-nation 
creature, with the spotlight obviously on the British:  How 
would they get on with  these  curious  Continentals  after 
centuries of imperial isolation? 
No sooner had we all  written our definitive  pieces  on 
the  Conservative  Government's  performance  in  Europe 
than it suddenly disappeared,  to be replaced by  a  Labour 
Government pledged to "re-negotiate" the entire package 
of entry terms  that we had so  painstakingly covered  just 
over two years before. So  we had an irritable year of re-
negotiations  culminating  in  the  British  referendum  of 
June 1975. Surely, we thought the poll's resounding "yes" 
to Europe would be the end of it.  But no. Just as everyone 
was  wondering  what  to  write  about  next,  the  British 
started making difficulties  again. They wanted a  separate 
seat from the rest of the Nine at the North-South dialogue 
in  Paris.  They  did  not  want  elections  to  the  European 
Parliament, or at least not at the same time as  the others, 
and  in  all  sorts  of ways  they  still  wanted  to  do  things 
differently.  Like  it  or  not,  with  all  their  appalling  eco-
nomic  problems  and their  unabashed  arrogance,  they  re-
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mained probably the most newsworthy people in Brussels. 
Still, the high point was undoubtedly the entry negotia-
tions.  It was  not  always  exciting.  We  waited  for  hour 
after hour, often all  through the night, in  uncomfortable 
lobbies while the negotiators argued over percentage con-
tributions  to . the  common  budget  and  over  butter  and 
cheese import quotas. But at least it was important. British 
membership,  and  thus  ultimately  the  future  of  Britain, 
would depend on the answers to questions such  as  these. 
The terms had to be right, even down to the minutest de-
tail,  or the British Parliament would not accept them. 
THERE \X!ERE  LIGHTER MOMENTS. There was the time, late 
at night, when Britain's chief negotiator banged furiously 
on the table and catapulted a  large tumbler of whisky all 
over the immaculate pin-striped suit of the Commi.ssion's 
chief  negotiator,  Jean-Fran~ois Deniau.  "It is  for  this," 
Deniau acidly remarked as  he wiped down his  waistcoat, 
"that they want export rebates." The British  were at the 
time engaged in  a devious attempt to  persuade the Com-
munity to subsidize Scotch  whisky exports.  They did  not 
succeed. 
Between  negotiating  sessions,  the  game  was  to  track 
down secret negotiating papers-a pursuit that both jour-
nalists  and  diplomats  entered  into  with equal  gusto.  At 
one  tense  moment a  senior  diplomat,  determined  to  get 
a  key  document,  grabbed  an  astonished  Community  of-
ficial  in  a  stranglehold  around  the  throat  and  shouted, 
"This one I've got to  have."  He got it. 
As  the  negotiations  neared  their  climax,  there  were 
extraordinary goings-on  in  the  22-story  Kirchberg  Euro-
pean Center in Luxembourg. The perfidious British smug-
gled  in  a  senior  New  Zealand  minister  through  a  back 
door to advise them on the arrangements being negotiated 
for  his  country's  future  dairy  exports,  a  crucial  political 
issue  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Neither  the  Community 
countries,  particularly  the  French,  nor  the  press  were 
meant to know he was there. The operation did not go en-
tirely smoothly. At one point he  found  himself ignomini-
ously locked out on the wrong side of a fire  exit, but the 
secret was kept for long enough. 
The breakthrough came in  Luxembourg early one June 
morning in  1971  after three marathon day  and night ses-
sions,  each  lasting three days,  in  as  many  weeks.  As  the 
exhausted negotiators straggled out of the Kirchberg into 
the dewy dawn, the sun  was  rising  from  the mist  into a 
clear blue sky.  It was  a  moment of history.  One exhilia-
rated British  reporter went to the typewriter and filed  an 
ecstatic story to London that started, "A new dawn broke 
over  Europe  today  as  the  sun  climbed  through  the  fog. 
... etc., etc." He was puzzled and upset when a down-to-
earth  deskman  in  London  threw  the  copy  in  the  waste 
bin  and ordered him to  rewrite the details of the night's 
agreements on butter quotas. 
L 
I Still, we all got a genuine champagne breakfast at the 
expense  of  the  British  Government.  Knowing  that  the 
Luxembourgers would offer Luxembourg champagne, the 
Rritish  had  craftily  hoarded  a  few  bottles  of  the  real 
French stuff in the Holiday Inn.  It is  a  sad comment on 
European enterprise that this symbol of American culture 
is  the only hotel in walking distance of the EC  buildings 
in  the Grand Duchy,  and many  EC  ministers  and diplo-
mats stay there rather than in the seedier European estab-
1  ishments in the city center. 
Just over  a  year  later,  presidents  and  prime  ministers 
gathered in Paris for the first summit meeting of all nine 
countries-both new members and old. We didn't know it 
at the  time,  but it was  also  to  be  the  last  of the  great 
ceremonial summits at which pomp and circumstance, and 
a massive resounding communique at the end,  seemed to 
be  almost more important than  the  immediate,  practical 
issues of the day. 
The press  corps  was  lavishly  entertained.  The  French 
foreign  ministry  laid  on  a  magnificent  buffet,  serving 
"typical"  dishes  from  each  of  the  nine  countries-Irish 
stew for the Irish, sauerkraut for  the Germans, spaghetti 
for  the  Italians,  and  so  on.  They  succeeded  in  morally 
offending  virtually  every  other  nationality  present-pre-
dictably,  the French  dish  ( coq  au  vin)  was  the only one 
worth eating.  And despite  the  shoals  of shiny  black  ci-
troens, motorcycle escorts, and strings of brand new flags, 
the ordinary Parisian  was  clearly  not impressed.  French 
radio interviewed a workman cleaning the outside of the 
building  where  the  meeting  was  to  be  held  and  asked 
what he thought the European  summit meant.  "Ah," he 
replied, "that must be Mont Blanc." It is  not only Ameri-
cans  who  find  it difficult  to  understand  what  the  Com-
munity is all about. 
In  retrospect,  Paris  1972  was  the  summit of all  sum-
mits.  Georges  Pompidou,  Edward  Heath,  and  Willy 
Brandt had not yet  given way  to  the  more prosaic  team 
of Giscard d'Estaing, Harold Wilson, and Helmut Schmidt. 
The world was as  yet  unsullied by  energy shortages and 
inflation,  and  it  seemed  as  if  a  new  Europe  was  really 
about  to  be  born.  With  hopelessly  optimistic  zeal,  the 
leaders  of  the  Nine  pledged  themselves  to  common 
energy,  social,  and regional policies, economic and mone-
tary union, political union, and above all European union, 
whatever that meant, by the end of the decade. 
IT  D!DN'T  TAKE  LONG  TO  COME  UNSTUCK.  Within  12 
months,  the  Arab  oil  embargo  and the world economic 
crisis had shown that the Community needed a great deal 
more  than brave declarations to  keep  it together.  Under 
the  threat of the oil  embargo,  both  France  and  Britain 
swiftly  abandoned  their  new-found  "Europeanism"  and 
reverted  to  the  old  policies  of  every  man  for  himself. 
Germany, which was regaining its political self-confidence 
for the first time since the end of W odd War II, started 
to jib at its role as the automatic provider of funds for its 
prodigal partners.  At the  snow-bound Copenhagen  sum-
mit of December 1973, the Community reached its lowest 
point ever. Nothing was decided. Fundamental differences 
of view were glossed over,  and within a  week Germany 
was  blocking  Britain's  cherished  common  regional  fund 
and the United Kingdom was vetoing a  common energy 
policy in retaliation.  For the first  time,  and by  no means 
the  last,  the  British began to  be  labelled Europe's  "new 
Gaullists,"  shamelessly  putting  self-interest  above  the 
common good. 
As  the gravity of the crisis  became  clear  in  Brussels, 
British voters chucked out Heath  (though for  quite  dif-
ferent reasons)  and elected a  Labour Government whose 
views  on Europe  ranged  from  the  passionately "pro"  to 
the pathologically "anti." For over a year the other coun-
tries  had  to  sit  back,  unable  to  plan  their  own  future, 
while the British once again tried to  decide whether they 
would  be  in  or  out.  At  the  time,  the  British  were  re-
proached for taking up too much time with their re-nego-
tiations.  In  retrospect,  one  could  easily  argue  that  the 
other Eight were  fairly  glad of an  excuse  not  to  tackle 
other problems that they might have been unable to solve. 
Nevertheless,  one  does  not  have  to  be  British  to  ob-
serve that Britain's problems have taken up an inordinate 
amount  of  the  Community's  time  over  the  past  seven 
years. Add to that the arrangements that had to be made 
for the Commonwealth countries, both rich  and poor, and 
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Hong  Kong  to  Gibraltar.  While  concentrating  on  the 
task of enlargement, the Community was able to close its 
eyes  to  its  own  fundamental  weaknesses,  and  it  is  not 
surprising that they did not go away. 
But, sooner or later, it had to be done. The Community 
had to incorporate Britain if it were to serve as  a credible 
basis  for  building  a  new  Europe.  Anyone  who  had  the 
slightest  knowledge  or  experience  of  the  British  would 
have  known  from  the beginning that it  would be  extra-
ordinarily difficult.  General De Gaulle,  as  so  often,  was 
right in  insisting that the British were not "Europeans," 
in  the Continental sense of the term.  I remember Deniau 
one evening seriously maintaining that no country could 
be really European unless  it  produced wine and  tobacco, 
thus  categorically  ruling  out  everyone  north  of  a  line 
drawn roughly from Paris to the Rhine. 
Despite such Gaullist sentiments, Britain is  now at last 
very slowly becoming to regard itself as European, and the 
Nine are preparing to take new nations on board, notably 
the southern European countries from Portugal, via Spain, 
to  Greece and Turkey. That will also  be  difficult,  and it 
would  be  most unwise  to  try  to  attempt it  too  quickly. 
But  the first  hesitant buds  of a  new  sense  of European 
optimism seems to be sprouting in  Brussels.  As  the Nine 
slowly emerge from  the  trauma of recession,  a  new and 
more realistic attempt is  being made to redefine  the way 
ahead.  With  luck,  the  report  on  European  union,  just 
published by  Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans, will 
receive  a  serious  hearing.  There seems  to  be  a  growing 
body  of people who believe  that the  time  could  be  ripe 
for a new step forward. 
So  I  leave Brussels in a  slightly more optimistic mood 
than I  would have done a  year  ago.  I  shall  undoubtedly 
miss it. The Brussels atmosphere can be addictive.  I shall 
miss  the camaraderie of the  press  corps  and its  idiosyn-
crasies:  the  Dutch,  who  always  com1nandeer  their  own 
special table and sit around it drinking beer and campari 
waiting for someone to come and brief them; the French, 
who are usually told nothing for hours on end,  but who 
are  suddenly  summoned  upstairs  for  ministerial  brain-
After eight years as Bmssels 
correspondent  for The Financial Times, 
Reginald Dale is nou' retttrning to 
London as the paper'J  E11ropean editor. 
44 EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY March 1976 
washing  at  key  moments;  the  usually  sober  Irish,  who 
one night in the bar last year held up the stories they had 
just written like music sheets and sang out their copy  to 
the tunes of patriotic ballads;  the hard-working but less 
sober  British,  who  are  always  the  last  to  leave  an  all-
night marathon; the Danes, whose language nobody else 
understands,  but who  are  often  the  best  informed;  the 
pragmatic German,  who  used  to  bring  a  fully  equipped 
camp-bed  into  the lobby whenever he thought the  meet-
ing might run late. 
As I leave, the Commission is  producing new proposals 
on tax harmonization, which was the subject of the first 
Council meeting I covered eight years  ago.  In those days 
we  also had to  write about the German als  ob  tariff  for 
freight  traffic  in  the Saar  (too fiendishly  complicated  to 
explain), which fortunately ceased to attract any interest 
years ago. Since then we have spent long hours on import 
quotas for tomato concentrates and the breeding habits of 
the  male  and  female  hop.  Today,  we  have  the  axle 
weights of heavy trucks  (an old favorite), customs duties 
on  potatoes,  and  the  harmonization  of  daylight-savings 
time. These are the nuts and bolts of the Community, and 
will  remain  so  long after I  have  gone.  There  are  many 
days in Brussels that are frustrating and unrewarding, but 







STANLEY JOHNSON, head of 
the Commission's pret,ention of 
pollution and nuisances division 
The  first  meeting  of  the  environ-
ment  ministers  of  the  European 
Community  was  in  July  1973,  when 
they  adopted  the EC  action  program 
on  the  environment.  This  program 
not  only  laid  down  the  objectives 
and  principles  to  be  followed;  it 
also  established  in  considerable  de-
tail  the  specific  areas  where  the 
Commission  was  called  upon  to 
make  proposals,  and  the  relevant' 
deadlines. 
in November  1974  the  Nine's  en-
vironment  ministers  met  again  to 
adopt  the  first  series  of  measures 
proposed  by  the  Commission.  This 
first  series  included:  a  directive deal-
ing  with  the  quality  of  water  des-
tined  for  drinking;  a  directive  deal-
ing  with  the  disposal  of  waste-oils; 
a  recommendation  on  the  applica-
tion  of  the  polluter-pays  principle; 
a  resolution  on  energy  and  environ-
ment;  and a  decision  authorizing the 
Community  to  negotiate with a  view 
to  becoming  a  party  to  the  Paris 
Convention  on  the  prevention  of 
marine  pollution  from  land-based 
sources. 
In  the  first  part  of  1975,  certain 
other  environment  measures  were 
adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ministers 
as  priority  points.  These  included: 
a  "framework" directive  on the elim-
ination  of  waste;  a  decision  con-
cerning  the e:xchange  of  information 
between  atmospheric  monitoring 
networks  dealing  with  S02  and  sus-
pended  particulates;  a  decision  con-
cerning  "second  category"  pollutants 
for  which  criteria  were  to  be  estab-
lished;  and  a  decision  establishing 
the  European  Foundation  for  the 
Improvement  of  Living  and  Work-
ing Conditions. 
At  the  third  meeting  of  environ-
ment  ministers,  in  Luxembourg  on 
October  16,  1975,  the  Council 
adopted  another  draft  directive 
d.ealing  with  water  quality  objec-
tives.  This  time  for  bathing  water 
(both  sea  and  freshwater).  The 
Council  of .Ministers  also  adopted  a 
proposal  regarding  the  sulphur  con-
tent of heating oil.  A  general  reduc-
tion  in  the  sulphur  content  of  heat-
ing  oils  as  proposed by  the Commis-
sion  and  approved  by  the  Council, 
could  make  an  important  contribu-
ti.o~ toward  improving the quality of 
~ur 10 Europe's cities. 
Two  other  proposals,  recently 
adopted  by  the  Council,  deal  with 
the Community's  international  activi-
ties  in  the  field  of environment. The 
Council  approved  the  idea  that  the 
Community  should  in  principle  be-
come  a party to  a framework conven-
tion  relating  to  the  pollution  of the 
.Mediterranean,  as  well  as  to  a  con-
ve~tion relating  to  the  chemical  pol-
lutiOn  of  the  Rhine.  In  approving 
these  Commission  proposals,  the 
Council  recognized  that  environmen-
tal  problems  transcend  national,  and 
even  EC  boundaries,  and  that  at  the 
same time real  problems may  arise  if 
obligations  member  states  !Di.l}'  take 
within  the  framework  of  interna-
tional  conventions are not sufficiently 
coherent and  "harmonized."  Another 
proposal adopted by  the ministers on 
October  16  created  a  European  en-
vironmental  information  system, 
compatible  with  the  global  system 
currently  being  developed  by  the 
United Nations. 
One  important  item  on  which  the 
Council  did  not  reach  agreement  on 
October  16  was  a  Commission  pro-
posal  on  the  reduction  of  pollution 
caused  by  certain  dangerous  sub-
stances  discharged  into  the  Com-
munity's  waters.  The  area  covered 
by  the  draft  Council  decision  was 
the  whole  of  the  aquatic  environ-
ment  of  the  Community,  that  is  to 
say  inland  rivers  and  lakes,  coastal 
waters,  and  territorial  seas.  Within 
those  waters  member  states  were 
asked  to  eliminate  the  pollution  re-
sulting from  the discharge  of "black 
list"  substances.  The  black  list  pro-
posed  by  the  Commission  included 
,mercury  and  cadmium;  organohal-
ogen,  organophosphorous,  and  or-
ganostannic  compounds;  carcino-
genic  substances;  and  persistent  oils. 
The  Commission  proposed  a  con-
cre~e mechanism  for  eliminating pol-
l utwn  from  the  discharge  of  these 
"black Jist" substances: 
•  The  definition  on  a  Community 
basis  of  certain  maximum  "limit 
values"  to  be  fixed  by  the  toxicity, 
permanence,  and  bioaccumulative 
~haracter  of  the  substances,  taking 
mto  account the best  technical  means 
available  for  the  elimination  of such 
substances from a discharge. 
•  The  obligation  of  the  competent 
authorities  in  member  states  not  to 
exceed  these  Community limit values 
whenever  they  give  "consent"  to  a 
discharge.  (A  system  of  prior  con-
sent  to  any  discharge  was  a  funda-
mental aspect of this decision.) 
There was  also  in  the  proposal  a 
"gray  list"  of  substances,  including 
various  dangerous  metals  and  metal-
loids  (such as  arsenic, lead,  uranium, 
etc.),  biocides ·and  their  derivatives 
cyanides  and  fluorides,  etc.  In  re~ 
spect  to  gray list substances,  member 
states  would  undertake  to  lay  down 
individual  emission  standards  when-
ever they gave consent,  or  authoriza-
tion,  to  a  discharge. That individual 
emission  standard  must  itself  take 
into  account  relevant  water  qualitv 
objectives.  · 
Member  states  would  be  obliged 
to  transmit  their  pollution-reduction 
programs  for  gray  list  substances  to 
the  Commission.  The  Commission 
would  in  turn  undertake  a  regular 
"comparison"  of  these  programs,  in 
conjunction  with  the  member  states 
so  as  to ensure steady and rapid prog: 
ress  toward  attaining  the  stated 
objective  of  a  "severe  reduction"  of 
pollution. 
After a long and sometimes heated 
debate,  the  ministers  failed  to  agree 
on this  proposal.  The essential  prob-
lem  was  that  the  British,  who  fa-
vored an  approach to  water pollution 
based  on  the  setting  of  environmen-
tal  quality  objectives,  were  not  pre-
pared  to  accept  a  system  which 
sought  to  regulate  pollution  by  dis-
charges of black  list substances  pure-
ly  by  means  of  emission  standards. 
The Commission  was  given  the  task 
of working  out a  proposal  involving 
a  compromise  between  the  emission 
standards  approach  favored  by  the 
majority  and  the  quality  objective 
argument  maintained  by  the  United 
Kingdom. 
The  Commission's  subsequent 
proposal  was  that  the  Council 
would  lay  down  quality  objectives 
for  the  substances  covered  by  the 
proposal  as  well  as  emission  stand-
ards.  The latter  would  apply  except 
where  member  states  could  prove  to 
the  Commission,  on  the  basis  of an 
agreed  monitoring  procedure,  that 
the quality objectives were being met 
and  maintained. If quality  objectives 
could be  met or established,  then the 
emission  standards  would  come  into 
force. 
At  2  o'clock  in  the  morning  on 
December  9,  the  ministers  finally 
agreed  to  adopt  a  solution  along 
these  lines,  and  an  important  road-
block in the way of the Community's 
environment  policy  was  removed. 
Work  is  now  going  ahead  on  the 
completion  of  the  first  environment 
program, while a start is  being made 
on  certain  actions  in  the  second  pro-
gram  already  approved  in  broad 
terms by the EC Council. 
EDUCATION 
HYWEL CERI JONES, head of 
the Commission's division on youth 
education 
The activities  of the European  Com-
munities have been  extended  into  an 
important new field  by  the EC Coun-
cil  of Ministers'  adoption  in  Decem-
ber  of  a  first  action  program  in 
education.  A  permanent  education 
committee  has  been  set  up  to  co-
ordinate  and  oversee  the  implemen-
tation  of  the  program  and  to  pre-
pare  discussions  on  future  develop-
ments.  Prior  to  the  adoption  of the 
action  program,  educational  coopera-
tion  in  the  Community  was  largely 
a  matter  for  intergovernmental 
agreement. 
The  European  Parliament  in  par-
ticular,  however,  has  been  pressing 
for  much  closer  integration  of  the 
education systems both as  a means of 
enabling  greater  mobility  between 
member  states  and  as  an  important 
element  in  "European  Union."  In 
his  report  on  the  latter,  Belgian 
Prime  Minister  Leo  Tindemans  re-
cently  emphasized  the  importance  of 
education  in  building  an  integrated 
Europe.  The  solutions  adopted  have 
to  be  pragmatic.  They  have  to  take 
account  of  structures  which  are  at 
present  diverse,  and  they  have  to 
deal  with the urgent problems facing 
the  Community.  One  such  problem 
is unemployment. 
In  the  action  program  special 
priority  has  therefore  been  given  to 
the  preparation  of  an  urgent  report 
by  July  1  on  the  transition  from 
study to working life, with particular 
reference  to  the  problem  of  unem-
ployment  among  young  people. 
Ministers  asked  that  the  report 
should set out measures which might 
be  taken  in  order  to  facilitate  the 
transition  from  study  to  employment 
and  to  improve  the  chances  of 
school-leavers  finding  work.  The 
Commission  is  setting  up  a  small, 
high-level  group  of  experts  to  pre-
pare this report. 
The  action  program  identifies,  in 
addition,  six  main  areas  in  which 
the  adoption  of  measures  at  Com-
munity level are of importance: 
1.  Measures  to  improve  the  living 
and  working  conditions  of  migrants 
and  their  families  are  recognized  as 
urgent.  Education  is  a  key  compo-
nent  in  the  Community's  approach 
to  the  problems.  Ministers  pledged 
their  agreement  to  take  measures  in 
each  member  state  to  improve  the 
reception  facilities  for  the  children 
of  migrant  workers.  The  ministers' 
agreement  to  take  action  in  each  of 
their  own  countries,  complementary 
to  the  action  at  Community  level, 
holds  out  much  brighter  prospects 
for  the  future  of  nearly  2  million 
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asked  the  Commission  to  undertake 
a  series  of  special  pilot  plans  and 
studies  to  provide better information 
about  the  current  organization  of 
special  teaching  and  teacher-training 
arrangements. 
2.  To enable  the education  sector  to 
make  a  full  contribution  to  the 
Community's  development,  the  min-
isters  committed  themselves  to  a 
much  more intensive exchange of in-
formation  and  comparison  of  poli-
cies  and  experiences  in  each  member 
state.  Study visits  for  local,  regional, 
and  national  administrators  will  bt: 
organized.  They  also  undertook  to 
give a  boost  to  the European dimen-
sion  in  teaching  and learning.  Mem-
ber  states  will  organize  short  study 
visits  and exchanges for  teachers  and 
pupils and  have agreed to  strengthen 
national  advisory  services  involved 
in  mobility  and exchange.  The latter 
is  also  an  important  element  in  the 
Tindemans  strategy  for  European 
union. 
3.  In the field  of documentation  and 
statistics,  the  EC  Statistical  Offic<:: 





Ortoli Visits US, Canada 
The current state of US-EC  relations 
is  good,  said  Commission  President 
Fran~ois-Xavier Ortoli after February 
2·4  meetings in Washington with Pres-
ident Gerald R.  Ford, Treasury Secre-
tary  William  E.  Simon,  and  Federal 
Reserve  Board  Chairman  Arthur  F. 
Burns. 
Ortoli's Washington visit came im-
mediately  after  a  trip  to  Ottawa, 
where  he  met  with  Canadian  Prime 
Minister  Pierre  Elliott  Trudeau  and 
discussed  the  proposed  EC-Canadian 
economic and commercial cooperation 
agreement. 
At a Washington press conference, 
available  on  education,  and  th<:: 
member  states  are  to  try  out  the 
procedures  involved  in  the  compu-
terized  European  documentation  sys-
tem  for  education,  which  was  origi-
nally  developc.:d  by  the  Council  of 
Europe. 
4.  In  higher  education  a  number  of 
measures- will  be  taken  to  promot<: 
cooperation  among  institutions. 
These will  inc! ude  the  strenght<::ning 
of  links  with  and  between  organiza-
tions  representing  higher  educ1tion 
institutions,  the  organization  of 
short  study  visits  for  teaching  and 
administrative  staff  and  for  research-
ers,  and  the promotion  of  joint pro-
grams  of  study  or  research  among 
institutions  in  several  member  states. 
The emphasis  is  on  assisting  the  in-
stitutions  to  develop  and  strengthen 
links  and  JOint  activities  among 
themselves.  Ministers  were also  con-
cerned  about  problems  now  being 
encountered in several  member states 
arising out of current policies  of ad-
missions  to  institutions  of  higher 
education,  and  agreed  to  arrange  a 
discussion  involving  representativt:s 
of  higher  education  institutions 
Ortoli noted: During the last 10 years 
Canadian  exports  to  the  Community 
have in  fact  decreased,  as  has  the re-
verse  trade  flow.  The  proposed  EC-
Canadian  economic  and  commercial 
cooperation  agreement  is  not a  pref-
erential  trade  pact.  Canada,  whose 
number one trade partner remains the 
United States, in diversifying its trade 
is  looking not only to the Atlantic but 
the Pacific as well. 
EC-Portugal Negotiations 
Negotiations  for  the  extension  of 
the existing free  trade agreement  be-
tween  Portugal  and  the  European 
Community  got  underway  February 
13  in Brussels. 
The  new  agreement  will  cover 
trade,  industrial,  technical,  and  fi-
nancial  cooperation,  labor  problems, 
and  social  security.  The  Portuguese 
are  specifically  asking  for  supple-
mentary concessions  for  their exports 
of  textiles,  wine,  paper,  and  certain 
fish products. 
. The  present  EC-Portugal  agree-
ment,  which  came  into  force  on 
January  1,  1973,  provides  for  the 
progressive  dismantling  of  customs 
duties  on  industrial  products  be-
tween  the  two,  as  well  as  easier  ac-
cess  to  the  Community  market  for 
certain  Portuguese  agricultural  pro-
ducts. 
The  negotiations  will  also  cover 
the  establishment  of  a  new  EC-Por-
tugal  financial  protocol,  to  replace 
the  temporary  measures  now  in  ef-
fect.  These  measures  take  the  form 
of  180  million  units  of  account 
(UA)  in  European  Investment  Bank 
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about these problems. 
S.  The teaching of foreign  languages 
was  regarded  as  a  vital  area  since  it 
provides one of the essential  tools  to 
European  integration,  namely  the 
ability  for  every  citizen  of the  Com-
munity  to  communicate.  Ministers 
have  agreed  to  pursue the  following 
objectives: 
•  offering all  pupils the opportunity 
of  learning  at  least  one  other  Com-
munity language; 
•  the  principle  that,  before  qualify-
ing  as  a  foreign  language  teacher,  a 
student  should  have  spent  a  period 
in  a  country  or  region  where  the 
language he is to teach is spoken; 
•  the  promotion  (e.g.  on  radio  and 
television)  of language teaching out-
side  the traditional  school  system,  in 
particular  to  meet  the  vocational 
training requirements of adults. 
6.  The final  area  of  action  concerns 
the equality of opportunity of access 
to  education  at  all  levels.  Ministers 
called  for  an  exchange  of views  and 
experience  on  concepts  and  trends 
at Community level  in order to  iden-
tify  specific  areas  for  joint  action. 
loans.  The  aid  was  g1ven  with  the 
stipulation  that  that  country  con-
tinue  on  its  path  toward  a  pluralist 
democracy.  (One  UA  equals  ap-
proximately $  1.16.) 
Canada-EC Pact Talks 
The go-ahead for the EC Commission 
to  negotiate the first  Community eco-
nomic  and  commercial  cooperation 
agreement,  which  will  be  with  Can-
ada,  was  given  by  EC  foreign  minis-
ters  at  their meeting in  Brussels  Feb-
ruary 9. 
The terms  of the negotiating man-
date  had  been  under  discussion  for 
over  six  months  and  had  been  held 
up  in  recent  weeks  by  disagreement 
over the extent of the commitment on 
access  to  Canadian  natural  resources 
which  should  be  sought.  Once  this 
had been  settled in the framework of 
the  International  Energy  Agency's 
long-term  cooperation  program,  in 
which  eight  EC  member  states  and 
Canada  (and most of the rest  of the 
industrialized world)  will participate, 
the way was clear for  the green light 
in Brussels. 
The  agreement  is  designed  to  put 
a  formal  stamp  on the  existing  close 
trade  relations  between  the  Commu-
nity and Canada and promote cooper-
ation  between  the  two  sides·  indus-
tries. 
Export Credits Negotiations 
The  EC  Commission  believes  the 
Community  should  partiCipate  as 
such  in  negotiation  of  a  "gentle-
man's  agreement"  on  export  credits 
The  exchange  of  views  will  focus 
initially  on  nursery  education  and 
its  link  to  primary  education,  and 
on  the  organization  of  secondary 
education. 
The  Commission  now  has  the 
task  of  implementing  the  program 
at  Community  level,  and  the  minis-
ters  will  meet  regularly  to  review 
progress  and  establish  future  guide-
lines.  The  program  represents  a 
major  development  in  a  number  of 
key  areas  in  education,  but  the 
fundamental  importance  lies  in  the 
political  commitment  of  the  govern-
ments  of the Nine to  include,  hence-
forward,  education  as  an  element  in 
its  own right within  the  Community 
framework. 
Taken  on  its  own,  the  education 
action  program  represents  a  signif-
icant  step  forward,  but  taken  in  the 
light  of  the  growing  importance  of 
the  European  Parliament,  which  has 
always  been  keenly  interested  in 
education  affairs,  and  in  the  context 
of  the  Tindemans  proposals,  it  as-
sumes  major  importance  in  the 
further development of the European 
Community. 
with the United States and Japan. 
Early this year the Commission in-
formed  the  Council  of  Ministers  of 
its  conclusions,  which were naturally 
influenced  by  the  recent  Court  of 
Justice  decision  that  the  field  of  ex-
port  credits  is  one  in  which  the 
Commission  has  absolute  jurisdic-
tion.  Negotiations  on  such  a  gentle-
man's  agreement  have  hitherto  been 
limited  to  several  member  states  act-
ing individually. 
The  Commission  suggests  that 
there  should  be  a  negotiated  Com-
munity  position  on  questions  such 
as  minimum interest rates  and  maxi-
mum  lengths  for  officially  supported 
export credits and related matters. 
The  point  of  reaching  agreement 
on export credit terms is  to  eliminate 
the  costs  of  continued-and  some-
times  cut-throat- competition  and  to 
eliminate  competitive  distortions 
among member states. 
AID 
Aid to Portugal Detailed 
Representatives  of  EC  member  state 
governments,  the  European  Invest-
ment  Bank,  and  the  EC  Commis-
sion  met with Portuguese officials  in 
January  for  the  first  session  of  the 
EC-Portugal  Joint  Commission,  cre-
ated  to  oversee  implementation  of 
the  emergency  aid  that  the  Commu-
nity  is  providing Portugal. 
Against  the  background  of  a  re-
/i port  on  the  present  economic  situa-
tion  in Portugal  and  the outlook for 
the  future,  there  was  discussion  of 
Portuguese  investment  plans  in  in-
dustry,  energy,  transport,  agriculture, 
tourism,  and  commerce.  A  group  of 
officials  from  the  European  Invest-
ment  Bank,  which  will  disburse  the 
aid  for  Portuguese  industry  on  be-
half  of  the  European  Community, 
has since been in Portugal to  make a 
thorough  technical  analysis  of poten-
tial  beneficiary projects. 
Fighting Foot and Mouth 
The EC Commission  has  made  350,-
000  doses  of  foot  and  mouth  vac-
cine available  to  the United  Nations 
Food  and  Agricultural  Organization 
(FAO)  to  help  fight  the  disease  in 
southeastern  Europe  (mainly  Greece 
and Turkey). 
The EC  action  thus  helps  prevent 
the  Asia  1 and  A  22  viruses  spread-
ing west  into  the  European  Commu-
nity,  where  they  would  pose  a  se-
rious  threat  to  Community  livestock. 
The vaccine  comes  from  stocks  set 
up in  1973  precisely  for  this kind of 
action.  To  date,  the  Community  has 
given  2,650,000  doses  of  vaccines, 
worth  526,500  units  of  account 
(UA),  to  FAO.  (One  UA  equals 
one  1970  dollar.) 
African Railway Helped 
Along  with  the  Congolese  Govern-
ment,  the  World  Bank,  the  African 
Development  Bank,  the  Arab  Bank 
for  Economic  Development  in  Afri-
ca,  and  bilateral  contributions  from 
Canada and France,  the Community's 
European  Development  Fund  is  to 
provide  financial  support  for  a  proj-
ect  to  modernize  over  50  miles  of 
railway  line  in  the  People's  Repub-
1  ic  of Congo. 
The  line  runs  between  the  towns 
of  Holle  and  Loubomo  in  the  Con-
go,  a  vital  stretch  of  the  Congo-
Ocean  railway  from  Pointe  Noire 
to  Brazzaville,  which  cannot  cope 
with  current  levels  of  traffic.  The 
line  provides  access  to  the  sea  for 
Chad,  the  Central  African  Republic, 
as  well  as  the  People's  Republic  of 
Congo  itself.  It  is  also  used  by  Ga-
bon.  Saturation point will  be  reached 
within  two  or  three  years. 
The  Community's  contribution, 
which  will  be  half  grant  and  half 
loan  for  40  years  at  1  per cent with 
a  ten-year  grace  period,  is  to  be 
7.238 million units of account (UA). 
EC Aid to Guatemala 
One  third  of  the  European  Commu-
nity's emergency aid budget for  1976 
-200,000 units  of account  (UA)-
has  been  allocated  to  Guatemala  to 
purchase  blankets,  tents,  medicine, 
etc.  for the victims of the Guatemalan 
earthquakes.  (One  UA  equals  one 
1970 dollar.) 
ECONOMY 
Youth Unemployment Rising 
The number of young persons unem-
ployed  in  the  Community  has  in-
creased  alarmingly  in  recent  years, 
according  to  figures  released  by  the 
EC Commission, and the time it takes 
to  find  a  job is  growing. 
In  Belgium  the  number  of  young 
people  under  25-years-old  looking 
for  a  job  rose  from  14,500  in  mid-
1973  to  over  89,000  at  the  end  of 
last year;  in  Germany the level  went 
from  51,000  at  the  end  of  1973  to 
287,000  at  the end of last year.  And 
in the Netherlands it  has  risen  from 
27,000 to  87,000 in the same period. 
These are the countries for which the 
most complete statistics are available, 
but the trend is  the same everywhere. 
Only  in  Belgium  has  the  percent-
age of those who take more than  six 
months  to  find  a  new  job  fallen-
from  40  per cent  to  39  per  cent.  In 
Germany  the  proportion  requiring 
more than six months has  risen  from 
13  per cent to  24 per cent;  in  France 
it  has  gone  from  19  per  cent  to  23 
per  cent;  in  the  Netherlands,  from 
12  per cent to 22  per cent; and in the 
United  Kingdom,  from  10  per  cent 
to  11  per cent. 
EC Steel Production Down 
Steel  production  was  down  19  per 
cent  in  the  European  Community  in 
1975.  While it  totaled  156,000  tons 
in  1974, it was down to  125,000 tons 
in 1975. 
The  only  increase  was  in  Den-
mark,  where  production,  which  is  a 
very  small  percentage  of  the  Com-
munity's  total.  went  up  by  3  per 
cent.  The  next  best  place,  relatively 
speaking.  was  Italy,  where  produc-
tion was down 8 per cent; then comes 
the  United  Kingdom.  where  produc-
tion  was  down  11  per cent,  and  the 
Netherlands.  where  it  was  down  17 
per  cent. 
In  France  it  dropped  by  one  fifth 
exactly,  and  in  Germany,  the  Euro-
pean  Community's  leading  producer, 
it  w:1s  down  24  per  cent.  In  both 
Bel:~ium and Luxembourg production 
fell  by  28  per cent. 
And in Ireland, where it was down 
by  one  quarter  last  year,  it  has  now 
heen  halted  completely.  Production 
forecasts  elsewhere  show  I ittle  sign 
of improvement. 
Optimistic EC Businessmen 
Things are  looking up  economically: 
On  that  businessmen  in  the  Euro-
pean Community surveyed  by  the EC 
Commission  last  autumn  agree,  but 
their  optimism  is  cautious. 
Order books  are still  not as  full  as 
they  ought to  be  and  there  is  a  fear 
that  restocking.  not  resurgent  de-
mand,  is  the  main  reason  for  the  to  29  cooperation  agreements. 
slight  recovery.  Order  books  are  The agreements involved nine Brit-
emptiest  in  the  textile,  paper  and  ish,  12  Belgian,  10  French  and  Ger-
board,  and  steel  industries;  and  the  man,  five  Dutch,  four  Italian,  one 
outlook  for  production  in  the  steel  Danish  and  Luxembourg,  and  no 
industry  is  the  worst,  although  Irish  firms. 
slightly  better  than  six  months  pre- 1\fechanical  engineering,  metal-
viously.  lurgy,  foodstuffs,  chemicals, and serv-
Not surprisingly, the main area for  ices are the most frequent sectors. On 
optimists  is  oiL  although  the  chemi- average the firms  brought together in 
cal  and  motor  industries'  executives  this way employ 250 people. 
are  also  becoming  less  gloomy  than  But the agreements are just the tip 
most.  of  the  iceberg.  Since  it  was  set  up, 
the center has  handled 2,2 59  requests 
Encouraging Trends Noted 
Industrial  recovery  in  the  European 
Community could be  in  the pipeline. 
The  most  recent  EC  figures  avail-
able  indicate  that  industrial  produc-
tion  started  upwards  again  in  Octo-
ber,  although  it  was  still  6  per cent 
below  the  level  of  October  1974. 
(The only  exception  is  Luxembourg, 
where falling  steel  production  black-
ens  the whole picture.) 
This  phenomenon  is  accompanied 
by  a  certain  stabilization  in  unem-
ployment.  In  the Netherlands  and  in 
Germany, there has been a very slight 
fall,  though  absolute  levels  are  still 
high.  And  in . some  countries  part-
time working  is  on the decline. 
At  the  same  time,  inflation  has 
settled  at  a  level  of  around  10  per 
cent annually-a figure now regarded 
as  encouraging,  whereas  a  few  years 
ago  it  would  have  been  considered 
frightening. 
Finally,  there  are  signs  that  the 
steady  deterioration  in  the  Commu-
nity's balance of trade position, which 
continued  through  October,  was 
halted in November as  imports started 
to  fall  and  export  growth  hastened. 
Minimum EC Steel Prices? 
The  Community's  steel  industry-
both  employers  and  unions-and the 
Community's  steel  consumers  have 
come out in  favor of minimum prices 
on the EC steel  market. 
In a vote in the European Coal and 
Steel  Cornmunity's  consultative  com-
mittee,  which  represents  these  three 
groups,  the  proposal  from  the  EC 
Commission  received  a  majority 
backing,  but  the margin  was  close---
~ 1 votes to  2 2,  with nine abstentions. 
That the steel  market  is  in  a  state of 
crisis,  none  disputed;  but  whether 
minimum  prices  were  the  right  an-
swer-particularly  this  late  in  the 
day---was  doubted  in  some  quarters. 
The  next  step  is  to  consult  the 
member  states'  experts,  and  then  the 
whole  n1:1tter  could  be  raised  in  the 
Council  of Ministers. 
Wedding Bells For Business 
Since  it  was  set  up  two  and  a  half 
years  ago,  the  Commission's  Euro-
pean  Business  Center  for  industrial 
cooperation  has  acted  as  godfather 
for  information. 
Familiarly  the  center  is  known  as 
the EC "marriage bureau,"  though  it 
stresses  that its  goal  is  not marriages 
in  the form  of mergers  but  introduc-
ing  friends  to  bring  about  transna-
tional  cooperation. 
Uneven Economic Forecast 
Three  per  cent  growth  in  1976  is 
the EC Commission's latest economic 
forecast. 
While modest  in  terms  of growth 
rates of a  few years  ago,  it  is  a  con-
siderable  improvement  on  the  2.5 
negative  growth  rate  expected  for 
1975  when  the final  calculations  are 
made. 
Not  all  the  indicators  are  bright, 
however,  according  to  the  Commis-
sion's  December  report  on  the  eco-
nomic  situation:  Unemployment  is 
still  at  5 million,  and the fall  in  the 
rate of inflation does not appear to be 
continuing. 
Moreover, the rate of improvement 
from  country  to  country  is  still  very 
variable-with  Germany  and  France 
performing  best.  Extreme  flexibility 
in economic policy-making is  advised, 
with  stimulants  concentrating  on  la-
bor-intensive sectors  such  as  employ-
ment. 
AGRICULTURE 
Too Few EC Potatoes 
The  18  per  cent  customs  duty  nor-
mally charged on imports of potatoes 
has  been  suspended  until  the  end  of 
March  by  the  EC  Council  of Minis-
ters,  in  an  attempt  to  alleviate  the 
shortage of potatoes  in  the European 
Community. 
The Council  of Ministers  has  also 
imposed an export tax of  25  units of 
account  (UA)  on each  100 kilograms 
of  potatoes.  (One  UA  equals  one 
1970  dollar.)  The tax applies to  po-
tatoes  for  processing,  as  well  as  to 
certain potato plants exported to third 
countries, and is valid until June 30. 
This year's crop is  only 80 per cent 
of  the  average  annual  crop,  and 
prices  have  rocketed  in  a  number of 
countries.  Belgium,  for example,  was 
forced  to  resuscitate wartime laws on 
hoarding. 
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ucts for which there is  not a common 
market  organization  as  part  of  the 
Community's  common  agricultural 
policy,  but  the  EC  Commission  has 
recently  put forward  proposals  to  ra-
tionalize  production  and  encourage 
producer groups in the Community as 
a whole. 
Since  there  is  no  common  market 
for potatoes, member states are free to 
impose  more  restrictive  measures  on 
their potato exports to third countries. 
Subsidizing EC Beekeepers 
The  high  cost  of  sugar,  the  ending 
of the denaturing premium for  mak-
ing  sugar  suitable  for  feeding  bees, 
bad weather last spring, and pollution 
caused  by  pesticides-all  have  com-
bined  to  threaten  the  Community's 
beekeeping sector. 
Thus the EC  Commission  has  pro-
posed  that beekeepers  benefit  from  a 
total  subsidy  of  9  million  units  of 
account  (UA)  over  the  next  three 
years.  Half  the  cost  would  be  met 
from  the  Community  budget.  The 
money  would  be  used  to  provide  a 
subsidy  of  UA  12  per  hive.  (One 
UA  equals  one  1970  dollar.) 
Scrutinizing Wine Measures 
Two  national  measures  on  the  wine 
front  have  raised  eyebrows  in  the 
EC  Commission  and thus  have  come 
under careful scrutiny at a time when 
the Community's wine lake  is  a  sen-
sitive political  issue. 
One  national  measure  is  the  dou-
bling of excise  taxes  on  wine  in  the 
Benelux-hardly likely  to  boost  con-
sumption  of the surplus and  directly 
contrary to  what the Commission has 
recommended  even  if  Benelux  ex-
cise  levels  will  remain  far  below 
those  of  countries  like  Britain  and 
Ireland. 
The other is  the creation  of a  na-
tional  wine  office  by  the  French 
Government.  The  Commission  will 
watch  closely  to  see  that this  office's 
powers  do  not  impinge  on  its  own 
jurisdiction. The office  is  in response 
to  pressure from  French winegrowers 
who  feel  that  the  border  tax  on 
Italian  wine  imports  introduced  last 
September  (declared  illegal  by  the 
Commission,  which  is  taking  France 
to  the  Court  of  Justice)  has  been 
ineffective. 
A  new  attempt  to  settle  the 
Franco-Italian  dispute  and  to  agree 
on  the  conditions  for  overall  reform 
of the wine market during the Janu-
ary  19-20  Agriculture  Council  was 
abortive. 
EC Farm Productivity Rises 
Although the number  of people em-
ployed  in  agriculture  in  the  Euro-
pean  Community  is  falling  steadily, 
production and productivity continue 
to  climb-by  2  per  cent  a  year,  ac-
cording to  the EC  Commission's  re-
port on the situation in  1975,  which 
was no exception to the general  rule. 
The amount of farmed land is  also 
falling. The increase in farm incomes 
varied considerably in  1975:  In some 
countries  it  exceeded  industrial  in-
creases  and  inflation  rates;  in  others 
it  fell  well  below. 
The Commission estimates  that in-
comes rose by  30-35  per cent in  1975 
in Ireland, by  15  per cent or more in 
the  Netherlands  (except  for  arable 
farmers  who  did  far  less  well),  by 
15  per  cent  in  Italy,  by  10-15  per 
cent  in  Denmark,  by  8.1  per  cent 
in  Luxembourg,  by  7-8  per  cent  in 
Germany,  and  6-7  per  cent  in  Bel-
gium.  In  France,  however,  incomes 
are  thought  to  have  dropped  by  1.8 
per  cent.  No  figures  were  available 
for  the  United  Kingdom. 
Wine Harvest Down, But High 
Total production of wine in the Com-
munity  from  the  1975  harvest  is  ex-
pected  to  be well  down on  last year; 
but there is  no  fear  of shortage. 
On  the  contrary,  the  experts  wel-
come  the  drop  in  the  hope  that  it 
will  help stabilize the market,  which 
was severely disrupted after the 1973 
and  1974  bumper  crops.  These  sur-
pluses were the indirect cause  of the 
so-called  "wine war" between France 
and Italy,  about which  the European 
Court of Justice has  been  called  up-
on  to  decide  the  rights  and  wrongs. 
Per  capita  consumption  is  likely 
to  be  down  only  one I iter  to  51;  it 
is  still  three  liters  more  than  two 
years  ago.  The drop  in  total  produc-
tion  is  expected  to  be  18  million 
hectoliters,  down  to  142  million. 
ENVIRONMENT 
Banning Pollution at Sea 
A  ban  on deliberate dumping of cer-
tain  highly  pollutant  wastes  at  sea 
by  ships,  aircraft,  hovercraft,  and 
oil  rigs has  been proposed by  the EC 
Commission. 
The  Commission  wants  total 
prohibition  of  dumping  of  organo-
halogenic  compounds,  organosilicon 
compounds,  mercury,  cadmium,  per-
sistent  plastics,  crude oil,  radioactive 
wastes,  acids  and  alkalis  from  the 
titanium  and  aluminum  industries, 
and  materials  produced  for  biologi-
cal  and chemical  warfare. 
The  Commission  also  suggests 
that  dumping  of  a  number  of  other 
harmful  substances  be  subject  to  is-
sue  of  a  licence.  These  products  in-
clude  arsenic,  lead,  copper,  zinc, 
chrome,  nickel,  vanadium,  cyanides 
and  fluorides,  pesticides,  and  bulky 
waste. 
The  proposal  is  along  the  same 
lines  as  the  Oslo  Convention,  gov-
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erning the North Sea  and  the  north-
east  Atlantic,  and  the  London  Con-
vention,  governing  all  international 
waters,  and  the  Barcelona  Conven-
tion  on  the  Mediterranean,  currently 
under negotiation. 
Sulphur Dioxide Controls 
In  order  to  control  sulphur  dioxide 
pollution  in  the  Community's 
atmosphere,  the  EC  Commission  has 
proposed  that  the Council  of  Minis-
ters  designate  special  protection 
zones  in  which  the  amount  of 
sulphur  compounds  m  fuel  oils 
would be restricted. 
The Commission  suggests  keeping 
the  amount of sulphur  by  weight  in 
fuel  oil  down  to  2  per  cent  from 
June 1,  1978, and to  1 per cent from 
June  1,  1983.  Exceptions  would  be 
allowed  if  a  country  is  experiencing 
oil supply difficulties. 
HARMONIZATION 
EC Timing Daylight Time 
The  EC  Commission  is  proposing 
that  those  EC  member  states  which 
have  daylight  savings  time  should 
agree  on  a  coherent  approach  which 
involves  changing  the  clocks  at  the 
same day and the same time. 
But  the  Commission  has  with-
drawn a proposal  for  every  EC coun-
try  to  move  to  the  use  of  daylight 
savings  time,  in  the  face  of  opposi-
tion  from  some  member  states,  no-
tably  Germany,  which  does  not want 
to  be  on  a  different  time  from  the 
German Democratic Republic. 
This  year  daylight  savings  time 
will  be  applied  in  the  United  King-
dom,  Ireland,  Italy,  and,  for  the first 
time,  France.  Next  year  Belgium 
plans to follow suit. 
The  Commission  thinks  daylight 
savings  time  should  stretch  over  a 
six  and  a  half  month  period  from 
April  3 to October  16  in  1977,  from 
April  2  to  October  15  in  1978  and 
from  April  to  October  14  in  1979, 
and  the  change  be  made  at  01.00 
GMT on Sunday. 
Post Office Consortium 
A  meeting  of  a  consortium  of  the 
nine  post  office  authorities  in  the 
European  Community,  in  Paris  on 
February  6,  marked  the  first  con-
crete  realization  of  the  framework 
agreement  concluded  last  December 
between  the  EC  Commission  and 
this consortium. 
The consortium  is  intended  to  set 
up  and  manage  the  first  European 
data  transmission  network,  to  be 
known  as  "Euronet."  Euronet  is  de-
signed  to  meet  the  scientific  and 
technical  information  needs  of 
around  700  research  centers,  high-
technology  companies,  and  govern-
ment bodies. 
Euronet  should  be  operational  in 
June  1977.  The  information  it  sup-
plies  will  cover  the fields  of chemis-
try,  aerospace,  energy,  nuclear  ener-
gy,  metallurgy,  medicine,  agricul-
ture, economics, statistics, and law. 
Common Securities Market 
There  is  a  new  Commission  pro-
posal  on  common,  minimum  rules 
which  companies  would  be  required 
to  observe when they  seek  admission 
to  stock  exchanges  throughout  the 
European Community. 
The  proposal,  marking  a  small 
move  forward  towards  a  common 
securities  market  in  the  Community, 
is  designed  to  give  the  investor  uni-
form  protection  by  ensuring that cer-
tain  standard  information  is  avail-
able to him everywhere. 
It  is  the  logical  follow-up  to  the 
Commission's  first  proposal  in  this 
field,  which  was  on  the  information 
to  be  incorporated  in  prospectuses 
when  applying  for  stock  exchange 
quotation.  This  proposal  was  orig-
inally  made  in  1972  and  has  just 
been  modified  in  the  light  of  com-
ments  by  the  EC  Economic  and 
Social  Committee  and  the  European 
Parliament. 
In  both  areas  the  Commission  is 
also  suggesting  setting  up  "contact 
committees"  to  look  into  possible 
further progress,  so  that the diversity 
of  regulations  facing  the  company 
seeking  stock  exchange  quotation  is 
reduced. 
Pre-packed Goods Standards 
In  its  latest  move  to  bring  down 
artificial  trade  barriers  within  the 
European  Community,  the  Council 
of  Ministers  has  adopted  a  set  of 
common  standards  for  the  precondi-
tioning  in  bulk  or  volume  of  pre-
packed goods. 
The directive covers all  pre-packed 
goods,  except  liquids  used  in  food, 
which  are  already  covered  by  sepa-
rate legislation. 
The  new  directive,  which  should 
be  in  effect  throughout the European 
Community  by  1979  at  the  latest, 
sets  rules  on  how  to  label  the  mass 
or  volume,  on  providing  a  clear  in-
dication  of  the  name  of  the  packer, 
etc. 
Insurance Proposals Made 
Insurance  is  one of the  most hermit-
ically  compartmentalized  services  in 
the  European  Community-a  situa-
tion which the EC Commission aims 
to change. 
Its  latest  proposal  to  this  end  is 
that  large-scale  industrial  risks 
should  be  freed  from  the  obligation 
to  insure  nationally.  The  result,  if 
this  draft  directive  forwarded  to  the 
Council  of Ministers  in  late  Decem-her  is  adopted,  would  be  that  large 
companies  or  airlines,  for  example, 
which wished to  insure their  foreign 
holdings with  their own  national  in-
surance company could do so. 
Thus  they  could  probably  achieve 
economies  of  scale  and  savings  in 
administrative  costs,  plus  what  they 
think  is  better  and/  or  cheaper  pro-
tection  than  from  another  country's 
insurance company. 
INSTITUTIONS 
State of the Community 
In  the  annual  "state  of  the  Com-
munity"  report to  the European  Par-
liament on  February  10,  Commission 
President  Fran~ois-Xavier Ortoli  de-
fined  three  imperatives  for  the Com-
munity in the year  to  come-face up 
to  external  challenges,  make progress 
toward economic and monetary union, 
and  participate  fully  in  the  institu-
tional  debate on European Union. 
He struck a similar note in a speech 
to  the European  Congress,  organized 
by  the  European  Movement  the  pre-
vious weekend,  in  which he provided 
an  insight  into  his  own  view  of  Eu-
ropean  Union.  Its  goal,  he  said, 
should  be  to  finish  construction  of 
the  European  edifice  by  giving  the 
joint institutions more powers and in-
creasing  the  number  and  density  of 
common policies. 
In  particular  he  cited  transfer  of 
jurisdiction  for  foreign  pol icy,  more 
progress  to  economic  and  monetary 
union  while  taking  the  profound 
structural  divergences  in  the  Com-
munity  into  account,  greater political 
authority  for  the  Commission,  and 
finally  mobilization of political  forces 
in  member  states  for  direct  elections 
to  the European Parliament in  1978. 
If this  "mobilization"  takes  place 
and if  in  the meantime solidarity and 
common  action  have  been  strength-
ened  because  some  of  today's  major 
problems have been resolved,  then  in 
Ortoli's  view  a  decisive  step  will 
have  been  taken  in  reducing  the gap 
between  reality  and the ideal. 
Council Presidency Topics 
The  Luxembourg  presidency  of  the 
EC  Council  of  Ministers  expects 
three  political  topics  to  predominate 
in  its  term  in  office  from  January 
1  to  June  30-the  Conference  on 
International  Economic  Cooperation, 
preparation  of  the  convention  in-
troducing  direct  elections  to  the 
European  Parliament,  and  the  fol-
low-up  to  the  Tindemans  report  on 
European union. 
In  a  program  of  work  submitted 
to  the  first  meeting  of  EC  foreign 
ministers  in  January,  Luxembourg 
predicted  that  these  would  be  three 
issues  requiring  discussion  at  Euro-
pean  Council  (head of  government) 
level in March. 
Work on the Paris conference will 
require a  special  effort  by  the Coun-
cil  of Ministers "to shoulder authori-
tatively and successfully a  task which 
will  be  decisive  both  for  the  future 
of  Europe  and  for  that  of  interna-
tional economic relations." 
Outlining  the  many  successes  or 
areas  of  intense  activity  on  the  ex-
ternal  relations  front,  the  program 
goes  on  to  note  with  alarm  "the 
considerable  divergence  between  the 
drive  which  the  Community  shows 
in  its  external  relations  and  the 
lethargy  with  which  it  approaches 
internal matters." 
Luxembourg  Foreign  Minister 
Gaston  Thorn,  who  is  president  in 
office  of  the  EC  Council  of  Minis-
ters,  had  expressed  a  similar  preoc-
cupation  to  the European Parliament 
the previous week,  and he mentioned 
a  second  tripartite conference and re-
search policy as  internal priorities. 
ESC Gives Annual Report 
The European Community should aim 
to become the prototype of a new kind 
of society  more  in  keeping  with  the 
everyday  aspirations  of ordinary  peo-
ple in  Europe who are seeking a  bet-
ter  way  of  life  and  more  justice 
through reduction of inequality, writes 
EC  Economic  and  Social  Committee 
President  Henri  Canonge,  in  the lat-
est EC annual report. 
In this context he expects  the com-
mittee  to  make  a  positive  contribu-
tion  to  resolving  the  economic  and 
social  difficulties  that the Community 
is  currently  facing,  to  strengthen  its 
influence on general policy issues, and 
to  become more  integrated  in  EC de-
cision-making. 
MEMBER  STATES 
Pro-EC Opinion on Increase 
Except  in  Denmark,  the  European 
Community  is  becoming  increasingly 
popular in member states. 
The  latest  poll  of  Community 
opinion,  taken  last  autumn,  shows 
that  except  in  Denmark the majority 
now  favor  the  Common  Market.  In 
the  United  Kingdom  this  was  the 
first  time  the  50  per  cent  level  had 
been reached. 
The  number  of  those  who  think 
progress  to  European  unification 
should  be  speeded  up  is  also  grow-
ing-just  over  ·40  per  cent  instead 
of  something  under  40  per  cent  in 
the  September  1973  poll.  Italy  and 
Luxembourg  are  the  most  "Euro-
pean"  countries,  Britain  and  Den-
mark the least. 
But  the  public  is  less  preoccupied 
with  the philosophical  side  of  Euro-
pean  integration-political  union,  a 
European  passport,  etc.-than  in  a 
common  fight  against  inflation,  pol-
lution,  and  abuses  against  consum-
ers,  coordinated  social  policies,  and 
narrowing  of  gaps  between  the  re-
gions. 
ENERGY 
Nuclear Pacts Given Go-ahead 
Two  related  decisions  authorizing 
agreements  in  the  nuclear  reprocess-
ing  sector  were  announced  this  win-
ter by the EC Commission. The Com-
mtsswn  acted  under  the  Rome 
Treaty's  Article  85,  which  severely 
restricts the scope for concerted  prac-
tices. 
One  agreement  involves  coordina-
tion  of  investment  plans  by  British 
Nuclear Fuels Ltd.,  the Commissariat 
a l'Energie  Atomique  Fran~ais,  and 
Kernbrennstoff-W iedera  ufarbeitunga-
gesellschaft.  The  three  had  agreed 
that KEW  A  will  not put into  use  the 
nuclear  fuel  reprocessing  plant  it  is 
planning  until  two  French  and  Eng-
lish  plants  have  reached  saturation 
point.  The  three  firms  are  also  set-
ting  up  a  joint  subsidiary,  United 
Reprocessors,  to  market  their  serv-
ices. 
The second  decision  authorizes the 
creation  of  KEW  A  by  Bayer, 
Hoechst,  Gelsenberg,  and  Nukem, 
which  will  then  each  have  an  indi-
rect  stake  in  United Reprocessors. 
The  Commission  has  given  its 
blessing  because  it  feels  the  agree-
ments  will  give  consumers  economic 
facilities  in  a  costly  high-technology 
sector.  Otherwise,  states  might  have 
to  intervene to  subsidize uneconomic 
national  facilities. 
EC Experimental Reactors 
Two  experimental  reactors-Cieo-
patra and Cabiria-are to  be  built at 
the Community's lspra Joint Research 
Center  in  Italy  by  Fiat  and  Proget-
tazioni  Meccaniche  Nucleari.  Con-
tracts  between  the  EC  Commission 
and  the  two  groups  were  signed 
February  2. 
The  circuits  will  be  built  on  the 
site of the Essor reactor, which is  cur-
rently  leased  out to  the  Italian  Gov-
ernment for  its  nuclear research  pro-
gram.  They  will  provide  small-scale 
reproductions  of  conditions  in  light 
and  boiling  water  reactors  with . a 
view to  evaluating  the  irradiation of 
fuel  and  the  effects  of fire. 
Torus Preference Cited 
Ispra in  Italy,  where there is  already 
a  branch  of  the  Community's  Joint 
Research  Center,  is  the  site  the  EC 
Commission  has  suggested  for  build-
ing the Joint European Torus  (JET). 
This  reactor  is  the  main  plank  of 
the  next  five-year  stage  in  the  Com-
munity's  thermonuclear  fusion  and 
plasma  physics  research  program,  an 
area  of  technology  in  which  the 
European  Community  is  a  world 
leader. 
Ispra  was  chosen  on  the  basis  of 
scientific  experts'  advice,  in  prefer-
ence to  Cadarache in  France,  Mol  in 
Belgium,  Culham  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  and  Garching  and  Julich 
in  Germany.  It came  out better over-
all  in  terms  of  technical  require-
ments,  support  facilities,  and  ability 
to attract good staff. 
Research Brings Questions 
The  European  Parliament's  energy, 
research,  and  technology  commit-
tee  wants  to  invite  British  Energy 
Minister  Anthony  Wedgwood  Benn 
to  explain  his  thinking  on  the 
Dragon  high-temperature  research 
project,  since  the  committee  feels 
that it  was  largely  as  a  result  of  his 
interventions  that  the  project  was 
dropped. 
The  committee's  chairman  takes 
the  view  that  the  decisions  on  such 
a  vital  issue  in  a  sector  of  such 
promise  for  security  of  energy  sup-
plies  were  taken  contrary  to  reali-
ties.  The  EC  Commissioner  respon-
sible,  Altiero  Spinelli,  told  the 
committee  that  internal  political  di-
vergences  were making  it  impossible 
for  the  EC  Council  of  Ministers  to 
give a  dynamic and rational  direction 
to  Community  research  and  that  this 
ought to  be  the  job  of an  independ-
ent body. 
Energy Consumption Drops 
The combined effect  of the  desire  to 
save  energy  since  the  oil  crisis  and 
the drop  in  energy requirements as  a 
result  of  the  recession  has  led  to 
steadily falling consumption through-
out  the  European  Community  (ex-
cept  for  two  instances  in  the  first 
quarter of last year  when there were 
small  increases  in  Denmark  and  the 
United Kingdom.) 
In  the  third  quarter  of  1975-the 
most  recent  date  for  which  statistics 
are available-consumption was down 
18  per  cent  in  Belgium  over  the 
same  period  the  previous  year 
(which  in  turn  was  down  18.3  per 
cent  on  the  previous  year's  level). 
In  Denmark  it  was  down  6.9  per 
cent,  in  Germany  6.4  per  cent,  in 
France 4  per cent  (first  quarter),  in 
Ireland  3  per  cent,  in  Italy  4.3  per 
cent,  in  the Netherlands  1. 7  per cent 
(first  quarter),  and  in  the  United 
Kingdom 2.9 per cent. 
Imports  of  crude  oil  are  in  con-
sequence  also  falling.  The  change 
ranges  from  a  2.3  per  cent  drop  in 
Denmark  to  a  20  per  cent  fall  in 
Italy. 
Despite  this,  total  energy  produc-
tion  is  up  8.2  per cent-mainly as  a 
result  of  greater  coal,  lignite,  and 
natural gas production. 
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European Community periodically lists books dealing with Com-
munity and Atlantic topics. Prices are also given when known. 
This presentation does not indicate approval or recommendation 
of these publications, which can be purchased or ordered from 
most booksellers. 
The European Community's Policy 
Towards Eastern Europe. By John 
and Pauline Pinder. Chatham House: 
PEP, London, 1975. PEP European 
Series No. 25. 45 pages with tables 
and notes. 
A summary and analysis of EC-
Eastern Europe economic relations. 
International Financial Markets: 
Development of the Present System 
and Future Prospects. By  Francis A. 
Lees and Maximo Eng. Praeger Pub-
lishers, New York, 1975. 5)8 pages 
with tables and references. 
A comprehensive survey of the 
evolution and conceptual framework 
of modern international financial 
markets. 
Enterprises a Caractere Juridique-
ment International. By Emmanuel 
Libbrecht. A. W. Sitjhoff, Leiden; In-
stitute Universitaire de Hautes Etudes 
Internationales, Geneva. 1972. 64 5 
pages with notes, index. and bibliog-
raphy. 
A study of eight ventures consti-
tuted on a legal  international basis. 
Among them are Eurofima, the Bank 
for International Settlements. and 
Eurocontrol. 
Foreign Disinvestment by US 
Multinational Corporations: With 
Eight Case Studies. By Roger L. 
Torneden, Praeger Publishers, New 
York, 1975. 157 pages with appen-
dix and bibliography. $15.00. 
An assessment of the importance 
or magnitude of disinvestment deci-
sions in the context of US business 
abroad and a description of the 
foreign disinvestment decision proc-
ess as  it exists in a number of US 
mul tina  tiona! corporations. 
Science Policies of Industrial Na-
tions: Case Studies of the United 
States, Soviet Union, United King-
dom, France, Japan, and Sweden. 
Edited by T. Dixon Long and Chris-
topher Wright. Praeger Pub! is hers, 
New York, 1975. 232 pages with 
bibliography and index. $17.50. 
Six case studies examining science 
policies, their background and im-
plications, in six industrial countries. 
Foreign Private Manufacturing In-
vestment and Multinational Cor-
porations: An Annotated Bibli-
ography.  By  Sanjaya  Lall. Praeger 
Publishers, New York,  1975. 196 
pages with index. $16.50. 
A bibliography that maps out the 
flood of writing, in English in 1965-
73, on all aspects of foreign invest-
ment. 
Management of the Multination-
als: Policies, Operations, and Re-
search. Edited by  S.  Prakash Sethi 
and Richard H. Holton. The Free 
Press, Macmillan Publishing Com-
pany, New York, 1974. 431 pages 
with notes and index. $14.95. 
Based on papers presented at the 
conference "New Perspectives in  In-
ternational Business"  (held by the 
School of Business Administration 
at the University of California at 
Berkeley), an examination of multi-
national corporations in a world of 
nation-states, organization and man-
agement, marketing management, in-
ternational accounting and informa-
tion systems, and research and analy-
sis in international business. 
Liquidity Creation and Distribu-
tion in the Eurocurrency Markets. 
By  John Hewson. Lexington Books, 
D.C. Heath and Company, Lexing-
ton, Massachusetts, 1975. 172 pages 
with bibliography and index. 
A discussion of Eurobanking 
operations and techniques and an 
analysis of the available data on ma-
turity transformation in the Euro-
currency markets and in selected 
domestic banking systems. 
The New Atlantic Challenge. 
Edited by  Richard Mayne. A Halsted 
Press Book, John Wiley and Sons, 
New York, 1975. 376 pages with 
index. $17.95. 
Based on a symposium held in 
Amsterdam in  1973, an examination 
of the problems and economic is-
sues in an  interdependent world, the 
process of change in the field of 
security, and new perspectives in 
foreign policy. 
Industrial Development in Europe. 
By  Bernard Brown. Unipub, New 
York, 1974. 327 pages with figures. 
$22.50. 
An economic analysis of the Euro-
pean Community and its member 
countries in mainly industrial terms, 
manpower resources, finance, re-
gional development incentives, and 
industrial bases. 
Business Atlas of Western Europe. 
Unipub, New York, 1974. 144 
pages, in English, French, German, 
and Italian, with tables, charts, maps, 
and graphs. $20.00. 
A guide to  16 West European 
countries, structured by  international 
businesses, regions, industry data, 
consumer standards, and statistical 
information. 
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Financing the European Communi-
ties. By Isaac E.  Druker. A.W. 
Sijthoff, Leyden, the Netherlands, 
1975. 445 pages with notes, bibli-
ography, tables, and indexes. 
An analysis of the problems re-
lating to revenue sources, parlia-
mentary control, public and financial 
administration, international law, 
and political science, with particular 
attention to institutional and other 
aspects affecting the integration proc-
ess among EC member states. 
The Enlargement of the European 
Communities. By J.P. Puissochet, 
A.W. Sijthoff, Leyden, the Nether-
lands,  1975. 454 pages with notes, 
bibliography, and index. 
A comprehensive examination of 
the accession of the United King-
dom, Ireland, and Denmark to the 
European Communities, by  a par-
ticipant in the enlargement negotia-
tions. 
Towards a Community Policy on 
Environment. Edited by  I.B.F. 
Kormoss. College of Europe pub-
lication, De Tempel, Tempelhof, 
Bruges, Belgium, 1975. 4-46 pages 
with list of colloquium participants. 
French/ English text. 
The report of the tenth session of 
the annual Bruges Week, dealing 
with the environmental aspect of 
European integration, in particular 
the impact of  production and con-
sumption on the environment, the 
utilization of space and the environ, 
ment, and the role of education and 
information in safeguarding the en-
vironment. 
Economic Analysis and the Multi-
national Enterprise. Edited by John 
H. Dunning. Praeger Publishers, 
New York, 1974. 405 pages with 
bibliography and indexes. $20.00. 
A collection of 14 essays on dif-
ferent areas of economic analysis and 
rriul tinational enterprises. 
The Energy Crisis and US Foreign 
Policy. Edited by Joseph S.  Szylio-
wicz and Bard E. O'Neil. Praeger 
Publishers, New York, 1975. 258 
pages with bibliography, tables, and 
index.  (paperback) $6.95. 
An analysis of the impact of the 
energy crisis, the economic dimen-
sions of the petroleum trade, reasons 
for the current crisis, regional polit-
ical relationships in the Middle 
East, US  relations with the Middle 
East, the Soviet Union, Western 
Europe, and Japan. 
The Information Seekers: An In-
ternational Study of Consumer 
Information and Advertising 
Image. By Hans B.  Thorelli, 
Helmut Becker, and Jack Engledow. 
Ballinger Publishing Company, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1975. 
3  73  pages with tables, bibliography, 
appendices, and index. 
A cross-cultural research study 
identifying the segment of consumer 
economies that insures the proper 
dissemination of market information, 
presenting a framework of basic 
consumer behavior principles, and 
comparing German and American 
consumer actions and attitudes. 
Free exhibit.r on the European Community are at'ailable on loan to univer.ri-
tie.r  . .rchool.r, libr,trie.r.  ci11ic organization.r. and other intae.rted groups. 
Shown here i.r  the mobile exhibit, mea.ruring ro-by-3  feet with headboard 
and light.r. Also a!'ailahle i.r  a tabletop exhibit. Both can  be ordered from 
the E~rop ean Community Information Sert'ice. ., 
Publications  Available 
Publications listed may be obtained from the European Com-
munity Information Service, Suite 707, 2100 M Street, NW, 
Washington DC 20037. Persons in the New York area can order 
copies from the European Community l11jormation Service, 277 
Park At•enue, New York City 10017. 
TAX POLICY AND INVEST-
MENT IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY. Taxation Serier No. 
r,  Commission of the European Com-
munities, Brussels,  1975, 484 pages 
--------------------·--·--·--··-------------------$20.00 
Study dercribing ,md an,dyzing l'dri-
ou.r  !<~X in.rtrument.r tt.red in e,tch  of 
the member .rtt~te.r to influence pritJ tlte 
illl'e.rtment.  Contdills ,"{  ch,tjJter relat-
illg efficiency indic<tlorJ of t<tx inrtrtt-
mentr to  CW!Wmic theory. 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE COMMUNITY COUN-
TRIES, 1974. Etudes et enquetes 
statistiques No. I, I975, Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg,  1975,  141  pages.  $5.00 
Summary report on research and de-
velopment appropriations by member 
state and by sector. Describes na-
tional, bilateral and multilateral ex-
penditures. 
NATIONAL ACCOUNTS YEAR-
BOOK 1974. Statistical Office  of the 
European Communities, Luxem-
bourg, 1975, 409 pages ---·-·--------$6.00 
Gives detailed data in national cur-
rencier  for  each  of the nine member 
states for the years I970 to  I972 and 
principal aggregates for I 960 to  I 97  3 
at current and I970 prices. 
DIRECTORY OF NON-GOVERN-
MENTAL AGRICULTURAL OR-
GANIZATIONS SET UP AT 
COMMUNITY LEVEL. Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 
Brussels, January 1974, 854 pages. 
------·----------------------···--·--------------···  $4.00 
4th edition of the directory. Contains 
information on all permanent groups 
representing the nine member coun-
try organizations at the Community 
level in the following sectors: agri-
cultural producers, agricultural co-
operatives, unions of workers in 
agriculture and the food industry, 
agricultural and food trades and in-
dustries. 
INVESTMENT IN THE COM-
MUNITY COAL MINING AND 
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRIES. 
Commission of the European Com-
munities, Luxembourg, September 
1975, 92 pages ------ ----------------···- $8.00 
Position as of January I, I 97  5 of the 
nine member states' coal, iron and 
steel industries. Covers production, 
capital expenditure and production 
potential for coal, coking coal plants, 
iron-ore, iron and steel industries. 
COMMON CUSTOMS TARIFF 
OF THE EUROP,EAN COMMUNI-
TIES. 0 fficial J oum.:d of the Euro-
{'ed/1  Communitie.r, Vol. 18, No. L 
.304/75, Office for Official Publica-
tions of the European Communities, 
Luxembourg, November 24,  1975. 
~ 70 pages ...................  ..$6.00 
Regulcttion  (EEC) No. jooo/7  5 of 
the Comzcil, of N ot'ember 17. 1975. 
oil the common wrtomr tm·iff. Sched-
ule of dutie.r for 1976 for goodr enter· 
i11g  the original six member rtate.r of 
the Community from  llOil·lltelllhcr 
culm  trier. 
ENERGY STATISTICS YEAR-
BOOK 1969-1973. Statistical Office 
of the  European  Communities,  Lux-
embourg,  1974, 297 pages ........ $5.00 
A  survey of energy economics for the 
member states and the Community as 
a whole. Part one gives basic data for 
the energy sector and overall energy 
balance-sheets. The second part lists 
balance-sheets and additional statistics 
for eac.h  source of energy, including 




TIONS, TOURISM 1972-1973. Sta-
tistical Office of the European Com-
munities, Luxembourg, 1975, 117 
pages  ···--··----·-·-··-····-----·····---···--··$4.00 
Transport statistics covering infra-
structure, equipment, employment, 
traffic and use for railroads, roads, 
interior and exterior navigation and 
air transport in the EC.  Include.r 
special surveys on road accidents, 
mileage by transport category, goods 
transported classified by type of mer-
chandise and transport category, and 
energy consumption for rail and road 
transport. Presents limited data on 
postal and telecommunications serv-
ices and tourism. 
A STUDY ON THE EVOLUTION 
OF CONCENTRATION IN THE 
IRISH FOOD INDUSTRY 1968-
1973. Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels, June 1975, 
107 pages .................................. $3.60 
Study Ot1 the structure, development 
and market of food manufacturing in-
dustry in Ireland. Appendices list 
foreign companies and their Irish 
subsidiaries as well as  Irish firms and 
groups, and data on the number of 
firms, turnover, net profits, captial, 
cash flow,  trade, salaries, and gross 
investment by product sector. 
People 
EC Commi.rsion Presidem Francoi.r-Xavier Ortoli (/eft) meets with US Presi-
dent Gerald R. Ford during Ortoli'  s February trip to Washington (see page 46). 
Secretary of State Henry A. KiJSinger (right)  pre.rents Jean Monnet, "the 
Father of Europe," with the Grenville Clark Award for "his contributions to 
world peace and stability." 
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